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 After the fall of communism in 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
began their transitions from communist strongholds to pillars of democracy. Each CEE country 
has undergone (or is in the process of undergoing) its own unique democratization process, but 
most have encountered a similar problem: eradicating the high levels of corruption that have 
become endemic within their institutions. Corruption can come in many forms. Transparency 
International, the leading global organization focused on combating corruption, identifies at least 
eighteen different forms of corruption on its website. Once corruption takes hold in an 
institution, it quickly spreads to another, and this pattern continues until it becomes widespread 
within a society. Literature on corruption is robust, and scholars have identified an extensive list 
of causes to explain how corruption can take root in a country’s institutions.  
While corruption is a global phenomenon and certainly is not unique to Central and 
Eastern Europe, it has become systemic in many CEE countries, causing the gradual weakening 
of the judiciary and rule of law. Transparency International ranks CEE countries among the most 
corrupt countries in the world. Many studies on corruption focus solely on countries that are 
developing or newer democracies. While it is true there are countries in the CEE region that can 
be classified as developing democracies, I chose this particular region because I am interested in 
examining corruption in post-communist societies. The beauty of the CEE region is found in its 
political and economic diversity. The countries of CEE have dramatically transformed since 
1989, and though no two countries are alike, the homogeneity across numerous variables 
commonly associated with high levels of judicial corruption makes this region particularly 
interesting to research.  
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This study seeks to evaluate causes of judicial corruption in two CEE countries, Albania 
and Romania, in an effort to better understand why and how judicial corruption can become 
rampant in certain political and economic climates. This study also attempts to extrapolate causes 
of judicial corruption at the regional level to account for the region’s high judicial corruption 
values on Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer.  
My project is qualitative in nature and uses case studies to examine causal mechanisms of 
judicial corruption in Albania and Romania. I use the method of process tracing to track three 
independent variables over the following time periods: 2000-2004; 2004-2008; 2008-2012; and 
2012- present. The three independent variables in this study are judicial independence, EU 
membership and candidacy status, and levels of media freedom. The two case studies featured in 
this project have roughly similar judicial corruption levels. Both can be classified as moderately 
to highly corrupt using Transparency International’s classification system. However, they do 
differ on certain political and economic variables, suggesting that there are causes that could be 
country-specific.  
Of particular interest in this study is the effect of EU membership and candidacy status 
on curbing judicial corruption levels. The effect of membership in global institutions on 
promoting democracy is a hotly debated topic in literature, and is particularly relevant today, as 
the European Union has come under attack in recent years by those who no longer believe the 
institution to be effective. A key tenant of democracy is upholding the rule of law and respecting 
the autonomy of the judiciary. An independent judiciary is vested with the proper authority to 
carry out its mandate, is free from politicization, and preferences upholding the rule of law over 
pursuing individual interests. Theoretically speaking, EU member and candidate countries should 
have lower levels of judicial corruption because they have underwent, or are in the process of 
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undergoing, the EU’s strict accession process. As a result, they have adopted numerous laws that 
are meant to promote a healthy democracy, a key component of which is an independent 
judiciary.  
Conditionality is the EU’s most powerful weapon, and over the years it has appeared to 
be losing its effect. Many CEE EU member countries have been accused of “democratic 
backsliding”—or the reversion to authoritarian tendencies and a disrespect for the rule of law. 
Romania, one of the case studies featured in this study, has followed this trend. Literature on this 
relationship will be explored in depth in the next chapter of this study, but the general consensus 
amongst scholars is that the effect of EU membership and candidacy status on curbing corruption 
levels is positive, but there are limitations to the extent of its effectiveness in different stages of 
the accession process (see Vachudova, 2009; Garbbe, 2014; Dimitrova, 2010). My findings 
support those of other scholars. First, I argue that the European Union is moderately effective in 
lowering judicial corruption levels in the early stages of accession, but is even more effective in 
lowering corruption levels once a country obtains candidacy status and gets closer to acceding to 
the Union. I also find that EU conditionality stagnates once a country accedes to the EU, as in 
Romania, because the “carrot” of membership status has been achieved and the “stick” is no 
longer effective in persuading political elites to continue reforms. Second, I make the case that 
the domestic context of the potential member country is important when discussing the effect of 
EU membership and candidacy status on lowering corruption levels. This study examines the 
influence of public opinion, the political will of the government to adopt EU reforms, and the 
possible influence of EU “enlargement fatigue”.  
Second, I examine the relationship between judicial independence and judicial corruption 
levels. Judicial independence, as previously stated, is a key tenant of a healthy judiciary. If a 
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judiciary is not autonomous from politicians, businessmen, or organized crime, then it is entirely 
likely that external actors will place undue pressure on judges and other important members of 
the judiciary. Due to the overarching nature of judicial independence, I have selected two 
variables to measure this concept: government system type and political competition. The effect 
of government system is heavily debated, and there does not seem to be a consensus in the 
literature about which type of government system (parliamentary, presidential, or semi-
presidential) is conducive to promoting low levels of judicial corruption. Literature slightly 
favors parliamentary systems, but my findings indicate that parliamentary systems are no better 
off at lowering judicial corruption levels than any other type of government system. In fact, 
Romania’s semi-presidential system posed similar problems to those identified with Albania’s 
parliamentary system. I found that what actually has the greatest effect on corruption levels is the 
distribution of powers between the president and prime minister. The more ambiguous the 
distribution of powers is between these two actors, the more likely it is that political elites 
attempt to consolidate power by using the judiciary as their pawn to further their political 
agendas. Additionally, I argue that higher levels of destabilizing political competition lead to 
higher levels of judicial corruption. I found that this was because, particularly in Romania, 
parties are not founded upon solid ideologies but are rather personality driven. As a result, they 
often engage in bitter political battles and attempt to undermine reform efforts so as to 
consolidate their power. Political elites in both countries also place an emphasis on furthering 
their own political interests over state building, which is consistent with other studies on post-
communist CEE states (see O’Dwyer, 2008; Gryzmala-Busse, 2002). 
Media freedom is a key tenant of democracy, and if not respected, can hinder the ability 
of the media to fulfill its role as a watchdog. My findings indicate that if a country has a low 
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level of media freedom, then it will have higher levels of judicial corruption. This is because 
journalists are either forced to self-censor, or their media outlets are politicized. A majority of 
the media outlets in Romania and Albania are owned either by political elites or businessmen 
with ties to politicians. Politicians also have a tendency to use the courts as their pawn in their 
fight against journalists.  
It is my hope that this study can provide a comprehensive understanding of how judicial 
corruption has become endemic in Romania and Albania. By using a case study methodology I 
can delve deep into the histories of these countries so as to produce a detailed narrative of their 
struggles with judicial corruption since 2000. The next chapter in this study will survey the dense 
literature available on causes of judicial corruption. First, I will discuss the causes of general 
corruption, as causes of judicial corruption are often closely tied to those of general corruption. 
Second, I will delve into causes that are specific to the judiciary. In the literature review chapter I 
also outline and justify my hypotheses. Chapter 2 will explain my methodology and case study 
justification. I will also operationalize my variables and define key concepts. Chapter 3 will 
focus on Albania’s judicial corruption woes from 2000 until present, and will include sections on 
all three independent variables with analyses for each. Chapter 4 focuses on the Romania case 
study. In Chapter 5, I will compare and contrast my findings and supply the implications of my 
findings for the broader CEE region. Finally, I conclude with closing remarks about judicial 







Chapter 1: Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
I. What is corruption?  
 
 Transparency International, the leading global anti-corruption organization, broadly 
defines corruption as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (2016). The organization 
identifies three classifications of corruption: grand corruption, petty corruption, and political 
corruption. Grand corruption occurs when individuals in high-level government positions abuse 
their power to “distort policies or the central functioning of the state, allowing leaders to benefit 
at the expense of the public good” (Transparency International, 2016). Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka emphasize that grand corruption primarily involves small groups of high-level “players” 
and trading of large sums of money (2016, 11). Petty corruption occurs at the low to mid-level 
ranks of public officials during their daily exchanges with citizens and involves abuses of power 
for personal gain (Transparency International, 2016). Political corruption, similar to grand 
corruption, involves high-level players in government. The key distinction between grand and 
political corruption, though, is that in addition to altering government policies, political 
corruption also alters a country’s institutions and its functionality for the personal gain of 
politicians or decision makers (Transparency International, 2016).  
 Rose-Ackerman and Palifka state that at the core of corruption is the inability to forgo 
pursuing self interests for “legitimate and productive purposes” (2016, 7).  In order to secure 
these self interests many government officials and politicians engage in different types of corrupt 
acts. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka identify the following as some of the most wide-spread forms 
of corruption: bribery, extortion, exchanging of favors, nepotism, cronyism, judicial fraud, 
accounting fraud, electoral fraud, public service fraud, embezzlement, kleptocracy, influence 
peddling, and conflicts of interests (2016, 8-9). For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant 
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corrupt acts pertaining to judicial corruption are bribery, extortion, exchanging of favors, judicial 
fraud, influence peddling, and conflicts of interest. Below are the definitions of the types of 
corruption, as defined by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, 8-9): 
Bribery: the bartering of money, gifts, or favors to obtain personal gain or influence.  
 
Extortion: occurs when an official asks for a bribe or favor in return for conducting a 
service.  
 
Judicial fraud: results in a decision that is based not on the “merits” of a case, but 
because of outside influence, such as bribery, extortion, exchange of favors, ect.  
 
Influence peddling: the misuse of one’s power or position to bribe or receive favors 
from influential people.  
 
Conflicts of interest: occurs when an official has personal connections to the decision or 
policy being decided on.   
 
Transparency International defines judicial corruption as “any inappropriate influence on the 
impartiality of the judicial process by any actor within the court system” (2007, xxi). The 
organization includes in its definition any acts that abuse public funds allocated to the judiciary, 
insufficient enforcement of judicial decisions, and the politicization of judicial appointments 
(2007, xxi-ii). Mary Noels- Pepys defines judicial corruption as the misuse of power for private 
gain, relating to “acts or omissions that constitute the use of public authority for the private 
benefit of court personnel, and results in the improper and unfair delivery of judicial decisions” 
(TI, 2007, 3).  
 Buscaglia identifies two types of judicial corruption: administrative and operational. 
Administrative corruption transpires when administrative employees of the courts breach 
procedural rules for personal gain (Buscaglia, 2001, 235). Operational corruption is primarily 
concerned with politically and economically driven court decisions by judges (Buscaglia, 2001, 
235).  Bucaglia also notes that operational corruption can occur between justice institutions—
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meaning that corrupt activities can take place “between” the courts and other institutions, 
including the police, prosecutors, and prisons (TI, 2007, 68). As can be seen, corruption is 
multifaceted in nature, and it is crucial to define the various components of general corruption 
before surveying the vast literature on corruption.  
II. Causes of Corruption and Judicial Corruption 
 Before delving into the various causes of corruption, it is important to note that many of 
the causes of general corruption are also causes of judicial corruption.  Often, once one sector of 
a country’s institutions becomes corrupt, corruption will spread to become endemic in other 
sectors. Therefore, it is also important to address the causes of general corruption in order to 
pinpoint why some countries are more prone to judicial corruption than others; one cannot 
address one without the other. Part II of the literature review will be broken up into two sections: 
causes of corruption and causes of judicial corruption.  
I. Causes of Corruption 
A. Electoral and Government Systems 
 
While there are many different types and variations of electoral systems, the general 
consensus amongst scholars is that the type of electoral system adopted by a country can play a 
role in curbing or enhancing corrupt activities. The electoral systems that will be discussed in 
this literature review are presidential, parliamentarian, proportional representation (PR), and 
majoritarian systems.  
A majority of scholars believe that closed-list PR systems are more likely to attract 
corrupt practices than open-list PR systems. Uslaner notes that closed-list PR systems “break 
down [the] system of direct constituency representation” in that it “disrupts the linkage between 
legislatures and their districts” (2008, 35). This is because the electorate cannot vote directly for 
a candidate, but instead must vote for a list of pre-chosen party candidates, which, Uslaner 
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argues, places too much power in the hands of party leaders (2008, 35). Party leaders can instead 
choose candidates for the ballot that they believe will fulfill the mandate of the party instead of 
those that are equipped to run for office. There is also a lack of accountability that is associated 
with closed-party PR lists because of the voting process. Closed-list PR systems can lessen the 
expectation that legislators must perform well in order to get re-elected, since candidates are 
placed on the ballot due to party loyalty and not past performance (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 
2016, 347). Whereas in an open-list PR system, the electorate votes for a party and then has the 
opportunity to rank candidates, taking control away from the party leaders (Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka, 2016, 347).  
In general, plurality systems are believed to be the most effective in decreasing 
corruption levels.  Plurality systems require that the electorate votes for a single candidate, and 
the candidate with the most votes wins (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 346). Rose-
Ackerman and Palifka state that in plurality systems, “party leadership does not have as much 
power over the individual legislators so the locus of rents is more evenly divided between the 
party leadership and individual legislators” (2016, 347). The authors also note that plurality 
systems are better for controlling rent-seeking because the monitoring system set in place is 
much more effective since leaders are held directly accountable to their constituents through the 
voting process (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 347). Tavares writes that this caveat of 
plurality systems is especially important for incumbents, who can often be in power for many 
years without any real political competition (2007, 1057).  
What remains unclear, however, is which system—parliamentary or presidential—fares 
better when tasked with deterring corrupt practices. The literature on this topic varies, and there 
are many studies that seem to advocate for both. Lambsdorff (2005, 23) notes that while previous 
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studies indicate presidential systems are less effective in curbing corruption, parliamentarian 
systems can actually prove to be ineffective as well if political parties are weak or unorganized. 
Therefore, in order to prove effective, parliamentary systems must have strong, organized 
political parties capable of generating competitive elections. In regards to the effect of 
parliamentary and presidential systems on the judiciary, both regime types can interfere with the 
independence of the judiciary. This occurs through overreaching mandates pertaining to the 
nomination of court judges, which can become politicized and can negatively impact the 
judiciary’s efficiency and independence—another sign of high judicial corruption levels. The 
degree of power granted to the Head of Government or Head of State in overseeing the judiciary 
can also affect corruption levels. See Part II, Section A of this literature review for more 
information regarding the politicization of the judiciary. Overall, it appears that closed-list PR 
systems are more effective in curbing corruption, while the type of government system can show 
to have mixed results. This will be crucial in the selection of case studies, as a majority of CEE 
countries have parliamentary systems, but there are some countries that are outliers.  
B. Growth Rates 
 Studies have shown that growth rates, measured in GDP/Capita, have an effect on 
corruption levels, but that the magnitude of the effect is multifaceted. In a study by Aidt, Dutta, 
and Senac, a relationship between regime type, growth rates, and corruption was found. The 
authors identified two types of regimes in their study: Regime G is a regime in which economic 
growth “can reduce corruption by improving the incentives of rulers…conversely the model also 
allows corruption to reduce growth” (2008, 197). The authors note that the relationship between 
corruption levels and growth rates is “self-reinforcing” and “endogenous”, meaning that high 
growth rates reduce corruption, which “in turn, enhances the growth performance of the 
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economy” (2008, 197). Regime B has ineffective and weak institutions where citizens lack 
control over their politicians, and thus corruption is rampant and “growth no longer has a benign 
impact on the level of corruption” (Aidt, Dutta, and Senac, 2008, 197). This study demonstrates 
that regime quality is important when discussing growth rates and corruption, and that “within a 
particular governance regime, economic growth and corruption are jointly determined and the 
corruption/growth relationship is regime specific” (Aidt, Dutta, and Senac, 2008, 209).  
Goel and Nelson (2010, 440) also conducted a comprehensive study that tested multiple 
variables on corruption, indicating that greater economic growth appears to decrease corruption 
levels. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, 33) note that growth as a result of corruption is 
destabilizing as well, particularly if it does not result in the growth of other sectors—such as 
education, health care, and public infrastructure. The authors argue that this type of corruption 
induced growth can also lead to volatile levels of inequality, which in turn become endemic and 
can decrease economic growth overall (2016, 33). Johnston (2005, 28) comments, “some 
countries remain poor because they are corrupt, but they may also have extensive corruption 
because they are poor.” 
However, the relationship between GDP/capita and corruption is not as clear-cut as it 
appears for some scholars. Most of the research on the relationship between these two variables 
indicates that there is a “mutual causality” between GDP and corruption levels (Ludic et al., 
2016, 362). There are outlier trends in the relationship between corruption levels and GDP per 
capita that make finding a clear relationship between the variables difficult. Ludic et al., state in 
their research: 
if we examine the relationship between perceived corruption level and economic growth 
rate across countries, we can see that growth rates diverge more for countries with high-
level corruption. In other words, while many highly corrupt countries have low economic 
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growth rates, there are countries that have achieved rapid economic growth under 
rampant governmental corruption. (2016, 364). 
 
The authors note that it is possible for countries with rampant corruption problems to experience 
unexplained economic growth over a span of time (Ludic et al., 2016, 364). A majority of the 
authors’ research is dedicated to determining if there is a certain time period in which corruption 
and GDP levels show causality (Ludic et al., 2016, 362). Their research indicated, “the mutual 
influences of corruption and GDP are most pronounced in the so called medium-term 
period…[at] six to ten years” (Ludic et al., 2016, 362). The authors state that this finding implies 
that when “you change one of these two indicators [GDP and corruption levels], it takes between 
six to ten years for this change to reflect the strongest effect on the change of the other indicator” 
(Ludic et al., 2016, 362). The findings of Ludic et al., are important for understanding why 
countries that have high levels of economic growth can still be relatively corrupt. These findings 
could help explain why certain EU member countries in the CEE region that are economically 
well-off can still struggle with high levels of judicial corruption. 
C.  European Union Leverage 
 Literature on the topic of EU leverage and corruption levels is extensive and robust. In 
general, the consensus amongst scholars on this complex relationship is that EU membership and 
candidacy status is effective in lowering corruption levels, but only under certain circumstances. 
Additionally, EU leverage over candidate countries appears to be the most effective during 
certain times throughout the long accession process. Overall, literature indicates that the 
secondary effects (or benefits) of EU membership can lower corruption levels, particularly 
through the creation of healthy economies and viable institutions. According to Vachudova, 
“liberalization of the economy, including privatization and the promotion of new small and 
medium enterprises, reduces the reach of state officials in the economy” (2009, 50). EU 
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membership also promotes the “reform of state institutions—including greater transparency and 
efficiency” which can “constrain the opportunities for corruption across different levels of 
government” (Vachudova, 2009, 50). Additionally, joining the European Union can also 
dramatically increases member countries’ growth rates (Vachudova, 2005, 70). If countries have 
greater growth rates, it in turn is correlated with lower corruption levels.  
The long-term implications of EU policy on maintaining low corruption levels and the 
implementation of reform are heavily debated. Some view the European Union as ineffective in 
lowering corruption levels in the long run because often implementation of European Union 
initiatives after adoption remains low. Vachudova (2005) distinguishes between the EU’s 
“active” and “passive” leverage over EU member states. The EU’s active leverage refers to the 
Union’s ability to not only ensure that candidate states fulfill the necessary EU requirements, but 
also to guarantee the effectiveness of reforms. Vachudova states that the active leverage of the 
EU is essential for maintaining reforms post-accession because “as candidates move through the 
pre-accession process towards membership, it becomes less likely that the polity will slide back 
by becoming less competitive or rolling back reform” (2005, 106). Also, the fact that EU 
conditionality acts as the enforcement mechanism for compliance ensures that countries failing 
to meet the EU’s standards will be prevented from reaching the next “carrot” of EU membership 
(Vachudova, 2005, 138). Thus countries have an incentive to demonstrate efforts at adopting 
reforms that can have positive effects on corruption levels, including those of the judiciary. 
While the minimal positive effects of EU membership and leverage cannot be denied, the 
consensus is that EU leverage is only effective in curbing corruption levels up until a country 
reaches a certain point in the accession process. The European Union begins implementing its 
conditionality policies with potential candidate countries to ensure that states adhere to the 
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Union’s strict policies. EU conditionality is believed to be a relatively successful tool for 
lowering corruption, as substantial policy and reform changes must be made so that a country 
can move on to the next “carrot”: beginning formal accession talks and setting a date for 
accession. However, it appears that once countries accede to the EU and the “carrot” is achieved, 
the power of EU leverage is limited, as “threats from the EU start to lose their power once the 
country gets into the Union because the strongest conditionality is attached to membership itself”  
(Garbbe, 2014, 42). Dimitrova would concur, stating that EU leverage is the most “successful in 
stimulating CEE states to introduce reforms while they were preparing for accession by setting 
reform objectives as conditions for membership” (2010, 137). Vachudova (2009, 60) explains 
that the application of EU leverage must be strategic and should be applied “well before 
accession…[as] experience suggests that once negotiations for membership have gained 
momentum, it is already too late to apply strong conditionality and/or turn back…”. 
Additionally, “rule adoption” is the strongest in candidate countries and then “expires” when 
countries accede to the EU (Dimitrova, 2010, 137-8). Often countries will renege on their 
commitments after accession, following three possible “outcomes”: full “reversal” of new rules, 
“institutionalization”—or as Dimitrova states, when “formal and informal rules align”, and, 
lastly, “empty shells” or when “actors ignore the new rules, [and] parallel informal rules are 
used” (2010, 146). 
Domestic factors often play a role in augmenting the effect of EU leverage on corruption 
levels. Borzel states that research on the effect of EU membership on the domestic climate is 
difficult to evaluate (2016, 79). Borzel notes that “EU conditionality has promoted 
democratization where the political costs for the incumbent were not prohibitive, threatening 
their political survival, and veto players were not powerful enough to block domestic reforms” 
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(2016, 79). When countries are conducting corruption reform, often there is political resistance 
from opposition parties that results in corruption reform being derailed. Borzel writes that EU 
conditionality and membership “may help buy off domestic veto players that bloc the domestic 
reforms the EU demands for the costs they incur” (2016, 79). Public opinion surrounding 
accession to the EU is also a critical component, as higher public approval for EU membership 
leads to better “traction” for EU accession as a “shared goal in society” (Garbbe, 2014, 44). 
Noutcheva and Aydin-Duzgit argue that the best results on corruption reform efforts take place 
when “the EU incentives for reform are aligned with the ruling elites’ domestic interests in the 
EU-advocated institutional and legislative changes…” and this when the most change in the rule 
of law occurs (2012, 62). There is difficulty in discerning whether or not EU membership can 
affect corruption levels, particularly in candidate countries, because if the political party in 
power is not fully behind reform then this may create “non-reform or patchy reform that amounts 
to marginal advances in the rule of law” (Noutcheva and Aydin-Duzgit, 2012, 62). In general, 
the effect of EU leverage on lowering corruption levels appears to depend heavily on domestic 
context. It will be important to account for the influence of domestic factors on overall EU 
conditionality in the case study chapters in order to get a clear picture of the dynamic 
relationship.  
II. Causes of Judicial Corruption 
A. Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence is an important variable that must be addressed in order to discern 
why certain countries’ judiciaries are more corrupt than others. A judiciary is described as being 
independent if it has full autonomy from a “central authority” (Priks, 2011, 77). This means that 
in many cases the judiciary is not politicized or under the influence of an outside institution, such 
	
21	
as the legislator or the executive. Rose-Ackerman and Palikfa (2016, 383) write that if a country 
has a truly functional, independent judiciary it can lead to higher levels of growth, lower 
corruption levels, increased protection of human rights, and more political freedom. An 
independent judiciary is also essential for checking the power of the state and “fraudulent private 
actors” who engage in rent-seeking (Rose-Ackerman, Transparency International, 2007, 16). 
Judicial independence encourages judges to be impartial so that they do not hand out judicial 
decisions that are biased or influenced by external actors, such as politicians or other actors 
within the judiciary.  
 One important aspect of judicial independence is ensuring that judicial appointments are 
merit based and not patronage based. If a judge is appointed solely to carry out the purposes of a 
politician or a political party, this could potentially politicize the judiciary and the decisions that 
it hands out. Transparency International in its 2007 Global Corruption Report on judicial 
corruption concluded that one of the most common issues seen in most countries with judicial 
corruption are improper judicial appointments (xxv).  Appointments of judges vary by country; 
however, it is necessary that a system of checks and balances be in place to guarantee that a 
politician or executive does not have control over the process in its entirety. Noel-Pepys points 
out that in many countries, the president or a body of individuals appoints and promotes judges 
without any restraints, including transparency of the selection process or eligibility requirements 
(Transparency International, 2007, 4). Hence, in order to safeguard the autonomy of the 
judiciary, an impartial body must act as a check on the power of the entity granted authority to 
nominate judges, otherwise judges will be subject to the control of politicians and have no 
incentive to uphold the law (Noel-Pepys, Transparency International, 2007, 4). However, too 
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much interference by the legislature in judicial appointments can also lead to a decrease in 
efficiency, as often opposition parties will block candidates out of political spite.  
 Worth mentioning is the dynamic relationship between political competition and judicial 
independence. A common concept that appears throughout literature on judicial independence is 
insurance theory, which postulates that politicians will uphold the autonomy of the judiciary 
because courts act as “potential insurance for politicians” (Randozzo et al., 2016, 584). Many 
scholars disregard this theory, though, advocating for different approaches to viewing this 
relationship. Aydin’s 2013 study on judicial independence and political competition argued that 
there is a difference in cost-benefit analyses of politicians seeking to undermine judicial 
autonomy in democratic and developing democracies (106). According to Aydin, politicians in 
developing countries, due to their “high levels of corruption, weak party systems and high 
electoral volatility”, could reap more “short-term benefits” from undermining judicial autonomy 
than they would “long-term benefits” amassed from “high levels of judicial independence” 
(2013, 107). Politicians in countries with high political competition are also tasked with the 
daunting task of being re-elected, thus having the judiciary in their pockets can help undermine 
the authority of the opposition while simultaneously allowing governing parties to carry out their 
political interests (Aydin, 2013, 111-12). Brown, Touchton, and Whitford (2011, 1524) note that 
veto players play an integral role in creating political polarization, which can negatively affect 
corruption perceptions. Scholars also believe that “larger numbers of viable political parties will 
possess higher levels of judicial independence...” (Randazzo et al., 2016, 589). Thus, a key 
aspect of political competition, in order to be considered healthy, is that parties must be viable 
and capable of setting comprehensive policy agendas.  
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 Finally, it is important to note that destabilizing, or “confrontational”, political 
competition can often play a role in inhibiting reform efforts in democratizing countries. This is 
because political elites often sabotage or undermine efforts at building strong institutions in order 
to consolidate their power. In Mavrikos-Adamou’s study on the rule of law and democratization 
in Albania, the author found that the “confrontational style of politics that permeates the 
parliament is largely due to the political parties, which are leader-dominated and which have 
created divisive party politics” (2014, 1162). This causes the minority party to block legislation, 
because its role in government has been “reduced” to being a veto player (Mavrikos-Adamou, 
2014, 1162). The author argues, “Indeed, political leaders play a decisive role in influencing the 
political environment within which democracy building takes place, and can either be supportive 
agents enhancing the development of democratic political institutions, or, contrarily, they can 
stifle their functionality” (2014, 1162). Furthermore, the author found that because Albania’s 
parties are not built heavily on ideologies, this leads to political elites answering political issues 
with “cronyism, nepotism and patron-clientelism, which continued unabated” (Mavrikos-
Adamaou, 2014, 1162). A similar finding was made in another post-communist country, 
Romania, as the country also lacks parties with strong ideological platforms, and thus politics is 
better “characterized by variable geometry alliances and, moreover, endemic and uncontrollable 
parliamentary migration” (Iancu, 2015, 154). 
 It is clear, then, that the dynamic relationship between politicians and judicial actors is 
extremely important when discussing judicial corruption levels. If countries do not have 
insulated judiciaries, it is more than likely that politicians will use the courts for personal gain. 
Political competition also appears to play an important role in stimulating political interests, 
which are often not conducive to ensuring the autonomy of the judiciary.  
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B. Judicial Salaries, Promotions, and Resource Investment 
 The failure of a state to adequately invest in the judicial sector is postulated to increase 
judicial corruption levels. Yang and Erichs state that if a judiciary is underfunded, judges will 
find alternate sources of monetary compensation, either through bribes or rent-seeking 
(Transparency International, 2007, 49). Promotions, including salary increases and added 
benefits, encourage judges to uphold the integrity of the law, as well as “attract and retain high-
quality and qualified candidates” (Yang and Erichs, 2007, 49). Yang and Erichs state, 
“establishing transparent, merit-based criteria for promotion helps to prevent career progression 
based on political affiliation or other inappropriate influence” (Transparency International, 2007, 
51). Rose-Ackerman and Palifka draw parallels between poorly paid judges and police, stating 
that when a country’s police force receives inadequate pay, it produces an “outsider mentality” 
because they feel disregarded by the state for their work so they augment their incomes with 
outside revenues from bribes (2016, 82). 
 If judges do not receive adequate pay corruption can be described as a “survival 
strategy”(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 169). However, Svensson notes that so-called 
“wage incentives” will only go so far in curbing corruption, arguing that the solution works only 
if two requirements are met: “the bribe being offered (or demanded) must not be a function of 
the official’s wage; and the cost of paying higher wages must not be too high” (2005, 33). Noel-
Pepys also states her doubts about the benefits of increasing the wages of judges, arguing, “even 
where incidents of illicit payments to judges have clearly been reduced, the public continues to 
believe that corruption persists at the same level” (TI, 2007, 6). She points to Georgia as an 
example of this, since the country increased its salaries for judges by 400 percent, but the general 
consensus about corruption among the populations was measured to be the same as before the 
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salaries were increased (TI, 2007, 6). 
One way a state can properly invest in its judiciary is to provide substantial training to 
judges, prosecutors, and court personnel. Buscaglia notes that training for prosecutors and judges 
when “coupled with performance-based indicators used for appointments and promotions, 
generates an institutional environment that discourages the application of random informal 
rules…” (Transparency International, 2007, 74). Rose-Ackerman and Palifka argue that an 
important aspect of a “modern bureaucratic state” is proper separation of roles, but note that in 
order to properly separate roles, the state must first provide workers with adequate pay so that 
they feel incentivized to work (2016, 166). Overall, the benefits of properly investing in the 
judiciary are apparent, as failure to do so can lead to judges engaging in corrupt practices, either 
to supplement their incomes or to cater to the interests of elites.  
C. Transparency, Civil Society, and the Media 
 
 In order to shed light on the corrupt practices occurring within a state and its institutions, 
a country must not place restraints on civil society and the media. Freedom of the press, in 
particular, is necessary in order to ensure that corrupt practices can be published without fear of 
repercussions. However, if the media is also heavily politicized, this poses problems. Kurkchiyan 
warns that politically motivated media can often times engage in covering up corrupt acts if they 
are in the pockets of politicians (Transparency International, 2007, 106). If media is 
“constructive” and trusted by society, Kurkchiyan states that it can make an “impact on how 
people view the world, how they behave toward it, and how they feel about their role in it” (TI, 
2007, 106). However, Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, 431), note that increasing press 
freedom is not enough; the media must be competent and credible otherwise the public will have 
no incentive to believe what the media writes.  
	
26	
Treisman states that freedom of association is also necessary for curbing corruption 
because it provides public interest groups and reporters with the opportunity to expose corrupt 
practices (2000, 404). Freedom of association also allows for civil society to thrive and function 
properly. If the government places limitations on civil society, it will be difficult for groups to 
organize, hold meetings, or publish reports on corruption. Civil society groups can also monitor 
institutions they believe to be corrupt to expose them (Treisman, 2000, 404).  Groups will not 
actively engage in reporting abuses if they feel that they will face negative repercussions by the 
government. Studies have shown that countries with stronger civil societies are less prone to 
corruption than those with weaker civil societies (Themudo, 2013, 65).  
When the media and civil society groups work together, they are extremely effective in 
combating corruption. Themudo argues that freedom of the press is “critical in civil society 
efforts to generate public pressure against corrupt officials” because “civil society’s impact on 
corruption should be partly conditioned by the level of press freedom” (2013, 65). Themudo’s 
study proved that civil society groups in countries with strong press freedoms typically were 
more affective in curbing corruption, but civil society groups in countries with weaker press 
freedoms had an insignificant effect on corruption levels (2013, 65). The main role of civil 
society groups, according to Themudo, is to inform the public and expose corrupt acts, and 
without the media, many civil society groups would be unable to function (2013, 69). This is 
because “civil society actors are unlikely to reach an audience that goes beyond their immediate 
supporter and, consequently to generate enough public pressure and political will to change the 
status quo” (Themudo, 2013, 69).  
Transparency in the judicial system is also necessary to combat corruption. Transparency 
International notes in its 2007 Global Corruption Index that a common issue countries with high 
	
27	
levels of judicial corruption face is a lack of transparency in its court processes (xxv). The 
organization adds that an overall lack of transparency prevents the media and civil society groups 
from carrying out their primary duties of monitoring the judiciary (2007, xxv). Buscaglia states 
that when countries allow for proceedings to be public, there is a “positive multiplier effect on 
lowering corruption” (TI, 2007, 72). The incentive to conduct corrupt practices diminishes with 
public proceedings, since judges are legally required to provide rational for judicial decisions 
(Buscaglia, TI, 2007, 72). Public hearings also allow for NGO’s, civil society groups, and the 
media to be present to hear court decisions, which increases transparency and allows for outside 
groups to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of the court (Buscaglia, TI, 2007, 74). Voigt 
(TI, 2007, 297) argues that if a country has a complicated judicial system—meaning that the 
system is opaque and has complicated procedural rules—, this will lead to a decrease in 
transparency because the probability of being discovered decreases, allowing corrupt practices to 
go unnoticed (Voigt, TI, 2007, 297). E-governance can also be used to increase transparency. 
Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, 139) argue that e-governance practices—such as, the 
publishing of laws/decisions, online applications, or documents—can also be effective in 
reducing corruption because they increase accountability and the dissemination of information. 
Citizens can also have a more interactive relationship with government, thus increasing overall 
trust in government institutions (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 145). 
D. Accountability and Discipline  
 
 Judges in corrupt societies must be held to a higher standard in order to decrease 
corruption. It also goes that judges who engage in corrupt activities must receive proper 
discipline otherwise they will feel no incentive to uphold the law. Transparency International 
(2007, xxv) states that “unfair or ineffective processes for the discipline and removal of corrupt 
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judges can often lead to the removal of independent judges for reasons of political expediency”. 
Noel-Pepys notes that in some systems, judges who want to uphold the laws often are not 
guaranteed promotions or positive evaluations (TI, 2007, 6). In most countries, judges have the 
option to either carry out the wishes of high-level officials or face negative repercussions.  
 Piana and Rogowski warn of a phenomenon called “negative accountability”, or the 
“prevention of accountability on behalf of the political and the social system” (2010, 27). This 
type of accountability means that judges are appointed for “good behavior” and their new tenure 
protects them if they accept bribes or engage in other corrupt practices (Piana and Rogowski, 
2010, 27). Therefore, promotions, if not based on merit, can further entrench corrupt practices in 
the judicial system. The authors argue instead that there must be institutional accountability that 
emphasizes proper “promotion, selection, and disciplinary control” of judges, which can “give 
citizens certainty with regard to the competence and impartiality of the judicial staff” (2010, 29).  
E. Legal Systems 
 There also appears to be a correlation between the type of legal system developed by a 
country and its level of corruption. Most literature focuses on two types of legal systems: 
common law and civil law systems. Common law systems, according to Rose-Ackerman (TI, 
2007, 20-1), are built off of the following components: use of precedence in interpreting and 
applying law; public trials where judicial power is “checked by lay juries who decide the facts in 
many criminal and civil cases”; a heavily politicized judicial nomination process; and lifetime 
appointments of federal judges. Civil law systems differ significantly: they do not use 
precedence, but instead include written opinions without dissents; they frequently do not use jury 
trials; and judges act as “career civil servants who have passed a competitive exam soon after 
completing their legal training” (Rose-Ackerman, 2007, TI, 19). The judges in civil law systems 
receive promotions from high-level officials or judicial councils, and the civil service sets 
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judges’ salaries (Rose-Ackerman, 2007, TI, 19-20). Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, 386) also 
note that in civil law systems, judicial independence is often derived from “professional training, 
oversight, and career paths”.  
 Cowdery states that in common law systems it is usually the case that judges are 
“appointed from the senior ranks of the practicing profession and may come from private 
practice” while judges in civil law systems frequently switch between prosecuting and judging 
roles (TI, 2007, 81). The training of judges in these two systems varies differently and offers 
their own individual benefits and drawbacks. Civil law systems usually include training that 
takes place outside of the judiciary, but in common law systems, an emphasis is placed on 
obtaining candidates with a background in legal scholarship, private practice lawyers, and 
attorneys (Piana and Rogowski, 19).   
Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, 286) note that many judicial decisions are “made 
behind closed doors, and hierarchical corruption is a real risk”. The authors also state the use of 
lay judges—a feature of the common law systems—can curb corrupt practices (2016, 386). The 
fact that judges salaries in civil law systems are set by the civil service creates incentives to 
augment salaries through bribe-taking (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 386). However, a 
drawback of the common law system is that due to the often-politicized nomination or promotion 
process of the system, it is likely high-level officials could influence judges and their decisions 
(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, 387).  
Selection of Hypotheses 
 After completing a survey of the literature, four hypotheses have been created to test the 
three independent variables featured in this study (judicial independence, EU leverage, and 
media freedom). There is clearly an overabundance of literature available on judicial corruption, 
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and covering all of the relationships commonly associated with judicial corruption would require 
an entire book. In order to narrow this study, I have chosen two hypotheses for judicial 
independence, one for EU leverage, and one for media freedom.  
H1: Countries with high levels of destabilizing political competition will have higher levels 
of judicial corruption. 
H2: Countries with parliamentary systems will have lower levels of judicial corruption.  
 
 Due to the fact that judicial independence is a broad, overarching variable, I have selected 
two variables to measure this concept: government system and levels of destabilizing political 
competition. The type of government system adopted by a country can affect judicial corruption 
levels because it determines the distribution of powers between the prime minister and the 
president. As a result, whichever political entity is granted the most power over the judiciary can 
misuse its authority to place pressure on the institution, either to consolidate the power of his/her 
party or for personal gain. Destabilizing political competition often results in parties engaging in 
intense competition in an attempt to further their respective political agendas, which often places 
the judiciary in the middle of the conflict as a pawn of political elites.  
The general consensus amongst scholars today is that high levels of political competition 
often lead to higher levels of judicial corruption, particularly in developing countries, such as 
those in the CEE region. The relationship between political competition and judicial 
independence becomes problematic when the competition between parties is destabilizing, 
meaning that parties are not ideologically focused, but rather are driven by personalities and 
divisive political fighting. It is this destabilizing political competition amongst the governing 
party and the opposition that leads to poor democratization of institutions, such as the judiciary. 
The influence of veto players and viable political parties also contributes to the influence of 
political competition on curbing judicial corruption levels. Romania and Albania are arguably on 
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two different “levels” of democratic development, with Romania being considered a democracy 
and Albania being classified as a developing democracy. Thus, it will be particularly interesting 
to see if the theories presented in the literature will be confirmed in the case studies.  
 Literature on government systems proves to be indecisive. Presidential and parliamentary 
systems both have their drawbacks, and it is clear that certain political climates will perpetuate 
corruption problems relative to others. Additionally, the two case studies in this chapter—
Albania and Romania—have two different systems in place. Albania is technically classified as a 
parliamentary system, but has a stronger executive than what is common in parliamentary 
systems. Romania is a semi-presidential system, thus it has characteristics of both presidential 
and parliamentary systems, as well as an equal distribution of powers between the president and 
prime minister. A majority of the countries in the CEE region—and Europe in general—have 
parliamentary systems. Studies on the effect of parliamentary systems on judicial corruption 
seem to point to the fact that parliamentary systems can be exceedingly effective as long as 
parties within the given country are viable and capable of being competitive in elections. Since 
Albania is theoretically a parliamentary system, and Romania also has aspects mimicking those 
found in parliamentary systems, I hypothesize that countries with parliamentary systems will 
show to have lower corruption levels.  
H3: European Union (EU) member and candidate countries will have lower levels of 
judicial corruption.  
  
 The overall benefits of EU membership and candidacy status on judicial corruption 
appear to be positive, although many of these benefits are accrued from secondary effects, such 
as economic liberalization and better promotion of political rights. Many scholars admit that EU 
leverage is only effective up to a certain point. Theoretically speaking, EU membership should 
improve judicial corruption values, but the magnitude of reforms is also heavily dependent on 
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domestic factors, such as political will and public opinion. Overall, EU leverage through 
conditionality is meant to propel forward reforms. Now, whether EU member or candidate 
countries go on to implement them is another story and will be further evaluated in the case 
studies presented in this paper. However, it appears that the dangling of the EU accession 
“carrot” is effective and can demonstrate positive results, but under certain circumstances.  
H4: Countries with low levels of media freedom will have higher levels of judicial 
corruption. 
 
 Scholars agree that media freedom is an essential component of a healthy democracy and, 
in effect, promotes low corruption levels. Without the media, many corrupt practices would go 
un-reported, thus decreasing transparency and allowing corruption to become endemic. The 
media is supposed to act as a watchdog, reporting on corrupt practices of politicians and 
members of the judiciary. If media freedom is restricted, politicization of the media often occurs, 
leading to self-censorship. Essentially, low media freedom reinforces corruption and leads to an 
overall erosion of public trust in the judiciary. Thus, in order for corruption levels to be low, a 
country must have a media sector that is free from politicization and values the importance of 

















Chapter 2: Methodology 
  
 Chapter 2 seeks to outline the methodology used in this qualitative study. I will justify 
my decision to use a case study methodology and the selection of Romania and Albania as case 
studies. A section evaluating Transparency International’s (TI) judicial corruption indicators will 
be included. Most importantly, this chapter will operationalize the three independent variables 
under consideration, as well as the dependent variable. Tables will be used to convey important 
statistical data necessary for understanding trends in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
region for judicial corruption and other relevant variables.  
Why Case Studies?  
This study examines the causes of judicial corruption in Albania and Romania in an effort 
to understand the roots of this phenomenon at the regional level. A case study methodology has 
been chosen to discern which independent variables, as discussed in the literature review, have 
the strongest impact—either positive or negative—on corruption levels in the selected countries.  
The main purpose of this study is to draw out causal mechanisms of judicial corruption in two 
selected countries, and this cannot be done conclusively through a quantitative analysis. 
Typically, quantitative studies rely heavily on a large-N analysis, but this is not feasible given 
the size of the CEE region. There are simply not enough countries to create a quantitative model 
capable of producing statistically significant results. In addition, given the specificity of the form 
of corruption being analyzed in this study, it is difficult to create a comprehensive data set. Many 
data sets merely measure general levels of perceived corruption and do not create sets that break 
down corruption levels by type or form of corruption.  Judicial corruption can also only be 
measured indirectly, resulting in minor validity issues. This will be discussed further in a later 
section of this chapter.  
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A quantitative cross-unit analysis can only tell half of the story. Literature suggests that 
these studies are “thin” in nature, meaning that they only explain “a portion of the variance with 
respect to a given outcome…at a very general level” (Gerring, 2004, 348).   Qualitative analyses 
have a focused “depth of analysis”, particularly because they focus on the details of relevant 
cultural or historical examples, as well as the robustness of the specific causal relationship being 
measured or explained (Gerring, 2004, 348). The overall scope of this study is the broader 
Central and Eastern European region. Case study analyses are used to connect trends found at the 
state level of analysis to the regional level. This is known as the so-called “representativeness” 
phenomenon (Gerring, 2004, 348). The countries of Central and Eastern Europe rank among the 
most corrupt countries in the world (See Table 1 for a cross-national regional analysis), but they 
differ on several economic, political, and institutional variables. Thus, using case studies to delve 
deeper into the three independent variables will be essential for understanding if certain causes 
are state-specific, or if the findings of this study can have implications for broader, regional 
trends.  
The method of process tracing will be used to determine causal mechanisms within 
individual case studies over time. Collier notes that process tracing is particularly useful in case 
study methodologies because “it can contribute decisively both to describing political and social 
phenomena and to evaluating causal claims” (2011, 823). Process tracing is also beneficial when 
conducting small-N analyses because the method relies on “matching and contrasting of cases—
designs which have great value, but whose contribution to causal inference urgently needs to be 
supplemented by with-in case analysis” (Collier, 2011, 824). The time component of process 
tracing will prove to be valuable because it evaluates cases or historical events over a span of 
time (Collier, 2011, 324). This will be exceptionally helpful when evaluating the effect of EU 
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membership on the dependent variable, as it allows for an in-depth examination of pre and post-
accession historical and cultural examples. Furthermore, due to inconsistency in some theories 
pertaining to judicial corruption and its causes, there is ambiguity on certain causal mechanisms. 
Bennett and Elman argue that process tracing increases the confidence of case studies if the 
discovery of causal mechanisms proves to be contradictory or “inconsistent with alternative 
explanations” (2006, 460).  
 However, it should be noted that a limitation to using a case study methodology is that 
over-generalizing causal relationships can lead to an incomplete or inaccurate analysis at the 
regional level (Gerring, 2004, 348). This arises when causal relationship are drawn from a single 
unit and are “assumed to be true” for a larger population (Gerring, 2004, 348). Seawright and 
Gerring warn that background cases can negatively influence the determination of causal 
relationships due to an unclear “distinction between the case and the population it surrounds” 
(2008, 294). In an effort to account for this limitation, the method of process tracing should help 
to determine if a causal relationship is spurious or significant, as variables will be tracked over 
time. If a relationship remains prominent throughout the narrative presented in each case study, it 
is quite possible that it is not spurious and is in fact significant.  
Evaluation of Transparency International Indicators 
 Before delving into the remaining sections of this chapter, it is worth noting the 
limitations of using Transparency International’s corruption indices for measuring judicial 
corruption. Like any index, TI’s Global Corruption Barometer has its drawbacks. It has minor 
validity issues and scholars have criticized some of the agency’s methods for collecting data. 
This being said, it is one of few consistently reliable and comprehensive corruption indices 
available (the other being the World Bank Group’s World Governance Indicator). TI’s Global 
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Corruption Barometer is the only corruption measurement that will be used in this study to 
measure the dependent variable. The World Bank Group’s World Governance Indicator will not 
be used because it does not have an indicator that measures judicial corruption specifically. The 
dataset does measure public corruption levels (i.e., pertaining to the executive branch) and 
general rule of law scores, but does not go as far as to solely isolate judicial corruption levels. 
The wide range of country availability is a benefit of this dataset, but if it does not have the data 
relevant for measuring the dependent variable it cannot be used. Transparency International is 
the best indicator available for measuring judicial corruption specifically.  
 First, I will list the drawbacks of using this particular corruption index. Today, 
corruption scores are measured indirectly by obtaining survey data from populations. Indirectly 
measuring corruption values can only account for perceived levels of judicial corruption since 
the variable itself is qualitative in nature. Judicial corruption is a phenomenon and when being 
coded for, includes many different measurements—including judicial independence, 
effectiveness of the judiciary, and rule of law scores (see Freedom House’s 2016, “Methodology: 
Freedom in the World 2016”). Due to the complex nature of the corruption variable, it is 
impossible to completely quantify this variable into an ordinal number. Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka note TI’s use of “cardinal units” as opposed to a “unit-less constructed number that tries 
to capture a country’s position on a continuum from high to low levels of corruption” as being 
particularly important when discussing the organization’s effectiveness in quantifying corruption 
values (2016, 20). It is hard to normatively judge corruption scores if presented on a scale of 1-5, 
as they are often open to interpretation, leading to inconsistency in interpretation.  
Perceived corruption scores pose a possible validity issue because the scores are tabulated 
from public surveys. Often the survey population provides biased or incomplete answers to 
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survey questions. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2001, 16) note that even though populations are 
told not to take into consideration their country’s previous performances on TI corruption 
indexes, many replies end up being biased because survey populations rely on previous 
experiences with corruption that shape their answers. The authors also state, “expectations are 
often based on previous experience, so if a particular public service has required bribery in the 
past, those seeking the service will anticipate that this practice will continue” (2016, 16).  
Transparency International indices do not calculate corruption values for every state in a 
particular region. Rather, the organization varies the countries it studies in each publication 
resulting in an incomplete data set that can affect a researcher’s decision to use a quantitative 
analysis when studying judicial corruption. Furthermore, Johnston expresses his concerns with 
corruption indices due in part because, “corruption indices impose a common model upon all 
cases and are not particularly sensitive to qualitative variations” (2005, 4). TI’s Global 
Corruption Barometer asks respondents to categorize responses by institution, meaning that each 
respondent can provide scores for the judiciary or the police. This suggests that if a researcher 
were to use these values, it could not provide for a valid account of what proportion of the 
overall corruption score is due to high judicial or political corruption levels. Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka agree, stating that typically these indices “do not directly measure the volume of bribes, 
the incidence of corruption, or its impact” (2016, 19). 
Although the index has limitations, it is the best available option for this study. While 
survey responses could prove to have minor validity issues, answers for TI indices are in fact 
accounts of populations’ direct experiences with corruption and can provide for a substantial 
overview of relevant examples of corruption in countries. Scholars find value in the TI indices 
because they provide researchers with a way to quantify a variable that is, in its very nature, 
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multifaceted. Judicial corruption is comprised of numerous sub-variables, and using a TI score is 
much simpler than trying to combine multiple variables into a single statistic. The regional 
diversity of the indices is also excellent for developing cross-national or regional analyses. TI’s 
Global Corruption Barometer in particular is unique because it asks researchers to break down 
their evaluation of corruption by institution (TI, 2016, “Global Corruption Barometer 2010/11). 
Finally, while Albania is not featured frequently in the organization’s Global Corruption 
Monitor, the organization does publish reports on the country’s progress—with the latest having 
been released in 2016—thus it is possible to find overall discussions about judicial corruption in 
Albania. Romania is regularly featured in TI’s Global Corruption Barometer, and so judicial 
corruption variables are widely available for this country.  
Case Study Justification 
 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are among the most corrupt countries in 
the world. Transparency International regularly assigns CEE countries rankings indicating that 
judicial corruption is an ongoing concern in a majority of these countries. Transparency 
International’s corruption indices assign countries ratings on a scale of 1 to 5. If a country is 
assigned a ranking of 1, it can be interpreted that a country is not corrupt. A rating of 5 indicates 
that a country is extremely corrupt. These are the only classifications that Transparency 
International provides, thus it is necessary to infer classifications for countries that lie between 
these points. For the purposes of this study, any number ranking above the halfway point (2.5) 
through 3.9 is classified as moderately corrupt. Any number from 4.0 to 4.9 will be classified as 
highly corrupt. Any ranking from 0 to 1 is considered not corrupt, and a country scoring a 
ranking from 1 to 2.4 is considered to have a low level of corruption. However, in 2013, 
Transparency International changed its methodology from using cardinal units to percentages. 
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This methodology was not used in the tables presented in the Appendix because not all countries 
in the CEE region were included in the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer.  
 As depicted in Table 1, all CEE countries featured in Transparency International’s 
2010/2011 Global Corruption Barometer received scores of 2.9 or higher, indicating that these 
countries have judiciaries that are, at the very least, moderately corrupt.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Nonetheless, it is essential to note that these countries do fall within a spread that is reflective of 
the rest of the world’s standings. Most countries, such as those from North and Latin America, 
and Africa, have scores ranging from 2.5 to 3.5 (see Table 1). Thus, there is overlap between 
CEE countries and the rest of the world. It would be misleading to state that the CEE countries 
are within a league of their own, when in fact their scores are relatively average. This being said, 
the fact that “average” scores for judicial corruption can be classified as moderately to highly 
corrupt across the world is concerning. It is important to understand the reasons or causes behind 
judicial corruption in CEE countries in an effort to understand why this phenomenon has plagued 
the CEE region since the fall of communism.  
 Furthermore, the CEE region is unique because, while most countries in this region—
particularly EU member countries—are oriented towards the West and are democracies (or 
transitioning democracies), many CEE countries have levels of judicial corruption that are higher 
than their Western European counterparts. The divide between Eastern and Western Europe is 
fascinating, and evaluating causal mechanisms in this region could shed light on why these 
countries are lagging behind in developing strong, democratic institutions. It could also help 
explain why some CEE countries are engaging in what scholars are calling “democratic 
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backsliding”, or the reversion towards an authoritarian regime with a disregard for democratic 
values and the rule of law.  
 Interestingly, there is quite a large spread between CEE countries with the highest and 
lowest judicial corruption score.  
[Insert Table 2] 
The highest score for a CEE country was Ukraine’s 4.4 and the lowest was Hungary’s 2.9. But 
there are outliers that indicate causes of judicial corruption may be more prominent in certain 
political and economic environments. Additionally, the CEE region has wide variation on the EU 
membership variable, thus it is possible that EU membership could have a significant effect on 
corruption levels.  
[Insert Table 3] 
As seen in Table 3, member countries have an average judicial corruption score of 3.64, 
while non-member countries have an average value of 3.84. It would be expected that candidate 
countries have average scores placing them in the middle between member and non-member 
countries given that they have begun to implement the EU acquis and other anti-corruption 
policies. In order to obtain EU accession they must closely follow EU recommendations or face 
possible consequences. However, the results of Table 3 indicate that there is no statistically 
significant difference between candidate and non-EU member countries, as well as between 
candidate and member countries. This being said, it is important to note that running a 
quantitative analysis does not tell the whole story, as it is quite possible that the relationship 
between EU leverage and judicial corruption levels can be influenced by spurious variables, such 
as public opinion, political will, and possible EU enlargement fatigue.  
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 The CEE region was also selected for its economic diversity. The region has an average 
GDP/capita of $10,745.09 and an average judicial corruption score of 3.74 (see Table 4).  
[Insert Table 4] 
Only eight of the eighteen countries featured in Table 2 have GDP/capita levels over the regional 
average. Half of the CEE countries also have corruption levels higher than the regional average. 
Literature indicates that countries with lower GDP/capita values have higher levels of judicial 
corruption and vise versa. There are countries in the CEE region that do not follow this trend. 
For instance, Hungary and Croatia, although they have roughly the same GDP/Capita values, 
have drastically different judicial corruption scores. Croatia and Bulgaria have GDP/capita 
values in the $13,000’s, but have judicial corruption scores of 4.1 and 2.9, respectively. Belarus, 
an authoritarian regime with a low GDP/capita value of roughly $8,000, has one of the lowest 
judicial corruption values in the region, scoring a 3.4 in Transparency International’s 2010/2011 
Global Corruption Barometer.  
 CEE countries also implemented different government systems after communism, and 
this could be an underlying factor that affects the second independent variable studied in this 
project, judicial independence. There is not a consensus in the literature about which system is 
most effective in promoting lower corruption levels. The findings from this project could help 
fill this gap. Additionally, the media in most CEE countries receive rankings of “partly free” 
from Freedom House, but there are a few countries that have received ratings of “free”. 
Unusually, the countries that earned ratings of “free” are all EU member countries, but there 
were member countries that failed to obtain the same rating. The inconsistencies in media 
freedom rankings could prove to have a significant impact on judicial corruption levels that can 
explain regional variation.  
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Judicial independence is a component necessary for measuring overall rule of law scores. 
The CEE region has variation on rule of law scores that proves contradictory. It is believed that 
countries with high levels of judicial independence will have lower levels of judicial corruption. 
However, there are numerous countries in the CEE region that have high rule of law scores and 
high levels of judicial, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Lithuania (See Table 2). Finally, political 
pluralism and participation is also a component that must be considered when measuring judicial 
corruption. It is assumed that countries with high levels of political pluralism will have low 
levels of judicial corruption, but countries in the CEE region do not consistently show to follow 
this trend. Two authoritarian countries, Russia and Belarus, scored values of 3 in this category, 
but are ranked much lower in judicial corruption scores relative to their CEE counterparts. It is 
worth noting, though, that CEE countries typically scored much better on this variable, which is 
interesting because many of these countries still have high to extreme levels of corruption.  
 The one control variable in this study is the system of law present in each country, as all 
CEE countries have civil law systems. The three independent variables in this study are EU 
membership status, media freedom, and judicial independence. After consulting the quantitative 
data presented in Tables 1 through 4, Romania and Albania were chosen as the two case studies 
to be featured in this study. First, it is important to note that Albania has a judicial corruption 
value of 3.8, while Romania scored 4.0 in Transparency International’s Global Corruption 
Barometer. While Romania’s judicial corruption level appears to be higher, there is not a 
significant difference between the two countries, thus it can be concluded that both countries 
struggle with moderate to high levels of judicial corruption. In simple terms, Romania could be 
slightly worse-off than Albania, but the difference is marginal relative to comparing Hungary to 
Bulgaria (see Table 2).  
	
43	
The primary relationship being examined in this study is the effect of EU membership on 
judicial corruption levels. It is hypothesized that EU candidate and member countries will have 
lower levels of judicial corruption. Therefore, it was necessary to choose one EU member 
country and one candidate country. Romania is a EU member and has a GDP/Capita value that is 
close to the regional average. Albania is a candidate country, but has the third lowest 
GDP/Capita value of the entire region. Theoretically, countries that are members of the EU are 
predicted to be richer, and richer countries are expected to have lower levels of judicial 
corruption. Romania and Albania both deviated from this norm, and this could account for the 
moderate to high levels of corruption in both countries. Both also vary on the government system 
variable, as Romania has a semi-presidential system and Albania has a parliamentary system. 
Literature heavily debates the effect of government system on judicial corruption levels, thus it 
was essential to choose countries with different systems.  
Although both countries have medias ranked as “partly free” by Freedom House, the two 
countries have a different corruption level, which demonstrates that perhaps there is a spurious 
variable affecting this relationship that is worth exploring further. Or, perhaps, the relationship 
between the media, politicians, and the judiciary has affected judicial corruption more severely 
in one country over another. Romania scored a value of 4.0 and Albania scored a value of 3.8. 
Additionally, the two countries demonstrated to have rule of law values that contradict many of 
the theories presented in the literature review. Although Albania has a rule of law score of 9 out 
of 16, which is a fair score compared to others featured in Table 2, the country still has a 
relatively high level of judicial corruption. Countries ranked lower than Albania have rule of law 
and judicial corruption scores that are much better, such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
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Poland, and Latvia, which is typical of what one would expect to find.  Romania, on the other 
hand, has a better rule of law score than Albania, but has a higher judicial corruption score.  
In sum, the two countries were chosen because of their differing values in EU 
membership status, government system, rule of law, and political pluralism and participation 
scores. Although the CEE region is diverse in that it has varying scores in almost every category 
featured in Table 2, most countries fall within certain ranges, making it difficult to select two 
different countries that vary significantly on all variables. Romania is a wealthier country relative 
to its CEE counterparts, performs well on rule of law and political pluralism and participation 
scores, and is a EU member country. Albania represents the portions of the CEE region that are 
less developed, partly free, and are on the cusp of becoming EU member countries. Interestingly, 
both countries have relatively similar judicial corruption scores. Romania’s score of 4.0 is .2 
worse than Albania’s 3.8. However, it is essential to note that the only available corruption score 
available for Romania is from 2007, thus it is entirely possible that the county’s score is different 
today. This being said, the countries are relatively on par with each other in regards to corruption 
scores and can provide for the best account of variation on the independent variables.  
Operationalization of Variables 
 As with all qualitative studies, coding for variables is a difficult task. At the beginning of 
each case study chapter, I will provide an overview of each country’s TI judicial corruption 
scores to put the countries’ scores in perspective. Both countries have middle to high levels of 
corruption and presenting data from a quantitative perspective prior to delving into the case 
studies will aid the reader in understanding progress, or lack thereof, in curbing judicial 
corruption levels over time. Additionally, the level of judicial corruption can be understood in 
terms of progress made in implementing judicial reform. Theoretically, as judicial reform is 
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implemented, there should be tangible evidence of progress in judicial corruption levels. In order 
to measure judicial reform progress, an assessment of a country’s efforts to implement anti-
corruption reforms will be made, and the effectiveness of reforms on lowering/increasing 
corruption levels will also be evaluated. Finally, change in judicial corruption levels over the 
following periods will be evaluated in the conclusion of this study: 2000-2004, 2004-2008, 2008-
2012, and 2012- present. 
 The first independent variable studied in this project is judicial independence. This is a 
complex variable and is comprised of many different components. Of interest in this study are 
the effects of destabilizing political competition between parties and government system on 
influencing judicial independence, as high levels of judicial autonomy are predicted to result in 
lower levels of judicial corruption. I define destabilizing political competition as confrontational 
competition between majority and opposition parties resulting from their lack of solid ideological 
foundations and tendency towards personality-driven politics. As a result, political alliances 
between parties are quick to change after political interests are no longer being met. 
Consequently, the competition between the parties to consolidate power places institutions, such 
as the judiciary, directly in the middle of the political battles. I will measure this by examining 
how frequently judicial reforms are derailed for political reasons, as well as actions by the 
government to place undue burden on the judiciary via court packing or undermining judicial 
decisions. I will also evaluate the effect of conflict between reformists and anti-reformists in 
order to discern if competing political interests can negatively impact judicial independence 
levels.  
The effect of government system on judicial independence will be measured by 
evaluating whether the distribution of powers between the president and prime minister has 
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created a climate in which the executive has exerted too much power over judicial processes, for 
example judicial nominations and judicial decisions. Additionally, it will be measured by 
examining if problems arising from cohabitation—a phenomenon associated with semi-
presidential systems—has an effect on judicial independence.  
 The independent variable of EU candidacy and membership status will be measured by 
tracking the respective case studies’ progress in drawing up and implementing judicial reform 
packages, as instructed by the EU. A country’s responsiveness to EU conditionality and policy 
suggestions laid out in progress reports will also be tracked over time. In doing so, I will be able 
to test theories presented in the literature review suggesting that EU conditionality is essential for 
reforming corruption in member countries. A key component of evaluating if EU membership 
can truly lower corruption levels is by assessing the overall effectiveness of EU conditionality in 
persuading countries to enforce its policies.  
 The last independent variable, the effect of media freedom on curbing judicial corruption 
levels, is measured by evaluating the dynamic relationship between the press, politicians, and the 
judiciary. Media pressure can take many forms, but this study is only concerned with the 
influence of media investigations and investigative journalism in exposing corrupt practices 
within the judicial branch. This study is also concerned with the influence of politicians or 
members of the judiciary in attempting to conceal corrupt practices, either by placing pressure on 
the media to engage in self-censorship, undermining the credibility of journalists, or by taking 
control of the media market to sway the agenda set by media outlets. It is assumed that if the 
media has a high level of freedom and autonomy to exercise its role as a watchdog, then more 
corrupt practices will be exposed and efforts to increase transparency will result in judicial 
corruption levels lowering over time. 
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Chapter 3: Judicial Corruption in Albania 
 Albania, a developing democracy located in the Western Balkans, is among Eastern 
Europe’s most corrupt countries. Since the fall of communism in 1990, Albania has made strides 
towards rejoining its western counterparts through the slow establishment of democratic 
institutions. The country has faced significant setbacks in its democratization, including the 
crippling aftereffects of the 1997 pyramid scheme collapse, numerous flawed parliamentary 
elections, and its corruption problems in various sectors. The goal of the Albanian government 
since the early 2000’s has been to accede to the European Union (EU). In 2009, Albania 
submitted its application for EU candidacy, and the European Commission formally granted the 
country candidate status in 2014.  
In Transparency International’s 2007 Global Corruption Barometer, Albania received a 
rating of 3.8 out of 5, indicating that the country’s judiciary is on the verge of becoming highly 
corrupt (Transparency International, 2007). For an overview of TI’s classifications please refer to 
Chapter 2: Methodology. Transparency International changed its methodology from using 
ratings to percentages for measuring perceived judicial corruption levels in 2013, and Albania 
has not been featured in many of the organization’s Global Corruption Barometers since. 
However, in 2013, 81% of respondents answered that they perceived the Albanian judiciary to be 
highly/extremely corrupt (Transparency International, 2013). Given the change in methodology, 
it is hard to determine if there was a significant difference between the country’s score from 
2007 and 2013, however, it is still worth noting that both scores classify the Albanian judiciary 
as moderately to highly corrupt, indicating little change over the years.  
Since 2009 Albania has implemented small policy changes to limit judicial corruption, 
but until recently it was not enough to begin accession talks. In July 2016, with the help of 
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pressure from the EU and international community, Albania passed a comprehensive reform 
package that seeks to significantly alter the structure and effectiveness of the judiciary. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine common causal variables of judicial corruption to discern 
the extent to which these variables have positively or negatively affected corruption levels in 
Albania. The variables under consideration in this chapter are: judicial independence, EU 
leverage, and media freedom. The technique of process tracing will be used to track these 
variables over an extended period of time, beginning in 2000 until the present.  
I. Judicial Independence  
 After the fall of the communist regime, Albania established a Parliamentary Republic. 
Typically, the president in a parliamentary system plays a largely ceremonial role, and is not 
granted substantial authority or power by the Constitution. To an extent, the Albanian 
parliamentary system follows this formula, but the president enjoys more autonomy, closer to 
that of presidents in semi-presidential systems. For the purposes of this study, I will classify 
Albania’s government system as lean-parliamentary, as it is not a strict parliamentary system 
and has characteristics similar to that of a semi-presidential system.  
The prime minister serves as the Head of Government and is at the forefront of Albanian 
policy making and foreign affairs. The prime minister is appointed by the president “on the 
proposal of the majority party or coalition parties in the Assembly” (CIA, 2017). Formally 
speaking, the Albanian president is the symbolic figurehead of the Republic and is granted 
ceremonial powers accrued from holding this title.  The president is elected from the ranks of the 
parliament, as dictated by the Constitution. In 2008 the parliament amended the constitution to 
change the methods of electing the president. The changes made to the Constitution created a 
system in which the president “needs a three-fifths majority vote of the Assembly in 1 of 3 
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rounds or a simple majority in two additional rounds to become president” (CIA, 2017). The 
constitutional changes were meant to ensure that the president earns a majority of support from 
Parliament, and in doing so would represent the support of “a majority of the electorate” 
(Albanian Assembly, 2015, 23).  
Below is an overview of the key institutional players in the Albanian Judiciary and the 
powers granted to each institution, per the 1991 Constitution:  
[Insert Table 5] 
As depicted in the table above, the Albanian Constitution grants the President of the 
Republic significant authority over the judiciary. In theory, a majority of power should be vested 
with the prime minister in a parliamentary system, but, until 2016, the president held the majority 
of the power and influence over judicial appointments, as h/she was one of the sole appointers of 
judges and chaired the High Council of Justice. In July 2016, the Albanian parliament passed a 
judicial reform package that significantly curbed the authority of the president over the judiciary, 
as well as adjusted the structures of various bodies. The 2016 reforms will be discussed in depth 
in later sections of this chapter, but it is important to note that this chapter will place emphasis on 
Albania’s poor judicial autonomy prior to the passing of the 2016 reforms, as it is too soon to 
judge the effectiveness of these reforms today. 
The Albanian government has experienced unpredictable shifts in power since the fall of 
the communist regime, and this has created a de-facto two party system. In theory, Albania does 
have a multi-party system, but the only parties capable of forming governing coalitions are the 
Party of Albania (PS) and the Democratic Party of Albania (PD). The formation of a political 
opposition to the communist party began to form in 1990 after the collapse of communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe (BBC, 2012). In 1991 the first round of national elections were held 
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in the post-communist era, and the communist regime won a majority of the seats in parliament 
(BBC, 2012). However, the communist government was quickly dissolved, and in the same year 
Prime Minister Nano resigned and a new government formed under Vilson Ahmeti (BBC, 2012). 
Ahmeti was in power until 1992 when the PD swept the elections under leadership of Albania’s 
first elected president, Sali Berisha (BBC, 2012). The PD enjoyed a majority in parliament from 
1992 until 1997 and was in power again from 2005 until 2013 under prime minister and former 
president, Berisha (BBC, 2012). In a mandate on the government’s effectiveness in combating 
corruption, the electorate voted Berisha and his party out of office in favor of the reformist-
oriented PS in 2013. Currently the PS has an absolute majority, and is a member of the large 
Alliance for a European Albania (ASHE) coalition with the Christian Democratic Party, Party for 
Justice, Integration and Unity, the Socialist Movement for Integration, and the Union for Human 
rights Party (CIA, 2017). The government is run by young PS star, Prime Minister Edi Rama, the 
former mayor of Tirana. The president of the Republic of Albania is Bujar Nishani, a member of 
the PD. Albania is scheduled to hold national elections in June 2017.  
During the period of 2000 to 2004, Albania struggled with securing the autonomy of its 
judiciary. The country failed to hold free elections after the fall of the communist regime, and 
with the formation of politically unstable parties, corruption became endemic within the 
judiciary and efforts to secure judicial independence remained limited. This problem was 
exacerbated when the PS government won the 2001 elections, as “the country began to slip into a 
deep political crisis” and “became trapped in internal power struggles, and…lost its political 
initiative and vision” (Peshkopia, 2014, 121). For example, the ruling PS coalition reportedly 
nominated judges with connections to organized crime (Peshkopia, 2014, 121). Peshkopia (2014, 
121) also notes, “…higher courts, abusing the already-established judicial independence, played 
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a negative role in the progress of judicial reform by blocking reforms in court administration and 
career judicial employees, as well as the regulation of the distribution of legal cases.”  
Freedom House (2004) reported that in 2003 when the HCJ was tasked with appointing a 
candidate to the Central Election Committee (CEC), it was subject to intense political influence. 
At the time, the PS government held a qualifying majority in Parliament and used its position to 
select a candidate that would cater to its political interests. On June 19, 2003 the government 
passed a new electoral code, which explicitly called for the CEC to become a “politically 
balanced” body (Freedom House, 2004). The HCJ appointed Deshira Subashi, a candidate 
backed by the PS, giving “the party an absolute majority (five out of seven members) in the 
CEC. To achieve politically balanced CEC, a representative of the Democratic Party (PD) should 
have been appointed instead” (Freedom House, 2004). Conveniently, the HCJ, a key player in 
the Albanian judiciary, provided the PS with “an absolute majority in that body just before local 
elections”, furthering the depiction of the HCJ as a PS pawn (Freedom House, 2004).   
There were small improvements made on behalf of the government to promote judicial 
independence between 2004 and 2008. The PD government was reinstated in November 2005, 
and passed the Law on Organization and Functions of the HCJ, which “requires judges to resign 
their judicial posts once they have accepted an HCJ nomination”, thus removing potential 
conflict of issues for HCJ members who are also judges on other courts (Freedom House, 2006). 
However, any semblance of reform was short lived, as the Constitutional Court struck down the 
government’s new law, declaring it unconstitutional the following year (Freedom House, 2007). 
Freedom House notes that there “were concerns about political interference in the judiciary given 




One of the clearest examples of political interference with judicial independence occurred 
in 2007 when the PD attempted to obstruct the mandate of the Office of the Prosecutor General. 
The intentions of the PD were not ill placed, as Freedom House points out, because the Office of 
the General Prosecutor was perceived to be an “obstacle in the fight against corruption and 
organized crime” (2007). However, the way in which the government went about controlling the 
flow of corruption created by this particular body was flawed. Freedom House criticized the PD 
government’s decision to remove the prosecutor general and its efforts to “create new ties 
between the ruling party and the Constitutional Court, the High Council of Justice, and the public 
procurement ombudsman through new appointments to these institutions” (2008). The 
organization stated that the government should have attempted to pass a law to curb the judicial 
corruption, rather than further perpetuating the system of patronage already in place (Freedom 
House, 2008).  
Moreover, during the PD’s reign from 2005 until 2013, there was a breakdown in 
relations between the party and the opposition that resulted in the derailment of the judiciary’s 
functionality and efficiency. In 2009, Albania conducted its regular parliamentary elections, in 
which Berisha and the PD party barely held on to its parliamentary majority (BBC, 2012). As a 
result, the PS lost a significant number of seats and accused the PD of “vote-rigging”, and 
protested the results by holding demonstrations in Tirana—Albania’s capital city (BBC, 2012). 
The PS boycotted parliamentary procedures from September 2009 through February 2010 until 
an investigation into the results of the election was conducted (Freedom House, 2010). Freedom 
House states, “even after the boycott, PS participation in the parliament was hampered by the PS 
deputies’ “conditional relations” which meant they were absent from legislative voting until the 
election transparency issue was settled” (2010). Since the opposition party was not participating 
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in legislative voting, this prevented the passing of laws or appointments of state officials, such as 
the National Judicial Conference law, which was “essential for the appointment of High Council 
of Justice (HCJ) members” (Freedom House, 2010). If the HCJ did not operate with the correct 
number of judges, this could have inhibited the body’s ability to carry out its mandate. 
The 2009-2010 political crisis is merely one of many examples of politicians tampering 
with the independence of the judiciary. Since 2008, parliament has rejected 14 presidential 
nominees to the High Court because of arbitrary political interference by the opposition party 
(Transparency International, 2016, 66). In 2011, three members of the Constitutional Court 
concluded their terms but remained in office “because parliament has refused President Bamir 
Topi’s proposals for new appointees” (Freedom House, 2012). After the parliament refused to 
accept the nominations, the Constitutional Court reviewed the issue and concluded that the 
president and parliament have to “agree on selection criteria for appointments to the High Court 
and Constitutional Court”, which the president precluded, resulting in the parliament blatantly 
rejecting his nominees (Freedom House, 2012).  
In July 2013, shortly after the June 2013 elections in which Berisha and the PD lost their 
qualifying majority, the HCJ—chaired by the President Nishani, a PD member—presented six 
judges for consideration to be appointed to various district level courts (Lukmeta, 2013). All of 
the judges presented to parliament at one point in time had “overseen high-profile trials during 
their tenure and [were] perceived to have been under the direct influence of the Democratic Party 
of outgoing Prime Minister Sali Berisha” (Lukmeta, 2013).  Lukemeta states that the Albanian 
public generally believed that the appointments were made in order to “reward” those who 
helped the PD “emerge unscathed” during the many political crises it endured during its time in 
power (2013). To make matters worse, the judges were heavily criticized for their clear lack of 
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qualifications and disrespect for the rule of law. Two of the proposed judges were members of 
the appeals court that tried 28 defendants implicated in the 2008 ammunition blast that killed 26 
people, in which they were assessed as being “too lenient by experts and the public” (Lukmeta, 
2013). Another potential candidate fined an Albanian television network 400,000 euros for 
exposing the misdoings of a minister, clearly undermining the media’s right to investigate 
corrupt practices (Lukmeta, 2013).  
In March 2014 MPs from the PS fought with PD President Nishani over his replacement 
appointment for high court judge Ardian Dvorani, which was described as a “controversial” 
decision because the president was only nominating PD judges (Lukmeta, 2014). According to a 
news report, PS MP’s accused the president of “declaring war on the parliament and on 
independent institutions”, which resulted in party leaders having to hold a formal meeting to 
settle the dispute (Lukmeta, 2014). As of early 2016, there were three vacancies on the High 
Court that had yet to be filled (European Commission, 2016, 58). There currently is no vice chair 
of the HCJ “due to a conflict of interest between the President and Parliament over the latter’s 
removal in 2014 of two HCJ members who had been appointed by the previous Parliament; one 
of them being the former vice chair” (Transparency International, 2016, 66).  
A number of corruption cases have also demonstrated a lack of will on behalf of the 
government to relinquish its hold over the judiciary. In 2011, a corruption scandal involving 
Deputy Prime Minister Illir Meta of the Socialist Movement for Integration (SMI) rocked the 
judiciary and parliament. Deputy Prime Minister Meta was charged with bribery, and waived his 
right to immunity as a MP so that a formal investigation into his accused wrongdoings could take 
place (Freedom House, 2012). A videotape of Meta bribing an official became public, and was 
“presented to an international expert to confirm its authenticity” (Freedom House, 2012). 
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Because Mr. Meta was an MP, the case was within the jurisdiction of the High Court (Freedom 
House, 2012). Even though there was concrete physical evidence of Mr. Meta engaging in an 
illegal act, the court “refused to admit the findings of the international expert and instead 
appointed three Albanian experts to reexamine the recording” (Freedom House, 2012). The 
Albanian experts claimed that the tape was not authentic and it was removed from evidence, a 
move that contributed to Mr. Meta’s eventual acquittal (Freedom House, 2012).  
In the same year, the former governor of the Central Bank, Ardjan Fullani, was 
investigated for stealing 700 million lek (Albanian currency) from the bank’s reserve 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, 12). During his tenure, Mr. Fullani and his associates showed to 
have disproportionately high “allowances compared even to international standards”, and the 
governor had close ties with many prominent families with connections to powerful politicians 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, 12). At the time, the president’s wife was an employee at the bank 
and had close ties with the governor (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, 12). Mr. Fullani’s wife was 
also a judge on the High Court, and after the governor was arrested the High Court allowed for 
his release from prison under suspicious circumstances (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, 12). 
Bertelsmann Stiftung states that even though there was an on-going investigation against him, 
the president invited the governor to his 2015 New Year’s gala, and after this the prosecutor in 
charge was removed from the case, resulting in the collapse of the case in its entirety (2016, 12).  
Since 2009, Albania has passed very few laws to improve its poor judicial independence. 
As will be discussed in another part of this chapter, the European Commission noted from 2011 
to 2013 that little to no progress was made in regards to the government’s efforts to adopt 
legislation to enhance the autonomy of the judiciary (European Commission, 2011, 11; European 
Commission, 2013, 9). However, in 2014 the parliament did adopt legislation to “regulate” the 
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immunity of judges, prosecutors, MPs, and senior officials (European Commission, 2014, 11). In 
addition, in 2014 the Commission noted that the newly created administrative courts “started to 
function, but they still need[ed] to be made fully operational” (European Commission, 2014, 11).  
It was not until July 2016 when the parliament adopted its first comprehensive reform 
package. The effect of the EU on the passing of this policy decision will be examined later in this 
chapter, but the deal has been hailed as the final piece of the puzzle for unlocking formal 
accession proceedings. The package massively overhauls the judiciary by amending 58 articles 
of the constitution to enhance judicial performance and limit politicization (Mejdini, 2016A). In 
particular, the new legislation seeks to insulate the HCJ by removing the president from the body 
and establishing the new High Judicial Council (HJC) to take on some of the HCJ and 
president’s roles, such as the evaluation, appointment, promotion, and transfer of judges 
(European Commission, 2016, 14). The new law also creates a Special Prosecutor’s Office 
(SPAK) for investigating senior officials, MPS, ministers, and judges (Mejdini, 2016B). Upon 
passing the legislation, both PS and PD parties were in support of the legislation, and all 140 
members of parliament voted in favor of the reform (Mejdini, 2016A).   
 Parliament also adopted a controversial vetting law in 2016 as part of the reform 
package, which “calls for the scanning of around 800 judges and prosecutors in Albania in terms 
of their professional ability, moral integrity and level of independence from organized crime, 
corruption and public officials” (Mejdini, 2016C). The vetting law was under review until the 
end of 2016 by the Constitutional Court because the PD stated the law “was biased and created 
the possibility for ‘witch hunts’ against judges and prosecutors” (Mejdini, 2016C). The Venice 
Commission and the Union of Judges signed on as “interested parties in the ruling” (Mejdini, 
2016C). However, the EU and reformists believe the vetting law to be a crucial part of ensuring 
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the independence of the judiciary. The temporary pause on the vetting law gave judges ample 
time to get their affairs in order and to formulate a strong enough argument to either have the law 
watered down or derailed completely. 
Despite progress earlier in the year, in November 2016, the government hit another wall 
in judicial reform when PD leader, Lulzim Basha, led the PD party out of parliament in the 
middle of a voting on a law that would create monitoring bodies for judicial appointments 
(Mejdini, 2016D). Albania will be holding elections in June 2017, and in a press conference 
Basha stated that Prime Minister Rama was turning Albania into a “narco” state in an effort to 
undermine the PS government (Mejdini, 2016D). The PD announced that it would be using 
“radical” opposition “tactics” because “Rama was not to be trusted to take the country into the 
next elections, so activating major protests against the government was more necessary than 
ever” (Mejdini, 2016D).   
There was a brief sign of hope, however, because in December 2016, the Constitutional 
Court demonstrated restraint, calling the vetting law constitutional, which allowed for the vetting 
to begin immediately in January 2017 (Mejdini, 2016E). Experts believe that there will be a mass 
exodus of judges who will quit before the vetting begins because their corrupt practices will be 
exposed (Mejdini, 2016F). This could possibly result in a decrease in corruption levels, as most 
old-guard judges will no longer be able to exert their power. This being said, it is too soon to 
truly gage the effectiveness of the laws because they have yet to be fully implemented by the 
government.  
Analysis of Judicial Independence  
 After tracking Albania’s judicial independence issues from 2000 to the present, it can be 
determined that poor judicial independence has in fact contributed to high levels of corruption in 
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the country. The high levels of judicial corruption can be explained for two reasons: the intense, 
destabilizing political competition between the PS and PD, and the lean-parliamentary system 
established after communism.  
As stated in the narrative presented above, the Albanian system is not a true 
parliamentary system. This is because the president in the Albanian system wields a substantial 
amount of power over the judiciary, including the ability to nominate judges and hold a seat on 
the High Council of the Judiciary. It is essential to note, however, that the president’s power over 
the judiciary was diminished and the structure/distribution of powers between judicial bodies 
was changed in July 2016 with the passing of a massive judicial reform package. The recent 
changes have brought the Albanian government system more closely in line with what scholars 
would consider to be a parliamentary system. Due to the fact that this package was passed less 
than nine months ago, it remains unclear how these changes will affect judicial independence. As 
a result, for the purposes of this analysis, the effect of government system will be approached 
from the lean-parliamentary system in place prior to the July 2016 amendments.  
The lean-parliamentary system has contributed to a breakdown in relations between the 
government (led by the prime minister), the president, and the judiciary. The main issue is the 
president’s authority as one of the sole appointers of judges. While there is a check on the 
president’s appointees by parliament, this does not stop the president from appointing political 
cronies. This was best demonstrated during the events of July 2013, when the PD was on its way 
out of office. In his wake, President Nishani attempted to pack the court so that political 
appointees would be left to carry on the political interests of his party the PS regained their 
qualified majority. Not to mention that the candidates had questionable track records and lacked 
proper qualifications to be judges on a court of such a high caliber. A similar incident occurred in 
	
59	
2014, and was described as a “war on the parliament and independent institutions” (Lukmeta, 
2014).   
Another issue is that since the HCJ formulates a list of potential candidates for 
submission to the parliament, the presence of the president on this body is concerning. According 
to Albania’s ad-hoc committee on judicial reform, the presence of the president at the head of the 
HCJ, “who is elected by a clear political and nonconsensual formula”, does not “guarantee the 
independence and functioning of the High Council of Justice” (Albanian Assembly, 2015, 24). It 
is therefore possible that the president can place pressure on the HCJ to create a list that is partial 
towards a certain political agenda, which can lead to undue influence over an important body of 
the judiciary. The president’s de-facto control over the High Court is also a source of 
politicization, as the president has the sole authority to appoint members of this court. Given the 
High Court’s ability to bring about corruption charges against judges, MP’s, the president, and 
other government figures, the president can place undue pressure on the body, resulting in the 
court making politically motivated decisions in the event corruption charges are brought against 
an ally of the president (Albanian Assembly, 2015, 29).  
It can be determined that judicial independence has not improved because the current 
parliamentary system in place is not effective in promoting a judicial culture conducive to 
eradicating corrupt practices. The fact that political elites have a majority of the control over 
judicial appointments ensures that judges that are nominated to the courts are just an extension of 
the current governing party. The powers vested to the president also allow h/she to make judicial 
appointments based on patronage, not merit, thus ensuring that judges with a disregard for the 
law are appointed. In doing so, corrupt practices become part of the judicial culture, allowing for 
corruption to become endemic. The 2011 scandal involving Deputy Prime Minister Meta 
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demonstrated the grave dangers of political influence impeding the court’s mandate. Even 
though the court had physical evidence that would have convicted him in a corruption-free court, 
the High Court ruled to acquit Mr. Meta. Freedom House argues that this proved to be a conflict 
of interest because the High Court judges are “directly exposed to political pressure as they are 
nominated by the president and elected by a simple majority in parliament” (2012). Furthermore, 
because Mr. Meta was a member of parliament and the High Court is the only court that handles 
cases concerning high-level officials, there was a conflict of interest between the court’s mandate 
and the facts of Meta’s case (Freedom House, 2012).  The outcome of this case would come to 
have lasting impacts on the judiciary. Freedom House found that after the Meta scandal subsided 
there were many cases of “refusals of the ruling majority to approve candidacies proposed by the 
president based on unwritten criteria have intimidated judges…and several candidates have been 
rejected for seemingly arbitrary reasons” (Freedom House, 2012). 
Another trend worth noting is the ambiguity over judicial appointments arising from the 
lean-parliamentary system in place. There is clearly a struggle between the parliament and 
president over the authority to appoint judges, as the president is given the authority to appoint 
all judges but must obtain a simple majority approval from parliament. The problem with this 
format is that it allows the parliament to blatantly reject presidential appointments out of political 
spite. Part of this is because of the intense political competition between the PD and PS parties, 
but it also has to do with the fact that this is a way for the parliament to extend its power over the 
executive and the judiciary. In a strictly parliamentary system, a majority of the power should be 
vested with the prime minister, but because the president in the Albanian system has the most 
authority, it has resulted in a climate in which the only way the Prime Minister can exert its 
power is by playing a game of political chess with the executive. The actions of the parliament to 
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block judicial appointments are deliberate, as it is looking to consolidate its power. This is 
particularly true when the president and governing coalition are from different parties, as 
presidents will frequently try to pack the court with supporters to insulate them from threats to 
their power.  
While the parliamentary system in place is clearly flawed, I argue that the biggest 
hindrance to promoting judicial independence—and in effect, low judicial corruption levels—is 
the destabilizing political competition between the PS and PD. In Albania, political parties are 
stable in that that they are not frequently collapsing or rebranding themselves. However, the 
issue is that Albanian political parties are not driven by ideology, but rather are personality-
driven (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014, 1162). The author argues that Albania’s post-communist 
political climate is founded upon “leader oriented” political parties and “divisive party politics” 
that have caused the “minority party [to be] reduced to opposing immediately and thoroughly 
any legislation or proposals that are put forth by the majority” (2014, 1162).  This climate has 
also resulted in the failure of the rival parties to engage in “constructive dialogue and 
compromise” (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2014, 1162). In addition, during the communist regime the 
justice system “was seen more as an instrument for implementing the decision of the executive 
rather than an independent authority” (Albanian Assembly. 2015, 8). This legacy appears to have 
lived on after communism, as there is a blatant disregard by political parties to respect the rule of 
law and the autonomy of the judiciary, as enshrined in the constitution.  
In Albania, courts are merely a pawn of political parties and loyal supporters are 
rewarded with high-level judicial nominations or are let off the hook for corruption charges. The 
attempts of former PD president Nishani to appoint PD supporters as rewards for their continued 
backing during times of political scrutiny is evidence of this. Also, politicians frequently 
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interfere with judicial decisions, demonstrating that political ties are more important than 
upholding the rule of law.  The biggest issue is the constant vetoing of political appointees by the 
opposition. Although a majority of candidates presented by the president lack proper 
qualifications, if the president and governing coalition in parliament are from different parties, 
the opposition continuously vetoes candidates out of political spite. The failure to fill vacancies 
on courts ensures that courts cannot fulfill their mandate, which slows down the effectiveness of 
the courts and leaves them open to politicization. Failure to fill vacancies also allows the current 
political balance on the court to hold for longer, allowing the political parties to mobilize 
potential candidates that can help pursue their interests.  
Furthermore, the intense political competition between parties has led the opposition to 
boycott numerous parliamentary sessions during times when crucial judicial reform packages 
were on the table. The best example occurred in 2016 when the government passed the most 
recent judicial reform package. The most important law, the vetting law, elicited the greatest 
amount of outrage amongst the PD and the Union of Judges, who were deeply afraid that their 
corrupt practices would be exposed. The efforts of the PD to derail the law and discredit the 
governing party’s commitment to ensuring the independence of the judiciary demonstrated that 
politicians in Albania preference political interests over passing reform efforts meant to secure 
the independence of the judiciary, which are crucial for lowering corruption levels. This finding 
can also be extended to judges, who arguably are more concerned with maintaining their ties to 
politicians for personal gain than upholding the rule of law.  
In sum, judicial independence in Albania remained poor from 2000 until present. This is 
mainly because political elites refuse to reform the judiciary because doing so would force them 
to relinquish their control over the judiciary.  Securing judicial independence is clearly a 
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secondary priority for most politicians, although the recent reform effort in 2016 may reduce the 
dependency of the judiciary on politicians. The parliamentary system in place further exacerbates 
Albania’s poor judicial independence and high levels of judicial corruption, as the ambiguous 
distribution of powers between the prime minister and president leads to the courts being trapped 
in a battle between the two actors. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 stating that high levels of 
destabilizing political competition will lead to high levels of judicial corruption is supported. 
Hypothesis 2 stating that a country with a parliamentary system will have lower levels of judicial 
corruption was not supported, as the parliamentary system in place has further aggravated the 
problem.  
II. European Union Leverage 
 After the fall of communism in 1990, it was time for Albania to re-orient itself towards 
the West. The Albanian government, like most post-communist CEE states, believed that 
obtaining EU membership status formally solidified a country’s transition from a communist 
stronghold to a full-fledged democracy. Unfortunately, Albania’s path to accession has been 
slower than those of its CEE counterparts. When the Visegrad countries acceded to the Union in 
2004, Albania was still in the beginning stages of the accession process. There was a brief 
moment of hope for Albania in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania acceded, but once again, it 
appeared as if the EU believed the Western Balkans needed more time to mature politically and 
economically. It was not until 2013 when Croatia obtained membership that EU integration had 
spread to the Western Balkans.  
Albania’s journey to EU accession began in 2000, when the European Union began the 
Stabilization and Association Process at the Zagreb Summit (Panagiotou, 2011, 367). The 
Stabilization and Association Agreement mandated that Western Balkan countries begin reform 
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processes in the area of justice and home affairs (Panagiotu, 2011, 367).  However, EU 
assistance in promoting minor judicial reforms can be traced back to the early 1990’s, when the 
European Commission allocated money to the Albanian judicial system through the Poland and 
Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) program (Peshkopia, 2014, 
118). The PHARE program was implemented through 1995, and helped the Albanian 
government re-establish the country’s criminal code, and assisted with the training of magistrates 
(Peshkopia, 2014, 118).  
The beginning phases of Albania’s accession journey were geared towards meeting the 
criteria of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. While the Visegrad countries appeared 
to be moving forward towards democracy in the early 2000’s, Albania was still very much 
lagging behind in establishing democratic institutions. The mid 1990’s to early 2000’s were 
characterized by intense political competition between the PS and PD, as they were engaged in a 
struggle to assert dominance after a post-communism political vacuum was created.  In its 2002, 
Stabilization and Association Report, the European Commission (2002, 4) noted:  
Early efforts to introduce democracy and build a market economy were severely 
undermined by the socio-economic crisis and generalized unrest, which followed the 
financial collapse of 1997. The lack of a democratic culture, the absence of dialogue 
between different political tendencies and a limited understanding of the concept of 
national interest amongst political leaders have often prevented the development and 
implementation of sound policies to address the many issues that Albania faces. The 
tense situation in the region has also had an adverse effect on the country’s stability. 
 
Additionally, Peshkopia states that in 2001, Albania entered into a “deep political crisis”, as the 
PS-led coalition imploded, which led to “the collusion between the government with organized 
crime…” (2014, 121). The author writes, “not only did the coalition government lack the 




  After the publication of the EU’s critical 2002 report, there was a slight improvement in 
the efforts of the parliament to produce judicial reforms. The government passed the Law on the 
Organization and Functioning of the High Council of Justice, which the EU stated was a “central 
instrument for the proper operation of the judicial institutions” (European Commission, 2003, 5). 
The government also amended the Criminal Procedures Code in an effort to deter corruption and 
organized crime (European Commission, 2003, 5). However, the EU stated that while these were 
all positive improvements, “full implementation and enforcement” was an absolute necessity 
moving forward (2003, 12). The Commission re-asserted the power of EU conditionality in 
triggering reform, stating the “prospect of a Stabilization and Association Agreement” remained 
a “powerful motor for reform in Albania” (2003, 12).  
  Albania encountered a setback in 2004, when the government failed to implement the 
reforms they passed the previous year, unapologetically defying the expectations laid out in the 
European Commission’s 2003 report. The European Commission wrote in its 2004 report, “the 
Government has continued to state that Albania’s progress in the Stabilization and Association 
Process is a top priority. However, its actions have not always supported this” (2004, 1). The EU 
noted that the Albanian government failed to implement reforms relating to the “professional 
capacities of judges, prosecutors, judicial police and administrative staff”, as well as judicial 
infrastructure (2004, 5). The European Commission also shamed the Albanian government by 
directly tying the public’s overall low perception of the judiciary to the government’s poor 
implementation of SAA reforms (2004, 5). In it’s summary of the report, the European 
Commission warned Albania that if it wanted to continue EU accession talks, then it needed to 
“demonstrate political will, the determination and the capacity to address the key issues 
identified in this report without delay” (2004, 1).  
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  Albania’s political crisis continued into 2005, when the country held national elections. 
The PD swept the PS out of office, and a new government was installed under Prime Minister 
and former President, Sali Berisha. It was believed that the new PD government would prove to 
be a metaphorical breath of fresh air compared to the previous government. The PS government 
was largely ineffective in combating judicial corruption, and frequently reneged on many of its 
reform efforts to support its own political agenda. Soon after taking office, the European 
Commission released a comprehensive agenda for the PD government to closely follow. 
Peshkopia (2014, 122-3), summarizes the Council of the European Union’s agenda: 
(1) Increase the transparency of the criminal and civil justice process; (2) guarantee that 
judges and prosecutors be appointed through competitive examination; (3) foster the 
status, independence and constitutional protection of judges; and (4) establish a 
transparent and merit-based system for the evaluation of prosecutors. 
 
During the same year, the PD government retreated on its commitment to reform and attempted 
to undermine the judiciary’s independence despite previous statements by the EU for the country 
to respect the rule of law. Peshkopia states that the period of 2005 to 2007 is well known for the 
PD’s “fervent efforts…to depose the prosecutor general and some of the members of the High 
Council of Justice” (2014, 123). The government claimed that it was removing officials with 
corrupt ties, but others believed the government was trying to interfere with the autonomy of the 
judiciary (Peshkopia, 2014, 123). In 2006, the governing PD coalition created a parliamentary 
committee to investigate General Prosecutor, Theodhori Sollaku’s, past performance, while the 
opposition refused to participate in the committee (Freedom House, 2007). Both the PD and the 
opposition established their own reports, and the PD’s report was selected by Parliament for 
presentation to the president (Freedom House, 2007). President Moisiu decided not to abide by 
the parliament’s recommendations and instead allowed the General Prosecutor to remain in his 
position, arguing that “Parliament cannot judge the legality of decisions made by the General 
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Prosecutor” (Freedom House, 2007). Freedom House commended the president for exercising 
restraint, concluding, “while the ruling majority’s intransigence demonstrated its problematic 
relationship with independent power centers, the resilience of the system showed that over the 
year, Albania has come a great distance toward achieving a consolidated democracy” (Freedom 
House, 2007).  
  This being said, there were still moments of trouble in the EU reform process stemming 
from a lack of political will on behalf of the governing party. Peshkopia points to the “politicized 
atmosphere” of the Parliament as the main failure for the lack of judicial reform, which “stalled 
despite the intensive technical assistance” by the European Assistance Mission to the Albanian 
Justice System (EURALIUS) (2014, 123). During the ongoing dispute over the tenure of the 
General Prosecutor, the Albanian government was in the midst of passing a reform that would 
restructure the district courts, but it got sidelined in the midst of the political turmoil (Peshkopia, 
2014, 123). The government also drafted a law that would amend appointment criteria for 
judges, but critics said it failed to address a number of other crucial areas, including the 
implementation of decisions and training for judges (Peshkopia, 2014, 123). Peshkopia does 
state, however, that the drafted reforms are “considered an improvement over existing 
legislation…” (2014, 123). 
In 2008, the European Commission stated that the small, incremental changes to the 
judicial system in 2007 were insufficient (2008, 8). The Commission pressured the Albanian 
government to “adopt a comprehensive strategy on judicial reform, to complete the legal 
framework and to provide sufficient human and financial resources for implementation” of the 
necessary reforms (2008, 9). Going into 2009, the intense political deadlock between the PS and 
PD continued, casting a dark cloud over any prospect of judicial reform. The European 
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Commission laid out a comprehensive agenda for the government the year before, and it was 
expected—as with all recommendations in progress reports—that it be carried out to the fullest 
extent the following year. At this time, the PD was still in office and had a controlling majority 
in Parliament. The Albanian government did pass reforms in 2009, but they were not in 
accordance with EU recommendations from the 2008 Progress Report. The government 
attempted to pass the Law on Lustration, which targeted judges who had ties to the former 
communist regime. This law undermined the independence of the judiciary, which is one of the 
areas the European Commission consistently states as a priority for the government (Peshkopia, 
2014, 126). There was a sign of restraint, though, by the Constitutional Court, as it ruled the law 
unconstitutional; but the damage was already done. Peshkopia writes, the “debate around it 
affected the judicial proceedings against former minister of defense, and current minister of 
environment, Matmir Mediu as well as other high officials implicated in the 2008 accident in the 
ammunition plan in Gerdec…in which 26 people died…” (2014, 126).  
In April 2009, the Stabilization and Association Agreement came into effect between 
Albania and the EU. During the same time, the Albanian government also submitted its 
application to the European Union so that it could be considered for candidacy status. The 
European Commission was instructed to draft a formal opinion on the government’s application, 
to be released in November 2010 (European Commission, 2010, 2). Until then, the Albanian 
government continued to make few reforms, even after the SAA came into effect (European 
Commission, 2009, 1).  The European Commission noted that the failure to adopt a 
comprehensive reform strategy was an obstacle to being granted candidacy status (2009, 1). The 
2009 report mentioned that the “postponement on procedural grounds of high-level cases, such 
as the Gerdec trial, raised questions about the impartiality of the judiciary” (European 
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Commission, 2009, 1). Although brief, the 2009 annual report also called for more legislation to 
be adopted in strengthening “judicial accountability and transparency of political party funding” 
(European Commission, 2009, 2).  
In November 2010, the European Commission released its long-awaited opinion on 
Albania’s application for membership. The Albanian government hoped that the European 
Commission would grant the country candidacy status, but the country was ultimately denied the 
right to move along to the next “carrot” in the accession process. The European Commission was 
optimistic about Albania’s potential to reach EU accession criteria in the “medium-term”, but 
admitted that the country’s inability to implement its judicial reforms was a contributing factor to 
the Commission’s decision (European Commission, 2010, 10). The other contributing factor was 
the destabilizing competition between the PS and PD, which is “confrontational and 
unconstructive” and “obstructs parliamentary work and prevents necessary policy reforms based 
on consensus” (2010, 5). In the Conclusions and Recommendation section of its Opinion, the 
European Commission stated (2010, 11): 
The Commission considers that negotiations for accession to the European Union should 
be opened with Albania once the country has achieved the necessary degree of 
compliance with the membership criteria and in particular the Copenhagen political 
criteria requiring the stability of institutions guaranteeing notably democracy and rule of 
law. 
 
The Commission created a wide-ranging list of policy initiatives the Albanian government 
needed to tackle in order for the Commission to re-consider candidacy status at a later date. The 
policy initiatives relevant to the judiciary are the following:  
• Ensure the proper functioning of Parliament on the basis of a constructive and 
sustained political dialogue among all political parties 
• Appoint the Ombudsman, and ensure an orderly hearing and voting process in 
Parliament for constitutional and high court appointments 
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• Strengthen rule of law through adoption and implementation of a reform strategy 
for the judiciary, ensuring the independence, efficiency and accountability of 
judicial institutions.  
• Effectively implement the government's anti-corruption strategy and action plan, 
remove obstacles to investigations, in particular of judges, ministers and Member 
of Parliaments; develop a solid track record of proactive investigations, 
prosecutions and convictions in corruption cases at all levels. (European 
Commission, 2010, 11) 
 
These areas for reform would come to guide Albania’s judicial reform agenda for the coming 
years. 
 After the Commission’s Opinion was released in 2010, the Albanian government adopted 
numerous important laws relating to the judiciary. In July 2011, the government adopted the 
Judicial Intersectorial Strategy and Action Plan, as well as revisited the Law on the 
Administrative Courts that was abandoned in 2008 (Peshkopia, 2014, 127). The European Union 
noted progress in reform progress, improving Albania’s score from “none” to “limited progress” 
(European Commission, 2011, 10). This was primarily in part due to the adoption of a Judicial 
Reform Strategy and Action Plan, which “consulted with a broad group of stakeholders” 
(European Commission, 2011, 10).  
 Nevertheless, Albania’s progress was short lived, as another political crisis would break 
out in the same year, halting all judicial reforms. This included many of the agenda items 
presented by the EU in the 2010 Progress Report. The first problem Albania encountered was 
that it could not manage to pass any of the laws drafted in 2011. Peshkopia states that in order to 
adopt the laws mentioned above, the governing coalition needed three-fifths majority, but that 
was not possible because the PS was being uncooperative (2014, 128). To complicate matters 
further, the PS led a demonstration against the PD government and four anti-government 
civilians were killed by security forces, causing a political divide between the governing 
coalition and the opposition (Peshkopia, 2014, 129).  After the demonstration, Albania held local 
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elections, and the PS lost the mayoral position in Tirana to the PD (Peshkopia, 2014, 129). 
Pehskopia writes, “these events deprived the government from both the necessary energy needed 
for crucial reforms and the necessary consensus of the opposition to adopt legislation that require 
reinforced majority” (2014, 129).   
 To make matters worse, the European Union denied Albania candidacy status for the 
second time in November 2011 (Kola, 2011). The European Commission cited the government’s 
lack of progress in safeguarding judicial independence, its failure to properly implement the 
proposed strategy and action plans, and the overall lack of progress in lowering judicial 
corruption levels (European Commission, 2011, 10-11). The European Commission also noted in 
its 2011 progress report that the Law on the Administrative Courts was “pending” at the end of 
the year, which was one of the main policy initiatives that Albania had been trying to adopt for 
many years (2011, 11). In the EU’s report, titled, “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council”, the Commission wrote that Albania had made “little 
progress” on meeting the policy initiatives outlined in the Commission’s 2010 Opinion (2011B, 
15). The European Union laid out additional areas for improvement that were more specific, 
including reforming the appointment process for High and Constitutional Court judges and 
limiting immunity for high-level officials (European Commission, 2011, 51, 53).  
  The Albanian government was forced to go back to the drawing table in 2012, having 
been rejected candidacy status for the second time. Peshkopia notes, “the second failure of 
Albania to receive its EU candidate status served as a wake-up call to the Albanian politics, but 
also to the European Commission” (2014, 179). The author writes that after it became clear to 
the Union that the political situation in Albania was far from improving, the European 
Commission sent the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, Stefan 
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Füle, to Tirana to help mediate a solution to the crippling political crisis (2014, 179). After the 
negotiations with Füle, there was remarkable progress in the reforms, as both sides agreed to 
“speed up the adoption of reform-related laws”, including the Judicial Intersectorial Strategy and 
Action Plan and the Law on the Administrative courts, which were not passed in 2011 because a 
three-fifths majority could not be reached (Peshkopia, 2014, 179). The Law on the 
Administrative Courts was a key reform that was mentioned explicitly as an area for 
improvement in the EU’s 2011 Progress Report.  
Overall, Albania showed improvement in 2012 in regards to judicial reform, as the 
Commission rated the country as making “moderate progress” on this front (2012, 11). Minimal 
progress was made concerning the appropriation of proper funds and resources to the judiciary 
this year (European Commission, 2012, 11). Perhaps one of the most important legislative 
decisions made by parliament this year was the passing of constitutional amendments to limit the 
immunity of judges and high-level officials—a key request of the Commission dating back to 
2009, and, most recently, the 2011 Progress Report (European Commission, 2012, 12).  
Additionally, when revisions were being made to the 2011 Judicial Intersectorial Strategy and 
Action plan, the European Commission asked for the Albanian government to revise aspects 
pertaining to the judiciary (Peshkopia, 2014, 129). In response to the EU’s request, the Ministry 
of Justice set up working groups to promote collaboration and problem-solving to pass the 
reform through (Peshkopia, 2014, 129).  
After the positive progress Albania made in 2012, the European Commission once again 
recommended that the European Council grant Albania candidate status. The Commission 
reiterated in its 2012 report that accession negotiations are directly tied to Albania’s performance 
in the areas of reform presented in the Commission’s 2010 Opinion (2012, 4). Although the 
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Commission noted that there had been “moderate progress” in judicial reform, the Council 
rejected Albania’s request to be considered for candidacy to the European Union (European 
Commission, 2012, 11). Peshkopia states that one of the main initiatives the EU had wanted 
Albania adopt in 2012 included the passing of the Law on the Organization of the High Court 
(2014, 129-30). The author notes that this law was one of three that the European Commission 
directly tied to the prospect of Albania achieving candidacy status, meaning that if the 
government could not deliver on this reform, the Council would continue to prevent Albania 
from moving on to the next accession step (2014, 129-30).  
2013 was expected to be a challenging year for Albanian politicians on both sides of the 
aisle, as the time for parliamentary elections had arrived and both of the parties were mobilizing 
their forces. The previous year, Parliament elected Bujar Nishani as President of the Republic. 
Nishani had close ties to the PD and was conveniently elected just as it was becoming apparent 
that support for the existing PD coalition was waning. Peshkopia states that the PD knew what 
was at stake in 2013, as it “desperately needed a positive response from the EU to boost its 
chances for reelection” (2014, 181). The PS seized on its momentum and attempted to undermine 
the image of the PD party as the party of “reformists”. The PS ran on an anti-corruption 
campaign and swept the parliamentary elections in June 2013. Edi Rama, the young PS leader 
and former mayor of Tirana, was elected prime minister.  
The election of the PS government marked a change in Albania’s judicial reform and 
overall progress in curbing judicial corruption. The European Commission noted, “despite a 
tense and often polarized political climate in the run-up to the general election in the first half of 
2013, Albania continued its efforts on reforms in all areas under the key [democracy and rule of 
law] priorities” (2013, 5). The European Commission stated that it had seen a positive trend in 
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Albania’s judicial reforms, as the government was properly implementing the 2011-2013 judicial 
reform strategy, a “key priority” listed in the 2010 Opinion (European Commission, 2013, 9). 
The new PS government also adopted the Law on the High Court in May 2013, which was an 
improvement, but the Commission stated that comprehensive reforms on both the Constitutional 
Court and the High Council of Justice still needed to fulfill previous criteria laid out the year 
before (European Commission, 2013, 37). The significance of passing the Law on the High 
Court should not be ignored, though, as it helped increase the independence of the judiciary and 
stream-lined the appointment of judges by the president, two of the Commission’s key criteria 
laid out in previous reports (European Commission, 2013, 37-8). The Commission also 
highlighted an overall increase in the prosecution and investigation of corruption cases by the 
judiciary (European Commission, 2013, 40-1).  
In an effort to “maintain focus on its EU integration and to monitor reform progress”, the 
European Commission created in November 2013 the High Level Dialogue with Albania 
(European Commission, 2014, 1). Nonetheless, the European Commission still considered it 
premature to allow Albania to ascend to EU candidacy status (Rukaj, 2014). Five countries 
(France, Germany, the UK, Holland, and Denmark) all vetoed the motion to grant Albania 
candidacy status in 2013 (Rukaj, 2014).  
 The following year, the government dedicated its resources to fulfilling the agenda set by 
the European Union. The government’s hard work paid off, and finally, after three prior 
rejections, Albania was awarded candidacy status by the European Parliament in June 2014. The 
European Commission commended the country on its reform efforts, stating that it had 
“demonstrated continued political will to prevent and combat corruption” (2014, 12). In its 2014 
Progress Report, the European Commission noted that since adoption of some necessary reform 
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measures had been achieved, the next step was to begin enforcing them (2014, 12). Furthermore, 
the European Commission stated that the next substantive action the government must take is to 
adopt and implement a “comprehensive” judicial reform package, as well as continue engaging 
in constructive political dialogue with the opposition (European Commission, 2014, 1).  
The Albanian government responded accordingly in 2015, creating the first ad-hoc 
parliamentary committee on judicial reform to begin reform discussions and identify areas for 
improvement (European Commission, 2015, 51). Albania made strides towards decreasing 
political influence over the High Court, and discussions took place about reforming the body, 
along with the Constitutional Court, the HCJ, and the Prosecutor’s Office (European 
Commission, 2015, 52). The actions taken by the government were essential in meeting broad 
policy initiatives the EU has had in place since 2010, including in the areas of judicial 
independence and efficiency. Additionally, the number of corruption cases investigation by the 
judiciary increased by 82% from 2014 to 2015 (European Commission, 2015, 54). The courts 
also convicted double the number of low to mid-level ranking officials from 2014, but still did 
not convict many high-level officials on corruption charges, overlooking the Commission’s 
previous calls for increasing its conviction track records (European Commission, 2014 54). The 
European Commission stated that Albania’s priority for the next year must be to increase judicial 
accountability by investigating more corruption cases, as well as to better implement existing 
reform legislation (European Commission, 2015, 51).  
The following year was spent creating a comprehensive reform package capable of 
propelling Albania into the good graces of the European Commission. Since Albania had reached 
candidacy status, the next step in Albanian reform efforts was to unlock accession negotiations. 
Triggering accession negotiations is the last step necessary before being formally welcomed into 
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the Union as a member country. The Albanian Parliament fiercely debated the proposed reform 
package in 2016. The PS government was eager to pass the reform, as it wanted to take credit for 
driving Albania into the next stages of EU accession before the upcoming elections in June 2017. 
The PD, on the other hand, was not nearly as receptive to the idea of passing the 2016 package, 
as it wanted to delay reforms to make the PS government look weak and ineffective in the war on 
corruption.  
The beginnings of a political crisis were evident to the European Commission in early 
2016. The PS and PD had already begun exchanging barbs, with the PD accusing the PS of going 
on a “witch-hunt” against the judiciary and the PS accusing the PD of undermining Albania’s 
efforts to accede to the EU. As the year progressed, the adoption of the comprehensive judicial 
reform packed continued to be delayed, and the EU grew frustrated with the political elites’ 
inability to overcome their bitter rivalries for the sake of promoting democracy. The PD went as 
far as to boycott participation in the ad-hoc committee and this resulted in the negotiations 
becoming “private, informal, extra-parliamentary tables, in a very non-transparent process, in 
which no details and arguments emerged, but only allegations and threats or, alternatively, a 
sterile press conference rhetoric” (Mali, 2016).  
The European Commission set a number of deadlines for the Albanian government to 
meet, and by the time July arrived, all of these deadlines had come and gone. Finally, the 
European Commission exercised its authority over the Albanian government, definitively stating 
that the EU would give Albania until Thursday, July 21, 2016 to pass the judicial reform package 
(Gotev, 2016). If this deadline was not met, EU Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement 
Commissioner, Johannes Hahn, reportedly said it would be the “last possible one” and if there 
was “no decision, there was the possibility of holding a referendum” on the judicial reform 
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(Gotev, 2016). Gotev states that at this time roughly 90% of the Albanian population was in 
favor of passing the reform (2014).  
The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk also attempted to appeal to the 
Albanian government, calling the reform package “very important for Albania and its European 
future” (“Albania—Tusk: Focus on…”, 2016). Federica Mogherini, the EU’s top diplomat, 
addressed the Albanian parliament personally, urging them to adopt the reform (Associated 
Press, 2016). Mogherini directly tied the passing of the reform to the opening of accession talks 
(Associated Press, 2016). Other external actors, such as the United States, also placed significant 
pressure on the Albanian government and were essential in pressuring the government to pass the 
legislation. The US Ambassador to Albania, Donald Lu, reportedly sent text messages to 
Albanian MP’s, “summoning” them to the US Embassy to “take vision of the consequences the 
American state would adopt towards them in case of voting against the reform” (Mali, 2016).  
The pressure from the EU and international community paid off. On Wednesday, July 
20—one day before the EU deadline—the PD and PS reconciled their differences and agreed to 
rally behind the final draft of the reform package (Semini, 2016). On July 21, 2016 the Albanian 
government formally approved the amendments to the Constitution. The passing of the reform 
marks the first time in Albania’s modern history that a comprehensive reform package passed 
without being watered down or blocked all together.  
The 2016 reform package answered many of the Commission’s concerns regarding the 
politicization and independence (or lack thereof) of the judicial branch. In particular, it 
completely overhauled the processes for nominations of the High Court and Constitutional 
Court, as well as re-established the mandate of the HCJ. Under the new reform the High Council 
of Justice will be replaced by a High Judicial Council (HJC), which will “have greater 
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independence from political influence and be less prone to corporatism and corruption” 
(European Commission, 2016, 14). The composition of the new HJC will include 11 full-time 
members, of which 6 are judges and the other five are lay members (European Commission, 
2016, 14). The new reform package significantly curbed the power of the president over the 
judiciary. The president will no longer head the High Council of Justice (nor the HJC), and a 
leader will instead be voted on by the members of the HJC (European Commission, 2016, 14). 
The HJC has taken on the roles of the HCJ, particularly the evaluation, appointment, promotion, 
and transfer of judges so as to solve the issues attributed to politicization of the body (European 
Commission, 2016, 14).  
The reform package also vastly reforms the appointment process of judges, answering the 
EU’s requests featured in numerous progress reports. The president will still be involved in the 
appointment of the justices, but the list of nominees is formulated by the new HJC—without the 
input of the president (European Commission, 2016, 15). An independent body, the Justice 
Appointments Council, was created to “verif[y] the fulfillment of legal requirements, as well as 
the professional and moral criteria applicable to the candidates for the seats in the Constitutional 
Court and for the new post of High Justice Inspector” (European Commission, 2016, 15-6).  
The final piece of the reform seeks to improve Albania’s poor track record of 
investigating and convicting judges, as it “involve[s] checking the assets and qualifications of all 
incumbent judges in Albania, as well as those of potential appointees” (Nuttal, 2016).  The 
vetting law is perceived to be the cornerstone of the judicial reform package, and was the 
primary driving force behind the European Union agreeing to entertain the idea of accession 
talks (Nuttal, 2016). However, the vetting law did not have the support of the PD, and the 
Constitutional Court was petitioned by the opposition party to decide on the constitutionality of 
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the law (Nuttal, 2016). Both the opposition and the Union of Judges believe the law to be an 
assault on the independence of the judiciary by the PS. The implementation of the law was 
uncertain until December 2016, when the Constitutional Court finally ruled that the law was 
constitutional (Mejdini, 2016E). This allowed the process to resume in January 2017, with the 
creation of a new group, the International Monitoring Operation (IMO), to oversee the vetting of 
judicial figures (Mejdini, 2016E). The IMO is funded by the EU and US, and began its work on 
February 8, 2017 (Mejdini, 2017).  
Albania is scheduled to hold elections in June 2017, and the PD has begun to rally its 
troops against the PS. On February 22, the PD boycotted Parliament, which “defied” the EU’s 
requests that the opposition “not disrupt parliamentary approval of judicial reforms vital to 
starting EU accession talks” (EurActive, 2017). EurActive (2017) reports that the PD’s actions 
will inevitably “stall” the work of the IMO, despite the fact that the EU said that if Albania 
implements the reform and demonstrates ample progress by September then it will trigger 
accession negotiations by the end of the year.   
Analysis of European Union Leverage  
Upon analyzing Albania’s journey from a country in the early stages of democratization 
to an EU candidate country, two conclusions can be made about the effect of EU conditionality 
on curbing judicial corruption levels: EU leverage is moderately effective in encouraging reform 
in the lead up to a country obtaining candidacy status, but is particularly effective in producing 
results once a country becomes a candidate; and domestic context (such as political climates, 
ideologies, and public opinion) matters when examining EU leverage in candidate countries. 
These findings support those of Dimitrova (2010), Garbbe (2014), and Vachudova (2009), 
amongst others.  
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 This section of Chapter 3 traced Albania’s accession process from 2000 until present 
using the method of process tracing. After undergoing the first two phases of EU accession 
(signing the SAA and obtaining candidacy status), it can be seen that Albania has come a long 
way in curbing judicial corruption since the fall of communism. When the EU first began its 
work in Albania, the country’s judiciary was not well developed. Over the years, Albania has 
slowly but steadily begun to pass judicial reform packages that dramatically transformed its 
judiciary. Much of this progress can be attributed to the European Union’s success in using its 
leverage over potential member countries to create meaningful and sustainable reform.  
 Granted, Albania’s reform process was not perfect in the early stages of the accession 
process. Corruption levels remained relatively stagnant in the early 2000’s because the PS 
government was undergoing an internal crisis, which strengthened the ties between politicians, 
the judiciary, and organized crime. The main tool the EU used in the early stages of talks with 
the Albanian government was the Stabilization and Association Agreement. This tool was 
relatively effective in setting a broad agenda for the government to follow in the early 2000’s, 
but did not offer political elites much incentive to begin creating substantive reforms. The SAA 
agreement encouraged the passing of small reforms such as the Law on the Organization and 
Functioning of the High Council of Justice. However, the reason why EU conditionality was 
largely ineffective during this period was because, while the government was eager to adopt 
reforms to demonstrate effort on many of the agenda items, it lacked the proper incentive to 
implement the reforms.  
 The EU carried out its conditionality using its annual progress reports, but in 2004, the 
EU appeared to make a tactical change. The EU directly attempted to “shame” the Albanian 
government into beginning to implement reforms. The EU tied the public’s poor opinion of the 
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judiciary directly to the governing coalition, highlighting the inability of the government to 
follow through on its commitment. This was a clever move on the part of the EU, as it knew that 
the public was in favor of Albania’s swift accession to the EU. The year 2004 was also the first 
time that the EU directly called upon the government to augment its determination to “address 
the key issues identified in this report without delay” (European Commission, 2004, 1).  
 Unfortunately, it can be seen that the period of 2004-2008 did not experience much of an 
improvement in lowering corruption levels. However, this is mainly in part due to the political 
crisis that was broke out during this time between the PS and PD. The new PD government 
attempted to undermine the independence of the judiciary, and this caused many of the important 
reforms that the government had promised to adopt to be pushed to the sideline. This highlights a 
crucial part of my argument: domestic context and the interests of political elites are an 
important factor to consider when examining the overall effectiveness of EU leverage in Albania. 
Noutcheva and Aydin-Duzgit write that when “the EU incentives are only partially aligned with 
the incumbents’ domestic incentives for rule-of-law change, we witness partial reform that 
may…or may not be provoked by the EU factor per se” (2012, 72). Furthermore, the authors 
argue that when the “costs” of passing rule of law reform appear to be “too high for the 
government incumbents, we see non-reform or patchy reform that amounts to marginal advances 
in the rule of law” (2012, 62). The “lack of democratic culture” in the early part of accession 
procedures is also a crucial factor, as “politicians have a limited understanding of the concept of 
national interest, leading to intense political and personal rivalries within and between the main 
political parties” (Panagiotou, 2011, 370). Garbbe (2014, 44-5) would concur with Panagiotou 
writing:  
Where the accession process runs against the political tide in a country, it cannot gain 
momentum to overcome domestic obstacles consistently enough to achieve systemic 
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transformation. The EU’s combination of membership conditionality, material incentives 
and social pressure depends on widespread orientation towards future membership. 
Where the accession date seems very far away, rent-seeking elites, weak bureaucracies 
and nationalist leaders can stop EU-motivated reforms even if the public wants to join.  
 
However, during this time the government did pass some reforms that were described as 
“improvements over existing legislation” (Peshkopia, 2014, 123), which demonstrates that in the 
early phases of EU accession, EU conditionality is effective, but its power can be easily masked 
by the actions of power-hungry political elites seeking to advance their own interests over those 
of the state-building.   
 European Union conditionality and its effects on corruption levels improved after the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement came into effect in April 2009. I argue that this is 
because the implementation of the SAA convinced the Albanian government to re-evaluate its 
course of action, as it became increasingly clear that the next “carrot” in the accession process 
would be to obtain candidacy status. Anastasakis argues that EU conditionally “makes clear” and 
“explicit” to potential member countries because “it would lead to the successful conclusion of 
the accession negotiations for membership into the European Union” (2008, 368).  Obtaining 
candidacy status is one of two monumental steps a potential-EU member country can take in its 
accession journey, and provides political elites both with bragging rights and a plethora of 
political and economic benefits. After the EU rejected the country’s bid for candidacy status in 
2010, the government sped up its judicial reform efforts. The rejection by the European 
Parliament—on three occasions—served as the primary motivator for the Albanian government, 
particularly since the country was undergoing the process with the rest of the Western Balkans, 
creating a sort of competition.  
The policies the European Parliament laid out in the 2010 Opinion would come to shape 
Albania’s judicial reform progress until 2014. The EU used these agenda items as the minimal 
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baseline that Albania must meet in order to obtain candidacy status. By setting clear parameters 
early on in the accession process, the EU’s agenda setting provided the government with a 
working blueprint to follow. Vachudova states, “in order to be effective, EU leverage must be 
applied well before accession. Indeed, experience suggests that once negotiations for 
membership have gained momentum, it is already too late to apply strong conditionality and/or 
turn back…” (2009, 60). This finding appears to be applicable to the Albanian case, as in the 
year following its first rejection for candidacy status, the government adopted essential reforms 
that were praised by the EU. The EU’s progress report took note of this improvement, and 
improved Albania’s score from “none” to “limited progress” in the area of judicial reform (2011, 
10).  
After Albania’s second rejection of candidacy status in 2011, the European Union 
increased its leverage over the country to include the prescription of very specific policy reforms 
that the government needed to adopt in order to meet the criteria laid out in the 2010 Opinion. 
This leads me to my next argument: the role of the European Union as an agenda setter for the 
Albanian government has proven to be particularly effective in curbing judicial corruption. 
While implementation on many of the reforms continued to lag behind, without the European 
Union to continuously guide the government’s policy initiatives, it is more than likely that 
Albania would still be suffering from crippling corruption levels.  
The main problem the government faced from 2000-2010 was a lack of initiative and 
sense of urgency to adopt reforms. The European Union was able to provide the government 
with a “push forward” and its effect cannot be denied. After the Albanian government was 
rejected candidacy status in 2011 and a destabilizing political crisis broke out between the PS 
and PD, the EU adopted a new role: mediator. After the Union sent Commissioner Fule to Tirana 
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to mitigate the conflict between the parties, the parties reconciled and even began passing the 
specific reforms laid out in the 2011 progress report. At this point, the Albanian government 
recognized that it needed to comply with the EU’s requests otherwise it would face a humiliating 
third rejection for candidacy status the next year. Peshkopia writes that this is consistent with 
theories on the effect of EU conditionality, stating that “membership conditionality only works 
when it manages to shift domestic leaders’ policy preferences to compliance…if the benefits of 
membership are higher than the domestic cost of sectorial reform, then governments proceed 
with that reform” (2014, 214). The Albanian government continued to be responsive to the 
requests of the EU not only in terms of adopting policy, but also in engaging in problem solving 
initiatives with the opposition to mitigate political disputes.  
 However, it should be noted that an underlying force driving the progress in judicial 
reform from 2012-2014 was the upcoming elections in 2013. The PS party was very much aware 
of the fact that any efforts to derail judicial reforms would fare horribly for their chances of 
removing the PD government from power the following year. Similarly, the PD understood that 
in order to get re-elected the following year, it needed to continue to produce meaningful 
reforms. As stated previously, a majority of Albanians viewed the possible accession to the EU 
in a favorable light. As such, this came to influence the policy decisions that political elites took, 
as blocking suggested EU reforms would reflect poorly on them. Bogdani and Loughlin (2007, 
190) note that the “aspirations of the Albanian people to reintegrate into mainstream Europe and 
the ‘bottom up’ pressure that results may be used to promote reforms.” This explanation, coupled 
with EU leverage, can aid in explaining why EU conditionality was most effective in 2013, as 
the potential of obtaining candidacy status became a reality. It appeared that Albania’s third and 
final rejection in 2013 was the ultimate push the new PS government needed, as the following 
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year it finally obtained candidacy status. Thus, as a country grows closer to obtaining EU 
candidacy status, EU conditionality becomes the primary driver in the propelling forward reform 
efforts.  
The most important finding to come out of the narrative presented above is that once a 
country obtains candidacy status, EU conditionality is particularly effective in lowering judicial 
corruption levels. This finding is in accordance with the findings of other scholars who study the 
effects of EU conditionality on reform efforts. Indeed, Dimitrova argues that EU conditionality 
was particularly successful in “stimulating” CEE states to adopt and implement reforms as they 
are gearing up for accession, and this progress continues to improve once a country becomes a 
candidate country (2010, 137-8). This was best seen from 2014 to the present, when Albania was 
in the midst of passing its first comprehensive judicial reform. Over the years, the EU 
consistently requested that the Albanian government pass a comprehensive reform. Once the 
country achieved candidacy status, it began to undergo the adaptation of the massive reform 
package. However, political elites attempted to thwart the adoption of the law, as parliamentary 
elections were coming up the following year and the PD was itching to regain its majority in 
June 2017. The EU refused to let Albania renege on its commitments, as it had made progress in 
its judicial reform since 2000. The year 2016 was the first time that the EU began to use threats 
of halting accession negotiations with the government unless it met a deadline. The reform 
package was also the first time the EU had to dictate to the government a deadline to be met. 
This reinforced the idea to the government that failure to pass this reform package would derail 
any hopes of meeting the 2020 accession target laid out years before. After pressure from 
multiple members of the EU, including the President of the European Parliament, the EU 
Commissioner, and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
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Security Policy, the PD agreed to work with the PS. The next day, Albania passed a monumental 
reform package that is expected to overhaul the judiciary and dramatically improve corruption 
levels. The role of the US in pushing forward the reforms should also not be denied. The US 
played an essential role in working with the EU to put pressure on the government. The dynamic 
between the US and the EU and its commitment to leveraging its influence over the Albanian 
government demonstrates the effectiveness of powerful external actors on prompting judicial 
reform. The passing of the reform also “unlocked” the goal Albania had been reaching towards 
since 1989: the opening of EU accession negotiations.  
Of course, the Albanian government is not perfect and experienced minor setbacks after 
the reform package was passed. However, the reformists in the government proved victorious 
after the PD and the Union of Judges challenged the controversial vetting law. The 
Constitutional Court showed exceptional restraint when it ruled the law constitutional. The Court 
willingly subjected itself to vetting procedures upon releasing its decision, as it paved the way 
for the vetting procedures to begin as early as January 1989. The vetting law allows the EU to 
create a committee to oversee the vetting of 800 judges, including those on the Constitutional 
Court.  
Worth noting is the influence of EU “enlargement fatigue” on Albania’s overall accession 
journey. Throughout Albania’s journey to candidacy status many countries remained skeptical 
about the integration of the Western Balkans, as they believed Albania and its neighbors posed 
significant threats to the political and economic stability of the Union. The concern was 
particularly relevant given that the region was still recovering from the aftereffects of the global 
financial crisis triggered in 2008 (Zeneli, 2016). The Union was also facing an overall assault by 
critics about the future of “Europeanization”. These issues, combined with the promotion of 
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Jean-Claude Junker to European Commission President in 2014, have “sidelined” the integration 
of the Western Balkans into the EU (Kmezic, 2015, 11). Kmezic states, “many EU Member 
States seemingly pay lip service to enlargement, while making use of their veto powers to delay 
the accession process” (2015, 11). This was best demonstrated in 2013 when five countries 
vetoed Albania’s third attempt at reaching candidacy status even though substantial reform 
progress had been met by the new PS government. It is unclear, though, how much of a role 
enlargement fatigue influenced the overall effectiveness of EU conditionality in curbing 
corruption levels. Zeneli argues that “overall support has not been fizzling out at all”, pointing to 
the efforts of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to reassure the Western Balkans in 2014 
(2016). However, Zeneli also warns that the EU’s actions, including “sending de-stimulating 
messages to the region for further enlargement would create the unintended consequence of 
‘reforms fatigue’” (2016). The author concludes that this could “foster political back-sliding and 
instability for the region and the EU itself” (Zeneli, 2016).  
In sum, EU conditionality is effective in lowering judicial corruption levels. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 3, which postulates that EU candidate countries and member countries have 
lower levels of judicial corruption. Albania’s judicial corruption levels have diminished 
significantly since 2000, and this has been mainly in part due to the role of EU conditionality in 
putting the proper pressure on the government. EU conditionality provided political elites both 
with initiative and a sense of urgency. Two arguments have been made in this section: EU 
leverage is moderately effective in lowering corruption levels in the lead up to a country 
obtaining candidacy, but is particularly effective in lowering corruption levels once a country 
achieves candidate status (relative to the progress made when a country is still a potential 
candidate country); and domestic factors—such as the interests of political elites, veto players, 
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and public opinion—matter significantly and can either help or hinder the efforts of the EU in 
lowering corruption levels. Given the current state of Albania’s judicial reform, it will be 
interesting to see how the partnership between the EU and the Albanian government plays out in 
the coming months, as it could be crucial in deciding the June 2017 parliamentary election 
results and whether Albania meets its target date of accession by 2020. 
III. Media Freedom 
 Since 2002, the Freedom House Index has consistently rated Albania’s media as “partly 
free” in its Freedom of the Press report. Theoretically, the Albanian media is protected by the 
constitution, and the Albanian public is protected from defamation, as it is a criminal offense that 
carries the punishment of fines (Freedom House, 2015). In order to protect journalists from being 
subject to false claims of libel violations, an effort was made in 2012 to lessen the punishment 
for libel to remove prison sentences and lower hefty fines—which often were misplaced on 
journalists by elites (Freedom House, 2013). While it appears that the media is well protected 
under the law, Albania continues to receive only ratings of “partly free” because of the intense 
politicization of the media by political elites and wealthy business owners (Freedom House, 
2015).  
 Press freedom has only begun to slowly improve since 2000. In 2002, Freedom House 
reported that Albania still considered libel and defamation to be criminal offenses (2002). The 
quality of news at the time was described as “sensationalist and irresponsible”, and journalists 
lacked integrity (Freedom House, 2002). Additionally, the physical security of journalists was 
never guaranteed, as there were frequent attacks against journalists for publishing their opinions 
or the facts in stories (Freedom House, 2003). The government also had a tight hold over the 
media in the early 2000s. In May 2004, Prime Minister Fatos Nano sued the publisher of Koha 
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Jone, Nikolle Lesi, for libel when his newspaper pointed to Nano as a key player in corruption 
(Freedom House, 2005). Later that year the courts found him and another publisher guilty of 
libel and defamation, respectively (Freedom House, 2005).  
 In recent years there are still a number of highly concerning issues pertaining to press 
freedom that have resulted in a stagnation of media freedom values. Freedom House reported in 
2011 that the “high number of broadcast and print outlets competing in the small Albanian media 
market has led to an environment guided primarily by business interests.” The organization states 
that this is because “editorial independence and quality is hampered by media owners who also 
run other business, and state pressure on media is most often seen in interference in these other 
economic interests” (Freedom House, 2011). Over the years there has been an increase in the 
number of media outlets in Albania. As of 2015, Albania has the highest number of newspaper 
outlets in all of Europe, but also has one of the lowest circulation and distribution rates (Freedom 
House, 2015B).  
The relationship between the government, media, and judiciary also remains poor. 
Albania has a history of the court system fining the media for committing “offenses” during 
corruption investigations. Freedom House highlights one instance occurring in 2010 when a 
court fined the TOP TV channel for “violating the privacy of former minister of culture Ylli 
Pango” (2012). The network was fined 400,000 euros, which was viewed to be at the time 
“disproportionate to the offense and a threat to the investigative journalism in the country”  
(Freedom House, 2012). 
 Generally speaking, today the media does not break many stories on judicial corruption. 
In a report released by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in 2014, it was 
revealed that only 304 articles were published on the topic of corruption (BIRN, 2014, 22). Of 
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those 304 articles, corruption stories relating to the justice system only made up 9% of 
newspaper coverage (BIRN, 2014, 22). BIRN also conducted the same type of study for three 
TV networks. Similarly, the organization found that out of 290 news pieces analyzed, 152 were 
focused on politicians and the administration, while only 20 news articles (7%) covered judicial 
corruption (BIRN, 2014, 23). The report found that most of the time, media outlets focus on 
“pseudo-events drawn from political press releases or news conferences of public institutions 
(such as ministries, the General Prosecutor’s Office, State Police) which were identified as well 
as the main organizers of news events reported in the media on corruption cases” (BIRN, 2014, 
38).  
 The Albanian media is also heavily reliant on advertisement funding from political 
parties and this has compromised the independence of the media. Freedom House reported in 
2013, “media depend on coveted advertising contracts from state institutions, which are typically 
awarded to media that provide favorable coverage to the government, leaving few truly 
independent outlets” (2013B). The government also uses its influence over advertising funds to 
control the media and run pro-government stories (BIRN, 2015, 17-18). 
 As a result, the media has not shown to have a high track-record in breaking corruption 
stories at the higher levels of government, and there have been very few efforts dedicated to the 
investigation of mid to low level government officials (Transparency International, 2016, 197). 
In 2015, BIRN conducted interviews with several media groups, and concluded that self-
censorship has become the norm in Albania due to a lack of independence deriving from 
constant pressure by politicians or questionable financial dependencies on state institutions (23-
4). The report also highlighted that self-censorship is a continuous problem in the Albanian 
media because journalists are “fearful of what could happen if they publish certain information” 
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(BIRN, 2015, 8). The relationship between the media, courts, and politicians also remains poor 
because of this dependency. Overall, Transparency International states that “investigative 
journalism has grown but remains generally weak and hampered by the lack of independent 
media and judiciary, and low resource levels” (2016, 197). 
Analysis of Media Freedom  
 The narrative presented above provides a very limited picture of the overall relationship 
between the media, judiciary, and politicians. It is difficult to properly discern the effect of media 
freedom on judicial corruption levels in Albania, mainly because self-censorship and a lack of 
investigative journalism have contributed to a culture in which reporting on judicial corruption is 
non-existent. The role of the media in society should be to act as a watchdog on government 
institutions, such as the judiciary. However, in Albania the media is less of a watchdog and more 
of a silent observer. According to BIRN this has hindered the public’s access to information, thus 
ensuring that judicial scandals are rarely ever exposed (2015, 8). BIRN also states that in order 
for the media to be effective in the “fight against corruption” it must engage in investigative 
journalism that “produce[s] tangible and intangible results against corrupt practices” (2014, 7).  
 Part of the reason that Albania continues to struggle with judicial corruption is because, 
while the media is in fact rated as “partly free” and the government has not placed legal 
restrictions on journalists, a majority of the investigative reporting focuses solely on politics. 
BIRN writes that this “leaves little space for news from other sectors of society or government 
affected by corruption”, including the judiciary (2014, 39). There is a “tabloidization of 
corruption cases” which is meant to “divert public attention away from the abuse of power or 
impunity related to such cases” (BIRN, 2014, 41). Therefore, if judicial corruption is discussed 
in the media, it does not get the attention it deserves. The media is meant to investigate corrupt 
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practices in order to increase transparency. If transparency cannot be obtained, then corrupt 
practices will continue to go unnoticed, allowing corruption in the judiciary to become endemic. 
 Additionally, the relationship between politicians and the media remains strained, as 
politicians use the courts as their pawn to sue journalists who shed light on their corrupt 
practices. As a result, this has contributed to a culture in which journalists must self-censor or 
else face monetary or legal consequences for publishing incriminating stories. This was best seen 
in 2004 when Prime Minister Nino sued an editor of a prominent newspaper for libel, and 
another for defamation. The courts act as the middleman between politicians and the media by 
handing out decisions that are neither fair nor just. Courts should act as a check on MP’s who 
wish to use their power for political gain, but due to the lack of judicial independence in Albania, 
this is a tricky feat.  
 These findings support Hypothesis 4, which states that countries with low levels of press 
freedom will have higher levels of corruption. In Albania, the media is only ranked as “partly 
free”, which is not a horrible rating, but has contributed to the country’s high levels of judicial 
corruption levels. The media has the ability to investigate judicial corruption if it so chooses, but 
the reliance on the state for funding and advertisement as contributed to a culture where self-
censorship is acceptable. Thus, overall, it does appear the Albania’s media freedom score has 










Chapter 4: Judicial Corruption in Romania 
 
 In 2007, Romania acceded to the European Union (EU), effectively putting an end to any 
doubts about the country’s ability to join Europe’s most prestigious political-economic bloc. 
Romania’s journey to EU membership was rocky. After failing to join the Union with its fellow 
post-communist neighbors in 2004, Romania faced the daunting possibility of delayed accession 
talks unless the country got a handle on its significant corruption issues. The European Union 
used conditionality to encourage Romania to combat corruption. Through the use of the 
safeguard clause and biannual Co-Operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) reports, the 
European Union used its leverage over the Romanian government to push through reforms 
leading up to accession. However, as will be elaborated on further in this chapter, the effects of 
EU leverage on Romania’s corruption levels remain limited post-accession.  
 The European Union has listed judicial corruption as the most important policy area 
needing to be addressed post-accession by the Romanian government. In 2013, Romania earned 
a value of 3.7 (out of 5) on Transparency International‘s Global Corruption Barometer (TI, 
2013). Romania’s score indicates that the judiciary is moderately corrupt and that the public has 
moderately low trust in the judiciary. In TI’s 2010/2011 Global Corruption Barometer, Romania 
scored 4.0 (TI, 2010). In 2006—the year preceding Romania’s accession to the European 
Union—the country earned a 3.9 (TI, 2006). In the same 2010/2011 report, Romania’s Eastern 
European neighbors, Poland and Hungary, scored 3.3 and 2.9, respectively (Transparency 
International, 2011).  
 As one can see, Romania’s scores have remained in the middle to high range since 
acceding to the EU in 2007, but have improved since the fall of communism. These values also 
put Romania’s corruption values in perspective relative to other CEE states. Romania struggles 
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in comparison to its counterparts, encouraging one to assume that there is indeed a unique 
variation on the three main variables under consideration (EU membership, judicial 
independence, and media freedom) that could be contributing to its poor scores. This chapter 
seeks to examine the effect of three independent variables on Romania’s judicial corruption 
levels in an effort to trace causal relationships over time.  
I. Judicial Independence  
 After the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime in December 1989, Romanian politics have 
been unpredictable and, often, volatile. After Ceausescu, the socialist party renamed itself and, 
for the most part, continued to dominate Romanian politics until 2004 (Vachudova, 2009, 57). 
Post-communist Romania is characterized as a multiparty system in which many parties have 
stakes in government. Since 1989 the left-leaning Social Democratic Party (PSD)—formally the 
PDSR—, the center-right Liberal Democratic Party (PDL), the right-leaning National Liberal 
Party (PNL), and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, the party representing 
Romania’s Hungarian minority group, have dominated politics (Balkan Insight, 2010). The PSD 
and the PDL are, arguably, the leading political parties in Romania and have been members of 
various governing coalitions throughout the 21st century.  
 Romania’s government is a semi-presidential system in which the president is the formal 
head of state and the prime minister the head of government. The president is elected by popular 
vote and must earn an absolute majority in a run-off if one cannot be achieved in the first round 
(CIA, 2017). The president, with the approval of the bicameral Parliament, selects the prime 
minister.  
Romania has struggled to secure the independence of its judiciary since the early 2000’s, 
when the country was in serious talks with the European Union. In 2004, Romania was rocked 
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with a scandal Freedom House has dubbed Romania’s “Watergate” (Freedom House, 2005).  In 
November 2004, Romania was scheduled to hold presidential and legislative elections. The party 
in power at the time was the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The former communist party 
enjoyed a majority in parliament and former-PSD Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase, was looking 
to extend the party’s political control in the upcoming presidential election. His opponent was 
Traian Basescu of the opposition PDL.  
 Roughly one week before the first round of presidential voting, the media leaked pages of 
PSD meeting transcripts (Ionita, 2004, 119). In these transcripts, the PSD government openly 
discussed its efforts to interfere with the mandate of the courts. According to Ionita, the 
transcripts confirmed that “PSD leaders were scheming how to manipulate judicial investigations 
and influence the decisions of courts; how to block the activity of the nominally independent 
agencies, such as the Court of Accounts, in order to cover the actions of ministers…” (2004, 
119).  
 One particular transcript covered a meeting of three high-level PSD leaders on October 
20th, 2003.  Present were Nicolae Vacaroi (Chair of the Senate), Florin Georgescu (Deputy 
Governor of the Central Bank), and Rodica Stanoiu (Minister of Justice). Prime Minister Nastase 
was also in attendance but was not featured speaking in this particular set of transcripts. In the 
leaked transcripts, Mr. Vacaroiu expressed to Nastase his concern about the party’s poor image. 
He stated, “All our investigating institutions only expose PSD members”, and admitted to the 
Minister of Control, Blanculescu, that he could “expose one of ours in a press conference if [he 
has] five from PRM, four from PD and two from PNL alongside him” (“Corruption, Political 
Control…”, 2004, 121).1  Mr. Vacaroiu’s attempts to sabotage the opposition parties went a step 
																																								 																				
1 See “Corruption, Political Control of Judiciary, Traffic of Influence” for full transcripts 
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further, as he suggested that the PSD undermine the court’s ability to try cases by “produc[ing] 
three-four more investigation files, to hit them [PD and PNL] in the head...” (“Corruption, 
Political Control…” 2004, 121).  
 Perhaps the most incriminating parts of the leaked transcripts were the statements made 
by Mr. Georgescu, a top PSD leader and former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank. He 
suggested to Nastase that the PSD come up with “ a number of concrete cases [against the 
opposition, to counterbalance the resignation of 3 ministers in 2003…], because these are 
institutions we control.” (“Corruption, Political Control…” 2004, 121). Additionally, Mr. 
Georgescu pressed Nastase to speak with the head of the Court of Accounts, Mr. Saguna, “on the 
behalf of the party” so that the Court did not begin investigations into numerous PSD ministers 
and their mishandlings of public funds (“Corruption, Political Control…” 2004, 121). Georgescu 
warned Prime Minister Nastase that the corruption case files would soon be taken from the Court 
of Accounts to the “ordinary courts” where the PSD does not have “people at the top” 
(“Corruption, Political Control…” 2004, 121).  
 Below is an excerpt of a transcript in which Mr. Georgescu directly hints that the head of 
the Court of Accounts should collude with the PSD: 
I am not complaining here, don't get me wrong, this is just a friendly recommendation, he 
[the head of the Court of Accounts, n.t.] should be more constructive, he should come 
and talk to us more often. And he should look more often into the budget executions from 
the past, when he looks at 2002 he should say fine, is Ok, but oops, here is a problem 
from 1999 [from the previous center-right administration, n.t.], the law allows him to 
investigate 1999. Thank you. (Statement made by Florin Georgescu, obtained from 
“Corruption, Political Control…”, 2004, 122).  
 
Former Minister of Justice for the PSD government, Rodica Stanoiu, admitted to screening cases 
against PSD members to prevent them from being prosecuted. In the transcripts, she stated, 
“there are two-three other files on the pipeline, they are coming, and they are hard and important. 
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I have been told that in almost all of them we find people from here involved… so I left them in 
stand by to see how we work them out…” (“Corruption, Political Control…”, 2004, 122).  
 Many high-level PSD members, including the president of Romania, Ion Iliescu, 
confirmed the authenticity of the transcripts (Ionita, 2004, 119). Prime Minister Nastase, 
although not featured on the tapes, claimed that the leaked transcripts were fakes, but Deputy 
Prime Minister Adrian Severin admitted to their authenticity (Parvulescu, Demsorean, and 
Vetrici-Soimu, 2005, 10). The PSD’s power and control over the judiciary was evident when 
Romania’s anti corruption agencies failed to properly look into the matter. Ionita notes, “both the 
Prosecutor General and the Head of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Office (PNA, 
special institution created in 2002 with EU assistance) disappeared from public view for a few 
weeks when this scandal broke out” (2004, 220). The Prosecutor General also said he would not 
investigate the corrupt acts until the national elections were concluded (Ionita, 2004, 220).  
 After the national elections in November 2004, the PSD was thrown out of office and a 
new government favoring anti-corruption reform was installed under Prime Minister Calin 
Popescu Tariceanu  (Bilefsky, 2005). Former PSD Prime Minister Nastase and Traiain Basescu, 
were the front-runners in the presidential elections. Basescu was a member of the D.A. “Justice 
and Truth” Alliance between the PNL and the PD (Hipper, 2015, 159). During the first round of 
voting Nastase failed to earn a majority in the first round of voting, as required by law, so a 
runoff was conducted. Basescu was not favored to win, but miraculously beat Nastase in the run-
off vote, earning 51.2 percent of the vote to Nastase’s 48.77 percent (Hipper, 2015, 159). The 
socialists’ monopoly over Romanian politics had come to a surprising halt.  
 The 2004 presidential elections were a significant turning point in Romania’s history not 
only because they brought about the end of the socialists’ political dynasty, but also because the 
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elections changed the momentum of Romania’s judicial reform efforts. The newly elected 
government ran on an anti-corruption campaign, and had an ambitious agenda. The new 
president’s center-right Justice and Truth Alliance did not earn a majority in parliament, and had 
to form a coalition with the UDMR in order to gain a majority over the PSD’s National Union 
(Hipper, 2015, 159).  
 Monica Macovei was nominated as the new Minister of Justice. Hipper states, “the main 
internal political challenge for the new veto players involved implementing judicial reforms 
despite internal resistance from the judiciary” (2015, 160). Basescu’s appointment of Macovei 
and other ministers eager to reform the judiciary did not bode well with the opposition 
government, as “Basescu’s opponents charged that their investigations were politically 
motivated, targeting politicians from opposing political parties” (Vachudova, 2009, 58). Minister 
of Justice Macovei was the primary target of the PSD’s attacks, as she posed the greatest threat 
to the political parties, who were concerned the new minister’s agenda would harm their close 
ties with the judiciary.  
 Hipper writes that the Romanian judiciary in 2004 was “built upon conservative, opaque 
institutional and personal structures and was reluctant to change” (2015, 160). Macovei’s main 
policy initiatives included: increasing judicial independence from “political mechanisms” and 
removing “the institutional and personal influence of the old nomenklatura on judicial workings” 
(Hipper, 2015, 160).  Macovei passed a three-law package on judicial reform in July 2005. The 
three laws included: the Law on the Superior Council of the Magistracy, the Law on judicial 
organization, and the Law on the Status of the Magistrates (Hipper, 2015, 162-3). The package 
was crucial in increasing judicial autonomy, as it “envisaged the transfer of powers from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Superior Council of the Magistracy…[and] ensured the protection of 
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the judiciary from political pressure” (Hipper, 2015, 166). In particular, the Ministry of Justice 
lost its power to appoint judges, vote in the Superior Council of the Magistracy, and other 
powers pertaining to the suspension of judges (Hipper, 2015, 166). The laws sought to change 
the process in which members of the Superior Council of the Magistracy were elected. 
Previously they were chosen by Parliament, but under Macovei’s reforms the members were 
required to pass competitive exams in order to move forward with the selection process (Hipper, 
2015, 169).  
 While these reforms seemed like a positive step forward in Romania’s journey towards 
judicial corruption reform, the intensely politicized nature of Romania’s government threatened 
to derail efforts to de-politicize the judiciary. When the Ministry of Justice attempted to enact the 
2005 Action Plan’s reforms, there was significant backlash from the opposition and the Superior 
Council of the Magistracy because the groups felt it was necessary to dilute the reform packages 
(Hipper, 2015, 173).  
Hipper argues that the pushback from the Superior Council of the Magistracy was 
unnecessary, as the proposed reforms had already been publicly debated, were on the Ministry of 
Justice’s website, and were presented to the SCM well in advance (2015, 173). The SCM is a 
“representative body for the top management of the judiciary” and its powers include recruiting, 
promoting, and managing Romania’s judges (Freedom House, 2006).  The members of the SCM 
at the time were elected under the Nastase and PSD-led government, and thus the body was 
packed with trusted PSD insiders. As a result, the SCM was “reluctant to contribute to its own 
reforming process” since the PSD was the primary opposition party attempting to derail the 
reform efforts (Hipper, 2015, 173). The reforms eventually passed, but were watered down 
significantly to reduce the Ministry of Justice’s control over the judicial branch.  
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To complicate matters further, the political climate in Romania from 2004 to 2012 was 
marred with strife and was not conducive to securing the independence of the judiciary. The 
PDL-PNL coalition began to unravel as a feud between Prime Minister Tariceanu (PNL) and 
President Basescu (PDL) erupted in 2007. Prime Minister Tariceanu challenged Basescu’s power 
and swayed opposition parties, the PSD and UDMR, to form a counter coalition with Tariceanu’s 
party (the PNL) (Hipper, 2015, 193).  The prime minister and his new coalition began 
impeachment charges against Basescu, accusing him of infringing upon the rule of law. 
Tariceanu’s government went to great lengths to impeach Basescu and entered into a legal battle 
with the courts. Under the Romanian constitution, President Basescu had the opportunity to call a 
referendum to allow the population to decide if the parliament can continue with impeachment 
procedures (Freedom House, 2008). Parliament passed a law stating a “president can be 
dismissed with a majority of voters present if he was elected in the second round, but if he was 
elected from the first round with an absolute majority, then a majority from the absolute number 
of votes is required for dismissal” (Freedom House, 2008).  Tariceanu and his coalition changed 
the law to prevent the president from calling for a referendum for “constitutional matters”, which 
would include impeachment (Freedom House, 2008).  
 There was intense political debate over the legality of the changes to the law, and 
Romania’s Constitutional Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the changes. 
Freedom House notes that the Constitutional Court was “overwhelmed” by legal cases pertaining 
to the changes, and that “despite having a majority of members with PSD ties, the Court 
overruled most of these initiatives as unconstitutional” (2008). The court was successful in 
exercising its autonomy and ruled objectively without undue pressure from the government. The 
Romanian judiciary also asserted its independence after Minister of Justice, Macovei, was sacked 
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for “overreaching” in her efforts to reform the judiciary. Her removal is often depicted as a clear 
example of Romania’s inability to prevent the country’s volatile political climate from 
interfering with significant judicial reform. The prime minister chose Tudor Chiuariu of the PNL 
to replace Macovei in 2007.  
 Chiuariu interfered with the judiciary’s efforts to investigate and try corruption 
politicians, as he informed the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) to stop investigations 
of top-level politicians, confirming fears that the PNL would seek to protect its politicians on the 
chopping block (Freedom House, 2008). Chiuariu also aimed to have the anticorruption 
prosecutor, Doru Tulus, fired for “investigating his political sponsors”, as he had already indicted 
eight MP’s (Freedom House, 2008). Surprisingly, Chiuariu faced unexpected backlash from the 
judiciary, preventing the firing from taking place. In protest of the decision, 60 DNA 
prosecutors, the National Union of Judges, and the National Institute of Magistracy (the body in 
charge of training magistrates) banned together to halt the politicized firing (Freedom House, 
2008).  
 However, the judiciary’s efforts to resist politicization remained futile, as many of the 
bodies associated with the judiciary were incapable of carrying out their mandates. For example, 
in 2010, the National Integrity Agency (ANI), whose mission it is to investigate asset 
declarations, could not fulfill investigations of high-level politicians because the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the body’s mandate was unconstitutional (Vachudova and Spendzharova, 2012, 
11). In April 2010, seven of the nine judges on the Constitutional Court were under investigation 
by the ANI and thus had reason to derail the DNA’s mandate, as it would halt the ongoing 
investigations into the judges’ asset declarations (Vachudova and Spendzharova, 2012, 11).  
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 Romania’s judicial corruption woes came to a head in in 2012, when a constitutional 
crisis arose, completely derailing any possibility of securing an independent judiciary. President 
Basescu was re-elected in 2009, having survived an impeachment attempt by the opposition in 
2007. Once again, in 2012, Basescu faced stiff opposition from the majority coalition, the Social 
Liberal Union (USL), comprised of the PSD, PNL, and the Conservative Party (PC). The prime 
minister at the time was Victor Ponta of the PSD. Ponta’s government had just formed when the 
crisis arose, and was beginning to test the boundaries of its constitutional powers. Perju states 
that the Ponta government was “starved by many years in the opposition as a result of president 
Basescu’s reelection in 2009” and, as a result, was eager to regain its power (2015, 255).  
 The president is granted the duty of serving as Romania’s representative in international 
relations (Perju, 2015, 257). A debate arose between Ponta and Basescu over who was given the 
strict authority to represent the Romanian delegation to the EU in Brussels. The Constitutional 
Court was forced to intervene, ruling that Ponta could represent Romania if given an “express 
mandate from the head of state” (Perju, 2015, 257). Ponta accused the court of being politically 
“biased” and requested a formal mandate from the president—of which he was denied—and 
attended without permission (Perju, 2015, 257). The political game of “chicken” between Ponta 
and Basescu would come to culminate in the USL’s efforts to formally enact impeachment 
procedures against the president in July 2012. The Ponta government claimed that Basescu had 
infringed upon “the constitutional attributions of the government and the Constitutional Court” 
and had violated “his constitutional duty of political impartiality” (Iancu, 2015, 163).  
 The Romanian constitution states that the president can only be impeached if one-third 
of MP’s initiate the process, and, shortly after, the Constitutional Court must administer an 
advisory opinion on the subject (Iancu, 2015, 163). After the advisory opinion has been released, 
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an absolute majority of parliament (both houses) must vote to impeach the president—which in 
the case of Romania means that the president will be “suspended” (Iancu, 2015, 163). The 
caveat, though, is that the question of impeachment must be brought before the population via a 
referendum within 30 days of the passing of a parliamentary resolution (Iancu, 2015, 163). In 
order for the referendum to be valid a majority of the population registered on electoral lists must 
vote in favor of impeachment (Iancu, 2015, 164).  
 Ironically, the infringement upon the judiciary’s independence occurred at the hands of 
Parliament, not Basescu—despite what the charges brought against him would suggest. The 
Parliament’s governing USL coalition took strides to remove leadership in both houses, as well 
as the ombudsman on July 3, 2012 (Iancu, 2015, 165). Next, Parliament amended the 
Constitutional Court Law and Referendum Law, “in the simultaneous form of parliamentary 
Bills and emergency ordinances, in order to remove parliamentary decisions from the jurisdiction 
of the Court and to provide for a relative majority rule applicable to the impeachment 
referendum” (Iancu, 2015, 165). Iancu highlights that the purpose of these infringements was to 
ensure that if the bill was declared unconstitutional by the courts, the “analogous provisions in 
the ordinances would remain in force due to the lack of a legal remedy against them” (2015, 
165).  
 The Ombudsman was removed by the Romanian parliament due to the nature of its 
assigned duties. In Romania, the Ombudsman is tasked with conducting investigations into 
“alleged illegal acts of the administration”, which would include the passing of unconstitutional 
acts by parliament if it is determined they were passed to allow for corrupt practices (Nielsen, 
2012A). Additionally, the ombudsman is the only formal institution that can “directly challenge 
government ordinances” in front of the Constitutional Court (Nielsen, 2012A).  
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 Although the parliament had called on Basescu to be impeached, the Constitutional Court 
had to rule on the decision. The court ruled that the decision of the parliament to move forward 
with impeachment procedures was not valid, thus the process should have ended. But Prime 
Minister Ponta, in his effort to carry on his political crusade against the president, continued with 
the impeachment procedures in parliament despite the court’s ruling, and parliament voted to 
formally impeach Basescu (Nielsen, 2012A). This meant that the next phase of the impeachment 
procedures would begin: a national referendum.  
On July 29, 2012, the population voted on the impeachment of the president. Eighty-
seven percent of the population voted in favor of impeaching Basescu, but voter turnout was only 
at forty-six percent, thus it did not meet the majority requirement laid out by law and the results 
were invalidated (Pop, 2012). Prime Minister Ponta refused to accept the result and stated that 
the voter turnout was not accurate because the electoral lists left off critical voting populations 
(Pop, 2012). He asked the Constitutional Court to rule on the validity of the voter lists, and on 
August 21 the court ruled that the referendum results were invalid and President Basescu would 
not be impeached (Hoffmeister, 2015, 230).  
 During this lengthy referendum process, numerous judges on the Constitutional Court 
reported being under intense political pressures. On August 3, 2012, the president of the court, 
Augustin Zegrean, reported to the European Commission that members of the court and their 
families had received death threats (Nielsen, 2012B). One of the justices, Aspazia Cojocaru, 
reported receiving death threats as early as July 2012, which was well before the final court 
ruling at the end of August (Nielsen, 2012B). The government also publicly discredited the 
authority of the court in statements. The media reported that the leader of the National Liberal 
Party—a member of the USL coalition—called the court a “sham” and said “parliament should 
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throw out its members” (Nielsen, 2012B). Furthermore, Hipper states that the media highlighted 
that “the political battle over the presidency and the Constitutional Court created an open conflict 
between judges considered to be close to the USL… those considered supporters of the center-
right party…and those close to the UMDR…” (2015, 221).  
 After the Constitutional Crisis ended, Ponta and Basescu put aside their differences and 
continued to govern (Csaky, 2012). The two reportedly signed a pledge to uphold “institutional 
cooperation between the presidency and the government” and “respect the Constitution on both 
sides” (The Economist, 2013). Basescu and Ponta remained in office together until 2014 when 
new elections were scheduled to take place. Basescu could not run again for a third term due to 
Romania’s rule that presidents can only serve two consecutive terms (The Economist, 2014). In 
the 2014 elections, Victor Ponta ran for president and was predicted to win given his credentials 
and political experience, but in a surprise turn of events, Klaus Iohannis, the former mayor of 
Sibiu and member of the PNL, beat him in the second round of voting. After his loss, Ponta 
refused to step down as prime minister, sparking outrage amongst the Romanian people 
(EuroNews, 2014). Eventually, though, in September 2015 corruption charges were brought 
against Ponta and he was forced to go on trial (BBC, 2015). To add to Ponta’s growing list of 
problems, a fire broke out in a Bucharest nightclub in November 2015, killing scores of people 
(BBC, 2015). Massive protests erupted across Bucharest, calling for Ponta’s resignation (BBC, 
2015). He eventually resigned once it was revealed that the nightclub was not up to code and had 
ties to corruption (BBC, 2015). Ponta was replaced with Dacian Ciolos, a former EU Agriculture 
Commissioner and member of the European People’s Party (Mutler, 2015).  
 Today, Romania continues to struggle with ensuring the independence of its judiciary. 
After Ponta’s resignation as prime minister and the election of Klaus Iohannis as president in 
	
106	
2014, Romania appeared to be back on track to reform. The hopes of a de-politicized judiciary 
would remain fruitless, however, due to a shift from politicians interfering in judicial 
investigations to the Domestic Intelligence Service (SRI) overstepping its authority (Falasca, 
Castellani, and Hokovsky, 2015, 39). The latest controversy to hit the Romanian judiciary stems 
from the role of the DNA in investigating corruption amongst high-level officials. The SRI, in an 
effort to aid with corruption investigations, has been assisting with wiretapping for DNA cases, 
which the Constitutional Court ruled as unconstitutional in February 2016 (Flasca, Castellani, 
and Hokovsky, 2015, 40).  
 After the decision was made, Prime Minister Ciolos went over the court’s head and 
passed an emergency ordinance that would allow the DNA to use the SRI’s wiretapping 
capabilities (Flasca, Castellani, and Hokovsky, 2015, 40). According to the authors, the head of 
the SIR, General Dimitriu Dumbrava, “regarded the judicial system as a ‘tactical field’ in which 
the intelligence services were ‘keeping their attention until their final ruling’” (Flasca, Castellani, 
and Hokovsky, 2015, 40). The Superior Council of Magistrates was forced to rule on the 
questionable statement made by the general, as there were concerns that the statement could 
potentially submit the court to further politicization (Flasca, Castellani, and Hokovsky, 2015, 
40). The SCM did not find the comments to be inappropriate, and the issue was dropped 
completely (Flasca, Castellani, and Hokovsky, 2015, 40-1).   
Analysis of Judicial Independence  
 It is clear after exploring Romania’s poor history of safeguarding judicial independence 
that the country has a ways to go before full impartiality can be achieved. However, there are 
signs pointing to greater autonomy during times of politically sensitive crises, such as the 2012 
Constitutional Crisis. I argue that there are two reasons for Romania’s poor judicial 
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independence—and, in effect, its high judicial corruption levels: the tendency of political elites 
to engage in destabilizing political competition, and the ambiguity of the semi-presidential 
system. Vachudova argues that political competition is a necessary component of building a 
healthy democracy (2005, 15). In the Romanian case, while there are many parties capable of 
holding office, there are only a handful of parties that are frequently featured in governing 
coalitions—the PDL, PNL, and PSD. As a result, there is a tendency of parties to form coalition 
governments and then quickly dissolve them in an effort to consolidate power and sabotage those 
who interfere with a given party’s political agenda. This pattern of behavior is by no means 
conducive to promoting a thriving, independent judiciary. As a result, since judicial 
independence has not shown much improvement since the fall of communism, and it can be 
discerned that poor judicial independence has negatively impacted judicial corruption levels.  
 Romania’s 2004 “Watergate” scandal demonstrates that the independence of the judiciary 
has been poor since before the country acceded to the European Union. The PSD abused its 
authority as the key member of the governing coalition to screen investigations against its 
ministers, and admitted to preventing courts from fulfilling their mandates. The main driver 
behind these actions was the desire to implicate the PDL and PNL in corruption scandals so that 
the PSD could consolidate its power. The PSD’s monopoly over Romanian politics proved 
destabilizing, primarily due to its ties to Romania’s communist past. Since PSD politicians were 
constantly re-elected from 1989 until 2005, Romania was unable to build political parties 
independent of their communist history. According to Mendelski, the remnants of “old guard 
figures” or “senior networks left in power as a result of Romania’s incomplete post-communist 
transformation of judicial and political elites” is crucial for understanding this concept (2012, 
32).  When Romania began its democratic transition it was unable to purge the government of 
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former communist politicians. These communist politicians established a political culture in 
which sabotaging opposition parties, undermining institutions to consolidate power, and relying 
on patronage systems was acceptable, thus allowing judicial corruption to become systemic. For 
the PSD, further entrenching its control was more important than institutional reform after 
communism.  
 This finding is typical of many CEE states undergoing democratic transitions after the 
fall of communism. Indeed, Grzymala-Busse (2002, 124) writes that if parties were able to 
preserve their power as their country underwent the beginning stages of democratization—such 
as the PSD—then “successor parties could retain greater continuity in their organizational and 
patronage networks.”  The author argues that political elites became fixated on consolidation of 
power and “continued to sabotage elite reform proposals and subverted any reformist signals. 
Programs slid back into references to the glories of the past…and reformists were sabotaged” 
(2002, 280). O’Dwyer would concur, stating that there is a relationship between the 
“sequencing” of democratization and the state-building process (2008, 213). The key here is that 
if a country begins its democratization as an “unconsolidated state” this leads to a tendency to 
rely on “patronage politics and a predisposition for runaway state-building” because the state 
was never able to eradicate remnants of the undemocratic regime (2008, 213).  
 Additionally, the competing interests of political elites contribute to the lack of judicial 
independence and moderate to high judicial corruption values. One caveat of the Romanian 
political system is that “ideological” political labels are “nominal”, as they “mean relatively little 
in a context where internal politics is characterized by variable geometry alliances and, 
moreover, endemic and uncontrollable parliamentary migration” (Iancu, 2015, 154). Therefore, 
political alliances are developed based not on common political interests, but rather for 
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consolidating power to prevent the opposition from gaining influence. Political alliances then 
become unstable and dissolve quickly without allowing reform to permeate the judiciary. An 
example of this was the dissolution of the PDL-PNL collation by Prime Minister Tariceanu in 
2007.  
 Hipper argues that the judiciary was caught in a battle between politicians with differing 
political interests, particularly those with intentions of reforming the judiciary and others who 
feared losing their long-standing control over the institution (2015, 142). The fight for the 
independence of the judiciary became a battle between pro and anti-Basescu forces (Tanasoiu, 
2015, 172). Basescu—who was a key proponent of judicial reform—primarily used Minister of 
Justice, Monica Macovei, as a tool for achieving judicial independence, which created “hostility 
within the domestic political context” (Hipper, 2015, 160). It appears in the Romania case that 
any attempt at de-politicizing the judiciary is consistently met by opposition and attempts to 
either derail anti-corruption efforts completely or to water them down. However, scholars believe 
that the removal of the PSD from power in 2004 was a positive step forward for judicial reform, 
as it removed opportunity for the “old guard” politicians to harm political reform (Hipper, 2015, 
196).  
 It remains clear, then, that in order to reduce politicization of the judiciary and corruption 
levels, the governing coalition and reformists must enjoy broad political support for the 
implementation of their reform efforts. Once the PSD led coalition—the primary antagonist in 
promoting judicial independence—regained power, the objective of the governing coalition 
changed drastically to include the dismantlement of progress through “removal of institutional 
leaders or disruptions of institutional settings” (Hipper, 2015, 196). This implies that political 
will on the end of the governing party must be high in order to increase the autonomy of the 
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judiciary—which is often not possible in Romania due to the constant turnover of governing 
coalitions.  If progress does occur, it is short term and pro-reformers are often accused of 
committing political witch-hunts against the opposition, which undermines corruption 
investigations and court decisions. When corrupt practices continue, the acceptance of 
interference with the independence of the judiciary becomes internalized as a norm, thus 
allowing for corruption levels either to become stagnant or increase since little to no progress is 
made on judicial reform. However, it is also crucial to state that other institutional factors such as 
public opinion and EU leverage can influence the political will of governing party to enact 
judicial reforms, as both can put pressure on parties through agenda setting. This will be 
discussed more in depth in other sections of this chapter.  
 Romania has made some progress in maintaining the autonomy of the judiciary, but it is 
clear that brief moments of progress have not contributed to an overall reduction in judicial 
corruption levels. The court does exercise its authority to carry out its mandate under certain 
times of extreme political duress. The Constitutional Court was largely successful in its efforts to 
insulate itself from politicization during the 2012 Constitutional Crisis.  This could be in part due 
to the fact that the crisis was large enough to draw international attention, however, scholars 
believe that the crisis demonstrated restraint on behalf of the court. During the crisis, the court 
agreed to play its role in the impeachment process, as specified in the constitution, and listened 
to the government’s pleas to reconsider the validity of the referendum law and electoral lists. 
Perju notes that this was an effort by the court to “lower the stakes and diffuse political 
pressure…the outcome was strategic and quite lucid calculation on the part of the constitutional 
judges about a highly volatile political situation” (2015, 262). While the court demonstrated 
restraint on its part, the same courtesy was not provided by the USL, who used its power to 
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slander the efforts of the court and undermine its authority. However, clearly the courts were not 
completely free of political pressure during the 2012 crisis, as reports of political infighting 
between judges were published.  
 The second variable negatively impacting the independence of the judiciary is the semi-
presidential system in place. Because there are so many political parties vying for control of 
government, the possibility arises that the president and the prime minister will be from different 
parties. This phenomenon is called cohabitation, and it can often result in negative repercussions 
for institutions such as the legislature or judiciary. With cohabitation comes the possibility that 
the prime minister and the president will have differing political views regarding judicial reform 
and independence. Gherghina and Miscoiu argue that the true issue stemming from cohabitation 
is the “different sources of legitimacy—popular support for the president and the legislators’ 
confidence in the prime minister—both actors can claim more power and destabilize the 
equilibrium” (2013, 668).  
 The issue of cohabitation in relation to securing judicial independence is best 
demonstrated by the events of the 2012 Constitutional Crisis. Under the Romanian Constitution, 
the president is granted a broad mandate with largely ceremonial powers. There is frequently 
overlap between the powers of the president and the prime minister, particularly in the areas of 
national security, judicial affairs, and representation abroad (Gherghina and Miscoiu, 2015, 677). 
In this conflict, the overlapping power that sparked the most controversy was the issue of 
representing the Romanian delegation abroad at European Council meetings, as it is typically the 
duty assigned to the president. However, ambiguity arose as to if the president’s role as the sole 
representative in foreign relations extended to the European Council. When Ponta’s government 
was installed, in an effort to consolidate power, the USL government used the ambiguity with the 
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division of power to reduce the power of the president and politically isolate Basescu (Gherghina 
and Miscoiu, 2015, 677). 
 The Constitutional Court ruled on the matter, declaring that Basescu has the sole 
authority to represent Romania abroad, but Ponta, who secretly went to Brussels without 
permission, undermined their authority. The USL government’s blatant disregard for the 
authority of the court led to the accusations that President Basescu had overstepped his 
constitutional duties, triggering impeachment procedures. Perju summarizes the connection 
between the judiciary and the political bias of the Ponta government:  
The growing independence of the justice system, and the related danger that immunizing 
courts from political influence poses dangers to the country’s oligarchs, have 
unquestionably occurred during Basescu’s presidency and are an essential part of the 
context in which Romanian semi-presidentialism held its first encounters with political 
cohabitation (2015, 254).  
 
The author also adds that the origin of the political crisis had to “do with personal interest and 
fear of accountability for acts of corruption” (Perju, 2015, 254). Moreover, “the constitutional 
tension between legal and political forms has induced a state of perpetual ambivalence regarding 
the place of the presidency in the constitutional architecture, and, more particularly, never-
ending disputes regarding the proper division of attributions between the President and Prime 
Minister” (Iancu, 2015, 159).  
 Given that the court’s mandate is to rule on the constitutionality of laws and emergency 
ordinances passed by parliament, the Ponta government was forced to eliminate any potential 
threat to its political agenda by removing the jurisdiction of the court completely. When that did 
not work, the Ponta government would blatantly disregard the decisions of the court, calling 
them politically motivated or redundant. Thus, it can be discerned that cohabitation, since it 
results in the attempt by the prime minister’s party to isolate the president in a power grab, 
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actually encourages the governing party to infringe upon the impartiality of the courts in order to 
further a political agenda.  
 In sum, judicial independence has not improved much in Romania, and if it has, it is only 
during times of intense political duress, in which the Constitutional Court is under scrutiny of the 
public eye. This leads to the assumption that the influence of public opinion may in fact be 
stronger than efforts to reform judicial independence. Romania’s poor judicial independence has 
created an environment that allows judicial corruption to become systemic, resulting in little to 
no progress in decreasing corruption levels. As identified in the literature review, the two 
variables commonly associated with judicial independence are government system and levels of 
political competition. In the Romania case, the hypothesis stating that high levels of destabilizing 
political competition will contribute to higher levels of judicial corruption was supported. 
Hypothesis 2 stating that countries with parliamentary systems will have lower levels of judicial 
corruption cannot be assessed at this time because Romania is a semi-presidential system. This 
concept will be addressed further in the next chapter of this study. However, we can formulate an 
overall conclusion about the causal relationship between judicial independence and judicial 
corruption levels: countries with low levels of judicial independence will have higher levels of 
judicial corruption.   
II.  European Union Leverage 
 Romania joined the European Union (EU) with Bulgaria in January 2007. After the fall 
of communism in 1989, Romania began looking towards the west and European Union 
membership. Romania’s journey to EU membership took a different route than its neighbors, as 
the EU developed different policy methods to encourage the country to make strides towards 
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judicial reform. The EU consistently stated that Romania’s main obstacle to accession was its 
poor judicial autonomy and inability to enact reform efforts.  
 The bulk of Romania’s judicial reform occurred from 2000 to 2004, with the country 
implementing small and steady judicial reforms. The magnitude of the Romanian government’s 
dedication to such reforms, however, was low. As with other EU candidate countries, the 
European Commission instituted a set of guidelines for the country to follow and annually 
published progress reports. In 1999, the European Commission stated that Romania was making 
progress, but that further judicial reform was needed before formal accession talks could begin 
(Hipper, 2015, 130).  
 The PSD-led government, under President Iliescu, instituted judicial reforms in response 
to EU pressure for further progress in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. Hipper notes that 
Romanian political elites were not keen on instituting judicial reforms, but that the 
overwhelming support of the public for EU accession progress was enough for Iliescu to resist 
backtracking on previous commitments (2015, 131). As a result, the government adopted the 
National Program for Prevention of Corruption (NPPC) in 2001 and the Anti-Corruption 
Strategy (NACS) in 2003 (Hipper, 2015, 131). Both of these efforts included programs 
specifically targeting the judiciary. In 2003, there was a turn towards solely instituting judicial 
reform. The government fixed glaring flaws with the 1991 Constitution relating to the judiciary, 
amending the document to include clauses clarifying the importance of judicial independence, as 
well as the jurisdictions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the Superior Council of 
the Magistracy (SCM) (Hipper, 2015, 135).  
 However, from 2000 to 2004, political elites lacked the enthusiasm necessary to push 
forward meaningful reforms because reform would interfere with their political agendas. As a 
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result, “by the end of 2001 during the European Council meeting in Laeken….the EU announced 
that accession negotiations with ten countries would be completed by the end of 2002, not 
including those with Romania and Bulgaria” (Hipper, 2015, 150). With the appointment of 
corrupt politician Rodica Stanoiu to the position of Minister of Justice in 2004 (of the infamous 
2004 “Watergate” scandal), the Ministry of Justice became an “extended arm of the executive 
over the judiciary” and judicial reform was slow and ineffective (Hipper, 2015, 143). Stanoiu 
ordered the mysterious transfer of leadership of high-level courts to other bodies, and utilized the 
Service for Protection and Anticorruption (SIPA) for blackmail and oversight over the judiciary 
(Hipper, 2015, 143). After the 2004 Watergate scandal, the Romanian government revealed its 
hand to the European Commission, solidifying the view that the country’s judicial institutions 
were not well developed. The politicization of the judiciary remained a clear problem, and the 
dependence of the Ministry of Justice on the president and the PSD was criticized heavily. After 
the transcripts leaked, the “chief of the European Commission to Bucharest, Jonathan Scheele, 
expressed his concern on the matter and announced that he would transmit the information to 
Brussels” (Hipper, 2015, 155). Following the announcement, Iliescu replaced Stanoiu with 
Cristian Diaconescu, who was more reform-oriented than his predecessor (Hipper, 2015, 155).  
 The year 2004 marked a turning point in Romania’s EU accession journey. The upset of 
Basescu over PSD leader Nastase in the 2004 presidential election shocked the Romanian 
political scene. Basescu’s dedication to implementing judicial reform was evident, and left a sour 
taste in the mouths of many political elites. The PSD was out of power, and young, enthusiastic 
PDL and PNL politicians were eager to push forward with EU accession. Basescu’s appointment 
of reformist Monica Macovei to Minister of Justice was the critical turning point in judicial 
reforms, as it would come to kick start a movement of rapid reforms. In 2004, Basescu and 
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Macovei attempted to push through three judicial reform laws: the Law on the Superior Council 
of the Magistracy, the Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, and the Law on Magistrates 
(Freedom House, 2005). Under the laws, the SCM was given the authority to recruit, train, and 
promote judges and prosecutors, and a random assignment system for case distribution was 
installed (Freedom House, 2005). Additionally, the Minister of Justice lost the authority to 
appoint judges and magistrates to “higher courts, prosecutors’ offices, or management positions 
in the Superior Council, which [was] a positive development in terms of creating an independent 
judiciary” (Freedom House, 2005). Freedom House (2005) notes that although these laws were 
meant to enter into force in September 2004, they had yet to be implemented by the end of the 
year.  
 In the European Commission’s October 2004 Progress Report, the Commission called for 
the government to further secure the independence of the judiciary and for better implementation 
of the three-law reform package (European Commission, 2004, 145). Additionally, the European 
Commission “increased its pressure mechanisms in 2004 with its first red card against Romania 
in the form of gatekeeping. If Romania did not implement the conditionality of the EU by 2007, 
the EU threatened to implement gatekeeping once again” (Hipper, 2015, 161). The European 
Commission sought to encourage judicial reform through creation of a safeguard clause. In 
December 2004 the European Council created three safeguard clauses, one of which was in the 
area of judiciary and home affairs (Freedom House, 2006).  
On June 1, 2005 Romania signed the Treaty of Accession and was given a tentative 
accession date of January 1, 2007. The safeguard clauses were included in the Treaty of 
Accession, and upon signing Romania agreed to a clause allowing the EU to postpone accession 
by one year “should [Romania] be manifestly unprepared for EU membership” (European 
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Commission, 2005). In response, Romania implemented in 2005 a new Action Plan that was 
specifically targeted towards reforming the judiciary, and had a scheduled completion date of 
April 2005. However, “conservative forces”—including the SCM and higher-level courts—
resisted implementation of the three-law reform package and the Action Plan, and attempted to 
water down the reforms to consolidate their power (Hipper, 2015, 173). In June 2005, the EU 
enlargement Commissioner sent Romania “early-warning letters (i.e. “yellow cards”) that 
indicated serious shortcomings in seven areas, with reform of the judiciary and the fight against 
corruption being the most acute of them” (Hipper, 2015, 185).  
 In June 2006, judicial institutions placed intense pressure on the government to water 
down the proposed laws. The Constitutional Court was asked to rule on the laws to void the gap 
between reformists and anti-reformists. The court ruled that four of the laws in the reform 
package were unconstitutional, but their input was viewed to be politically motivated and 
resulted in additional concerns about Romania’s ability to commit to reform (Freedom House, 
2006). The government took into consideration the Court’s decisions, and made the necessary 
changes.  
 One of Romania’s final reforms before achieving EU accession was transforming the 
Office of the National Anticorruption Prosecutor (PNA) into the National Anti-Corruption 
Department in 2005. The DNA proved to be largely successful after its creation, and was used to 
investigate and prosecute corrupt politicians, judges, and lawyers. According to Freedom House 
(2006), the DNA charged 744 people following its creation, including high-level politicians and 
judicial officials. On January 2007, Romania joined the European Union after showing 
tremendous progress in judicial reform. Hipper states, “the three-laws package was applauded as 
a genuine and ambitious attempt to adopt and implement EU conditionality by restoring the 
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separation of powers and granting the judiciary…” (2015, 179). However, in the EU’s final 
progress report the European Commission (2006, 9) stated that “further progress is still necessary 
in the area of judicial reform and the fight against organized crime and corruption” and that it 
would establish a procedure for measuring Romania’s progress post-accession.  
 Freedom House (2008) states that shortly after joining the European Union, the 
Romanian government began to revert back to its old habits of interfering with the independence 
of the judiciary, subsequently reversing all previous pre-accession reform efforts. After accession 
the European Commission created the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) reports 
that are released twice a year to report on Romania’s progress. The European Commission (2007, 
5-17) released a set of four benchmarks that Romania must annually meet to maintain good 
standing: 
1. Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the 
capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor 
the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes 
 
2. Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, 
incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions 
on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken 
 
3. Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan 
investigations into allegations of high-level corruption 
 
4. Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within the 
local government 
 
The CVM reports are viewed to be an integral part of guaranteeing EU conditionality after 
accession. 
In March 2007, the PNL-PSD government attempted to remove Monica Macovei from 
her position as Minister of Justice (Freedom House, 2008). Macovei’s work as Minister of 
	
119	
Justice is believed to be a primary factor behind Romania’s remarkable judicial reform progress. 
Without her reforms, Romania would not have continued to meet the recommendations laid out 
by the European Commission in annual progress reports. Macovei initially refused to resign, but 
parliament voted to remove her, and, in April 2007, she was fired (Hipper, 2015, 200-1). 
Macovei was replaced with Tudor Chiuariu, who instituted a new Action Plan in order to ensure 
Romania made progress under the new CVM benchmarks (Hipper, 2015, 201).  
In order to meet the second benchmark laid out by the CMV reports, the Romanian 
government passed a law creating the National Integrity Agency (ANI). The body is in charge of 
monitoring asset declarations for high-level officials—including judges and politicians—and 
investigating conflicts of interests (Hipper, 2015, 203). The Commission noted that the creation 
of this body demonstrated “substantial progress in reaching this benchmark” (2006, 13). 
Nevertheless, there was growing concern over specific wording in the law that would allow for 
high-level officials to escape investigation for asset declarations while still protecting their image 
of promoting the rule of law. Freedom House states in its 2008 Nations in Transit Report: 
Originally, the goal was to set up an agency able to verify and take action in a zone not 
covered by any other institution in Romania—namely, wealth that cannot be justified by 
income(s) of the verified person. However the adopted form of the ANI legislation 
replaced the concept of "illicit" wealth instead of "unjustified" wealth. An article in the 
Romanian Constitution claiming that "all wealth is presumed licit" has so far allowed the 
few defendants charged with illicit enrichment to file for non-constitutionality and escape 
prosecution. In fact, individuals have no legal obligation to preserve any records of how 
they acquired their wealth, and the burden of proof is on the prosecutors. (Freedom 
House, 2008) 
 
The European Commission expressed concern with this wording in its 2007 CVM report, and 
urged that it be changed (2007, 14). The government listened to the Commission’s suggestion 
and changed the wording from “illicit” to “unjustified”, but when the law was voted on, the 
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governing coalition deviated from the EU’s wishes and changed the wording back (Freedom 
House, 2008).  
Unfortunately, the ANI came under attack by conservative, anti-reformers who were 
seeking to dismantle any agencies that threatened to expose their corrupt practices. In April 2008 
the Constitutional Court ruled that certain sections of the law establishing the body were 
unconstitutional (Hipper, 2015, 207). Those in favor of dismantling the organization stated that 
the issue arose from the idea of “’unjustified wealth’, as “wealth of “unproven” origin could not 
be confiscated, since it would be considered to have been legally acquired…” (Hipper, 2008, 
207).  The head of the SCM asked the Romanian Ombudsman to pressure the Constitutional 
Court to “adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws, specifically in regard to the constitutionality 
of the ANI” (Hipper, 2015, 207). The Ombudsman refused, and the issue was left unresolved 
until 2010, when the Constitutional Court “completely eradicated the ANI’s scope of activity” 
(Hipper, 2015, 207). The ability of the ANI to fulfill its mandate was seriously limited, thus it 
could not investigate asset declarations. Parliament eventually amended the unconstitutional 
parts of the ANI law, but the changes “limited the effectiveness of the ANI’s investigations and 
introduced less transparent and comprehensive asset declarations, rendering the agency 
essentially toothless” (Freedom House, 2011).  
The European Commission responded, stating that the “new law seriously undermines the 
process for effective verification, sanctioning and forfeiture of unjustified assets…[and] 
interrupts the encouraging development of ANI and breaches commitments taken by Romania 
upon accession” (2010, 3). The pressure from the CVM report caused parliament to adopt a new 
law reinstating the ANI’s ability to monitor asset declarations, but, according to Freedom House 
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(2011), “though the ANI generally survived the assault on its mandate, in December, its budget 
was significantly reduced…”.  
        During the same time that the ANI crisis was unfolding in 2010, the European Commission 
was contemplating admitting Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen free movement area. 
Spendzharova and Vachudova (2012, 54-5) state that there was great “speculation” that 
Romania’s possible admission to the Schengen zone would be dependent on reestablishing a 
functioning ANI. The authors note that in December 2010, France and Germany “publicly linked 
the two, declaring in a joint letter that Schengen entry should be postponed” until Romania 
solved its judicial corruption issues (2012, 54-5). Following the rather lackluster effort of the 
government to solve the ANI crisis, Schengen talks were delayed for Romania indefinitely in 
June 2011 (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 2012, 45). The efforts to link Schengen entry to 
judicial reform were not well received in Romania. Prime Minister Boc vehemently disagreed 
with this EU policy and was not receptive to implementing additional judicial reforms 
(Spendzharova and Vachudova, 2012, 55). 
 Romania’s judicial reform efforts completely unraveled during the 2012 Constitutional 
Crisis. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the Constitutional Crisis of 2012 was 
essentially a battle between reformists and conservatives. A battle erupted between President 
Basescu and Prime Minister Ponta, both from different political parties, over the right to 
represent the Romanian delegation to the EU in Brussels. Basescu was accused of infringing 
upon his constitutional duties and the rule of law, and the opposition accused Ponta of going on a 
political witch-hunt. The USL coalition sought to impeach Basescu, having taken umbrage with 
his aggressive anti-corruption reforms. As a result, the parliament suspended the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court in order to ensure that necessary laws passed to impeach Basescu were 
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not ruled unconstitutional. The parliament also made statements undermining the authority of 
judicial decisions, and often ignored decisions of the Constitutional Court that were not 
conducive to achieving the USL’s goals.   
 After the crisis unfolded, Prime Minister Ponta was summoned to Brussels to discuss the 
rule violations unfolding in Romania. The European Commission President gave Ponta a list of 
eleven points that “required answers”, including the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and 
judicial independence (Tanasoiu, 2015, 187). The European Commission expressed concern with 
the country’s rule of law violations, and stated that it questioned the government’s “commitment 
to respect the rule of law and independent judicial review” (2012, 3). The Commission also 
stated that it would not be ending its annual CVM reports (2012, 19). Finally, the Commission 
provided policy suggestions that must be implemented to solve the crisis. Overall the 
Commission recommended that the government respect the Constitutional Court’s decisions, 
amend Emergency Ordinances, publish acts in the Official Journal, appoint a new Ombudsman, 
and appoint ministers free of corruption scandals (European Commission, 2012, 20-1). 
According to the Commission, Ponta wrote to the Commission stating, “all of these requirements 
have or will be met” (European Commission, 2012, 21). The Commission also used the 
international media to express concern for the events that transpired throughout the crisis. 
European Commission leadership publically condoned the use of death threats to intimidate 
Constitutional Court judges (EurActive, 2012).  
 Hoffmeister notes that the Ponta government was responsive to the requests of the EU, 
but only sparingly. The parliament did amend some of the Emergency Ordinances passed early 
on in the crisis, but failed to promote a new Ombudsman in a timely fashion (2015, 230). 
Additionally, while the government allowed the Constitutional Court to hear decisions pertaining 
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to the referendum crisis, the government frequently made statements undermining the authority 
of the court. Thus, while the government was not legally interfering with the mandate of the 
courts, its public statements ended up harming the court’s credibility, resulting in justices 
receiving death threats. In the Commission’s 2013 CVM report, the Commission found that 
“Romania has implemented several but not all of the Commission’s recommendations aiming at 
restoring rule of law and the independence of the judiciary” (2013, 2). 
Analysis of European Union Leverage 
 After examining the effect of EU leverage on instigating judicial reforms in Romania 
before and after accession, a conclusion can be made about the EU and its coercive power over 
member states. Overall, EU conditionality proved effective in putting pressure on the Romanian 
government pre-accession to lower judicial corruption, but once the “carrot” of EU accession 
was achieved, Romania began to backslide on its reform efforts, causing corruption levels to 
stagnate. Vachudova, an advocate of EU conditionality’s positive results on member states, 
argues that “what makes the prospect of cooperating closely with EU representatives—and 
complying with the EU’s extensive requirements—attractive to domestic elites is the promise of 
eventual membership” (2009, 59). Theoretically, it is the single prospect of membership that 
should have driven judicial reforms in Romania’s accession process.  
 The best examples of EU conditionality proving successful occurred from 2000 to 2006. 
EU conditionality ultimately proved crucial in pressuring the PSD governments of the early 
2000’s to make incremental changes to the country’s judicial reform agenda. Hipper notes that 
the Strategy for the Reform of the Judiciary implemented under the Nastase government after the 
publication of the EU’s 1999 progress report was a signal that the government began to view the 
possibility of opening formal EU accession talks as a viable and worthwhile policy initiative 
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(2015, 139). Additionally, the EU’s refusal to admit Romania into the EU with the rest of the 
post-communist CEE states demonstrated the European Commission’s lack of faith in the 
integrity of Romania’s institutions. The delay was what arguably pushed the government to 
begin taking reforms more seriously.  
 However, one major domestic setback that prevented the reforms from performing to 
their true potential was the undeniable reluctance of the conservative political elite to create 
meaningful and lasting reforms. It appeared as if the Nastase and Iliescu government were 
simply going through the motions of judicial reform leading up to 2007, rather than seeking to 
build comprehensive reforms that could uproot corruption. The reforms passed during this time 
were done in a piecemeal fashion, and even if they were comprehensive, stakeholders in the 
judiciary frequently watered them down by placing pressure on politicians. 
 The PSD government, due to its deep ties to Romania’s communist past, proved to be the 
primary obstacle to passing important judicial reforms. According to Hipper, “the majority of the 
PSD, its coalition in the Parliament, and the leadership of President Iliescu had a high political 
consensus regarding joining the EU while keeping the costs as low as possible” (2015, 153). 
Hipper cites the efforts by parliament to implement “quick” judicial reforms and the “adoption of 
complex strategies to combat corruption…without eliminating political influence…” (2015, 
153). Iliescu’s appointment of Rodica Stanoui as Minister of Justice was a poor choice, and 
demonstrated the government’s inability to completely loosen the reigns over the judiciary. 
While literature indicates that the removal of Stanoui was not brought about by pressure from the 
European Union, but rather the upcoming December presidential election, the effect of the EU’s 
conditionality remained helpful as the signing of the Treaty of Accession drew near (Hipper, 
2015, 153).  Hipper states that the Nastase government needed to “gain external legitimacy and 
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approval for the closure of the accession negotiation process. Since increased domestic pressure 
and external monitoring would no longer allow for the process to stop at the emulation of 
legislative templates, domestic actors engaged in increased rule creation and maintenance” 
(2015, 153).  
 The judicial reform process was also pushed forward by the promotion of Monica 
Macovei to the position of Minister of Justice. Without Macovei’s persistence, many of the 
judicial reform packages would not have been passed, or if they were passed, they would have 
been weak. The EU also added the safeguard clause to the country’s Treaty of Accession in 
2005, which created additional benchmarks for the country to meet. The “carrot” in this case was 
the threat of delayed accession past the agreed upon date of January 1, 2007. When the EU 
scolded the government for its interference with the three-law package, the government 
immediately changed the laws to align them with EU policies.  
 It can be argued that EU conditionality can only explain part of the story behind 
Romania’s efforts to reform its judiciary. The pressure from the Romanian population also was a 
deciding factor, as it incentivized politicians to listen to their constituents. After the release of the 
Commission’s 1999 Progress Report and the decision to delay accession until after 2005, 
Romanian public opinion about implementing EU reforms skyrocketed. As a result, politicians 
needed to implement some judicial reforms in order to remain in good standing with the EU, 
whom would then comment on progress made in its annual reports. The media would then 
publish the reports, which could sway public opinion of the government. Vachudova and 
Sprendzharova (2012B, 55-6) note that “sustained domestic incentives centered on winning 
elections and holding power are crucial to ongoing reforms that consolidate the rule of law, 
which explains the mixed reform record of Romania.”  
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Therefore, while it cannot be denied that the EU did place significant pressure on 
Romania to reform its judiciary pre-accession, public opinion and political will also acted points 
of pressure leading up to 2007.  Ristei notes, “there were clear indications of political will 
manifested through comprehensive diagnoses of corruption, the intermittent inclusion of the 
main stakeholders in the policy-making process, the adoption of some substantive reforms, and 
the creation of an objective and transparent monitoring system” (2010, 357). Thus, political will 
on the part of the Romanian government was also crucial, as it was incentivized by the prospect 
of facing future reelection.  
 After its accession to the Union in 2007, it can be seen that the EU largely lost its 
coercive power in lowering corruption in Romania. This was best demonstrated with the ANI 
crises of 2007 and 2010, when the Constitutional Court attempted to interfere with the mandate 
of the asset declaration agency, even though it was clearly a violation of one of the safeguard 
benchmarks. In its 2008 Nation in Transit Report, Freedom House was critical of the EU’s 
decision not to trigger the safeguard clause. Freedom House argues that since the introduction of 
the safeguard was created explicitly for a situation of this magnitude, the Commission should 
have triggered the clause but was too concerned about the economic and political repercussions 
of doing so (2008).  Hipper argues that when Romania achieved the “carrot” of EU accession, 
not even the CVM reports could rectify the EU’s loss of control over the progress of judicial 
reforms (2015, 224). Mendelski (2012, 24) would concur with Hipper, arguing that, “the EU has 
been a very important change agent (among other domestic ones) in triggering judicial reforms 
and bringing about change in de jure and capacity-related aspects of judicial quality, it has not 
been able to change domestic power structures and create a fully independent, impartial and 
incorrupt judiciary.”  
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 It can be determined that Romania’s efforts to curb judicial corruption levels also 
stagnated because the EU allowed Romania to accede to the union even though it clearly had not 
formed mature judicial institutions. Mandelski notes that “the focus on formal institutional 
change, increasing magistrates’ salaries or the introduction of computer devices and management 
systems” was ill-placed as they do not “necessarily produce better and more accountable and 
impartial judges or change the overall judicial and political culture” (2012, 35-6). Finally, the 
author states that EU membership has actually created “less legal stability and more systemic 
incoherence due to the revision of legislation and the introduction of newly created agencies and 
bodies…and a more independent but less accountable judiciary” (Mendelski, 2012, 35-6).  
 During the 2012 crisis, the European Commission changed its conditionality tactics, even 
going as far as supplying direct policy suggestions for how to restore the rule of law in the 2012 
CVM report. However, in the Commission’s report from 2013, it noted that only some of the 
reforms had been enacted. Thus, it can be seen that even under significant external political 
pressure, accession to the EU has not made a dramatic impact on curbing judicial corruption 
levels. According to Mendelski, this occurred because Romania has a tendency to “cherry-pick” 
the reforms that the country will implement, as prescribed by the EU (2012, 36).  
 In conclusion, EU leverage has been generally effective in lowering judicial corruption 
levels in Romania. If Romania had not been successful in demonstrating progress in its 
corruption levels, the EU would not had let it into the Union. Nonetheless, the Romanian 
government passed crucial reforms that only prompted surface level changes necessary for 
decreasing corruption. As can be seen, though, Romania continued to struggle with maintaining 
the independence of the judiciary post-accession and was not consistent with implementing 
meaningful reforms. The country has come a long way since the fall of communism in regards to 
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corruption reform, but EU membership cannot fully explain the country’s progress in judicial 
corruption levels. As Mendelski argues, EU conditionality and “reinforcing domestic elites” 
leads to “institutional change” (2012, 37). This being said, the overall effect of EU membership 
in the medium-term was effective, particularly when Romania was in the process of acceding to 
the Union. As a result, Hypothesis 3 stating that EU member and candidate countries will have 
lower levels of judicial corruption was supported.  
III. Media Freedom  
 
 The Romanian media has transformed since the fall of communism in 1989, but still 
remains only “partly free” today (Freedom House, 2016). Under communist rule, the Romanian 
media was controlled by the state, thus there were limitations on transparency and the freedom of 
expression (Coman, 2010, 58). Once the communist regime collapsed, there was a rush by 
political elites to buy up media outlets, including television, print, and online formats. The 
Romanian media teeters on a fine line between being dependent on politicians for funds and 
reporting corrupt practices. Over the years, there has been an increase in the politicization of the 
media by politicians and the judiciary.  
 In the early 2000’s the government heavily regulated Romania’s media. Freedom House 
noted in its 2002 Freedom of the Press Report that libel and slander were still punishable with 
jail sentences. Additionally, the government passed the Audiovisual Law in 2002, which 
“maintains the government’s strict control over the distribution of television and radio licenses” 
(Freedom House, 2003). Things failed to improve over the course over the next year, as Freedom 
House reported over 400 criminal cases involving members of the media and more than 14 
accounts of journalists being physically attacked for their work investigating organized crime 
and corruption (2004).  
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 In 2006, there was an increase in the ownership of Romanian media outlets by politicians 
and the “concentration in media ownership continued to increase” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 47). During 
this time, Sorin Ovidiou Vantu and Dan Voiculesu dominated the media scene. Vanut owned the 
newspaper, Cotidianul, the magazine Academia Catavencu, and a radio station (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
47). Dan Voiculescu, a rather polarizing figure in Romania’s political and media scenes, owned 
“three TV channels, a daily, and a financial weekly that openly wage his political battles for 
him” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 47). Voiculescu is a member of the Conservative Party (PC) and served 
terms in the Romanian Parliament, as well as had a brief stint as leader of the PC. His party 
enjoyed close ties with the PSD and enjoyed membership in governing coalitions. Interestingly, 
Voiculescu was revealed to be a member of the Securitate under the Ceausescu regime, thus his 
ties to corruption in Romania run deep (Mungiu-Pippidi, 47). Former Prime Minister Ponta also 
at one point had controlling stakes in Radio 21 (Coman, 2010, 590).  
 Freedom House has rated the Romanian media as “partly free” in its annual Freedom of 
the Press reports since 2007 upon acceding to the EU (Freedom House, 2007-2016). While 
improvement has been made, overall the country’s media independence scores have remained 
stagnant. Transparency International noted in its 2011 report assessing corruption in Romania 
that the “media is not a profitable business and…investigative journalism is not among the most 
important journalistic activities. In depth reporting, investigations and other such “value-added” 
journalism pieces are a rare occurrence, especially in television” (2011, 144-5). Transparency 
International also stated that the judiciary, prosecutors, politicians, and the police are exposed in 
the media, but that “the coverage is often superficial, dealing with momentary cases rather than 
with systemic issues” (2011, 145).  
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Additionally, the government has passed questionable laws that have indirectly interfered 
with the ability of the media to investigate judges and report corrupt practices. In its 2010 report, 
Active Watch, a partner of Reporters without Borders, stated that “journalists and the public 
were on the verge of losing the ability to unconditionally access statements of assets and 
liabilities of dignitaries (public interest information” (12). During the ANI crisis of 2010, the 
Constitutional Court essentially dismantled the ability of the investigative body to report on asset 
declarations of judges. The court ruled the mandate of the body to be unconstitutional, thus 
suspending any investigations into asset declarations of judges, prosecutors, and politicians who 
could have been implicated in dealing corrupt practices. Although the government sought to 
reform the laws to make the body’s mandate constitutional, “the new system would have 
prevented public scrutiny of the dignitaries’ assets and liabilities” (ActiveWatch, 2010, 12). 
Thus, journalists would not have been able to properly report on corrupt practices, decreasing 
transparency and the overall accountability of politicians and judicial employees to the public.  
There is also a bitter relationship between the media and the judiciary, as the media is 
frequently accused of putting undue pressure on the judiciary and vise versa. The volatile 
relationship between the two actors was best depicted during the 2012 Constitutional Crisis. The 
media and judiciary took turns exchanging barbs with each other, with USL politicians 
instigating the conflict. Members of Romania’s independent media were slandered by the USL 
coalition when they published articles viewed to be unfavorable by the governing coalition. In 
particular, Prime Minister Ponta and his coalition harshly criticized any journalist reporting on 
the government’s failed attempts to secure the impeachment of President Basescu.  
In a joint public condemnation released during the crisis, Reporters without Borders and 
Active-Watch highlighted particular cases in which journalists were targeted in comments by the 
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government. According to the statement, a member of the USL coalition, Dan Sova, “accused 
Carmen Valica, a journalist with the state-owned broadcaster RRA, in early July of being behind 
European commissioner for justice Viviane Reding’s criticism of the Romanian government” 
(Reporters without Borders, 2012). Sova stated that Valica had tried to “influence” the 
commissioner by asking about “the imminent arrest of constitutional court judges” (Reporters 
without Borders, 2012). This prompted the state radio’s ethics committee to investigate Valica, 
although she was eventually cleared of attempting to sabotage the courts (Reporters without 
Borders, 2012).  
Interestingly, the Romanian government has also cracked down on the rights of foreign 
journalists to investigate corruption within the country. During the 2012 crisis, numerous foreign 
reporters were accused of being “agent[s] of influence”, sent to sabotage the USL government 
under orders from President Basescu (Reporters without Borders, 2012). The Economist (2012) 
reported that similar instances occurred with journalists working for Der Spiegel, El País, 
Deutsche Welle, CNN, Le Monde, USA Today, and many more. One reporter from Der Spiegel 
was accused of “lying and misinforming his audience about Romania’s political crisis” because 
he was critical of the government’s legally ambiguous actions taken during the crisis (Economist, 
2012).  
 The media has attacked the judiciary for its efforts to prosecute high-level officials, 
particularly politicians who have deep ties to media moguls or the media chains themselves. The 
European Commission noted in its 2014 CVM report that it had “received a large number of 
representations from judicial institutions concerning direct criticism by politicians and political 
motivated media attacks on individual judges, prosecutors and members of their families, as well 
as on judicial and prosecutorial institutions” (European Commission, 2014, 3). Additionally, in 
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2014 Dan Voiculescu was charged with blackmail and was sentenced to ten years in prison. By 
2014, Voiculescu had created an impressive media empire, and had amassed a significant 
amount of power as a prominent politician. ActiveWatch notes that his sentencing “gave the 
media under his control a new opportunity to attack the magistrates and to try to destroy the 
credibility of the judicial process” (2015, 11). Voiculescu’s TV stations “attacked” the judges 
and “resorted to manipulation techniques in order to turn Voiculescu into a “victim of the regime 
in the public’s eyes” (ActiveWatch, 2015, 11).  
 In an effort to influence the outcome of the case, prominent journalists and reporters from 
Voiculescu’s channel, Antena 3, sent an “open letter” to Voiculescu in which they rallied behind 
their boss (ActiveWatch, 2015, 18). After the unfavorable decision was released convicting 
Voiculescu, the same reporters sent another letter, discrediting the ruling as an “abuse” and a 
“political trial targeting the very newsroom of Antena 3 and claimed that it was an attack against 
media freedom” (ActiveWatch, 2015, 18). The reporters blamed Basescu, one of Voiculescu’s 
political enemies, for the outcome of the court decision and staged a protest (ActiveWatch, 2015, 
18). Voiculescu supporters assembled against the courts, and ignited “violent attacks” against the 
judges to voice their displeasure with the “wrongful” imprisonment of their boss (ActiveWatch, 
2015, 11). 
 Most recently, the Constitutional Court has taken it upon itself to take action against 
reporters who criticize the body.  In July 2016, the court stated it would sue reporter Liviu 
Avram for his comments criticizing the judiciary. Avram called the judges on the court “villians” 
(Bucureasa, 2016). The proceedings were not criminal, but the Court stated it was looking to 
make an example out of Avram to prove that reporters cannot make statements criticizing the 
integrity of the court (Bucureasa, 2016). 
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Analysis of Media Freedom 
 
 Upon investigating the role of the media in reporting on judicial corruption, it can be seen 
that the media plays a rather small role in uncovering corrupt practices within the judiciary. This 
is due mostly to the considerable dependency of the media on politicians. Either politicians or 
businessmen with strong ties to politicians own Romanian media conglomerates, thus increasing 
the likelihood that the media will be incapable of maintaining impartiality. Coman argues that 
the efforts of politicians to capture the judiciary arose from their desire to further their own 
political interests (2010, 588). This was best seen when Voiculescu attempted to utilize his ties to 
the Atena 3 network to put pressure on the judges before a decision was made on his court case. 
Although his attempts proved futile, this is unfortunately a common occurrence in Romania that 
is hindering the prosecution of corrupt officials, who then continue to perpetuate the problem 
through consolidating influence over the media market. Comaj argues that the relationship 
between media moguls and corruption is crucial for understanding how levels of corruption are 
influenced. The author argues, “countries where government controls large parts of media 
(especially newspapers) tend to have higher levels of corruption” (2013, 23).  
Furthermore, the government does not respect the independence of the media, and by 
criticizing its efforts to report on corrupt findings or passing legislation to limit transparency, this 
hurts the ability of the Romanian media to act as a watchdog. During the Constitutional Crisis, 
not only was domestic media discredited, but as were efforts of the international media to report 
on the transgressions of the ruling government. This highlights the concerning fact that the 
government, during times of political crisis, will unapologetically undermine the freedom of the 
press if it interferes with its political agenda. While the government does not pass laws directly 
targeting the judiciary and media, the use of political pressure is not conducive to promoting an 
	
134	
independent media and judiciary. If the government or judiciary interferes with the ability of the 
media to report on its corrupt practices, the media cannot place pressure on government veto 
players to implement judicial reform. Mungiu-Pippidi concludes, “naturally, the agenda set by 
this kind of media looks like a permanent war on anti-corruption, not on corruption” (47).  Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 stating that countries with low levels of media freedom will have higher levels of 





































Chapter 5: Findings and Comparisons 
 
 This chapter will compare and contrast the findings from the case studies presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4. The purpose of this chapter is to explore relationships found in the case studies 
to explain broader regional trends. I will break down the four variables featured in each case 
study and will briefly summarize the implications of the findings for the larger picture of judicial 
corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Overall, the case studies proved to be enlightening, 
demonstrating the complexity of the region’s systemic judicial corruption problems. 
Judicial Independence 
 In both Romania and Albania, levels of judicial independence have remained relatively 
stagnant, but are still high. Poor judicial independence is clearly a factor influencing the 
countries’ relatively high levels of judicial corruption since the early 2000’s. The two variables 
selected to measure judicial independence were destabilizing political competition and 
government systems. The findings indicate that both of these variables have contributed to poor 
judicial independence in Romania and Albania, which has in turn resulted in slow, if any, 
progress in lowering judicial corruption levels.  
 An interesting parallel between the Albanian and Romanian cases is that high levels of 
destabilizing political competition between primary parties have resulted in the inability of 
political elites to relinquish their hold over the judiciary. I found that, in both countries, this 
problem is due to the failure to properly eradicate remaining traces of their communist pasts. 
After the fall of communism, the countries failed to create viable political parties capable of 
promoting a culture in which tampering with the independence of the judiciary is not acceptable. 
Additionally, the parties that formed after communism in both countries are personality driven 
and are not founded upon basic political ideologies. This means political parties, particularly in 
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Romania, are more likely to create coalitions out of convenience rather than ideological 
similarities, making reform difficult. The personality driven politics has created a highly 
competitive environment between the main parties in Albania and Romania, which causes them 
to undermine the judiciary’s autonomy in order to further their political interests or consolidate 
their power.  
 In Albania, intense fighting between the PD and PS has resulted in the opposition 
blocking judicial reforms aimed at lowering corruption levels, as well as the appointment of 
judges to high-level courts. By obstructing the appointment of judges, the courts are unable to 
function, as they are operating without full capacity and cannot fulfill their mandates. The 
destabilizing political competition between the PS and PD has led to a de-facto two party system, 
which further perpetuates the problem of poor judicial independence, as it results in the parties 
stalling reform efforts out of spite. Another source of conflict is that the interests of the 
opposition parties in Albania are often secondary to those of the governing coalition, thus the 
minority party frequently blocks reforms out of spite. The opposition is not given proper 
representation on governing bodies, as seen in 2003 when the HCJ purposefully skewed the 
balance of the CEC to favor PS when a PD candidate was supposed to be selected to be in 
accordance with electoral law. The HCJ became a pawn of the PS to carry out its political 
vendetta against the PD before elections.   
 Similarly, Romanian political parties are not viable, as the lingering remnants of its 
communist past have created political parties that are concerned less with political ideologies and 
more with consolidating their power (Iancu, 2015, 154). As a result, governing coalitions will 
frequently disband alliances and regroup with other parties to account for changes in political 
interests, resulting in inconsistencies with implementation of judicial reform. In the late 2000’s, 
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the battle between pro and anti-Basescu forces resulted in two impeachment attempts by the 
governing coalition in an effort to isolate the president. The governing coalition dissolved its 
alliance and formed a new governing coalition with the minority party in order to carry out the 
impeachment attempt in 2007. By isolating the pro-reformist president, the governing elites are 
able to obstruct judicial reform packages or use the courts as their pawns to carry out political 
agendas.  
One difference between Romania and Albania is that, while political parties are engaged 
in frequent political battles, in Albania if one party is leading the government the other is 
defaulted to being the opposition party. In Romania, this is not the case, as coalition 
compositions are not predictable. For example, there was a brief time in which the PDL and PNL 
were in power together, but when President Basescu’s fight against corruption began to threaten 
the power of old-guard politicians, the PNL left the coalition to join the PSD. The PNL and PSD 
are not on similar ends of the political spectrum, thus this was not an alliance between 
likeminded parties, but rather an alliance of political convenience. Albania’s political parties 
remain on either side of the spectrum, and do not as easily create new governing coalitions given 
that they are run by party leaders that vehemently oppose any policies or reform efforts brought 
forth by the other.  
A commonality between the Albanian and Romanian cases is that there appears to be a 
struggle between reformists and anti-reformists. In Romania, this manifested in the form of 
fighting between the reformist president, Basescu, and the anti-reformist government. Any 
attempt by the reformist president to adopt judicial reform packages was frequently met with 
resistance by the government.  While this also occurred in Albania, it was not between the 
president and the parliament, but between the two political parties. Since the PS and PD are the 
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only two parties capable of forming coalition governments, the opposition party would become 
the “anti-reformists”, while the governing coalition would paint themselves as the “reformists”. 
In reality, both parties proved to be impediments to true judicial reform, but the opposition or 
“anti-reformists” would stall reforms in an effort to delay them to use this as leverage in the next 
round of elections.  
This brings me to my next finding: low political will is undoubtedly an issue in both 
countries, and this has led to reluctance on behalf of the politicians to relinquish their political 
control over the judiciary. This would account for the lack of judicial reforms over the years in 
both countries. Even if political elites in Romania and Albania do pass judicial reforms, the 
implementation of them is often weak, resulting in a lack of progress. Parties in both countries 
have become experts in delaying judicial reform when it does not coincide with their political 
interest. However, Romanian and Albanian political parties use different tactics to either delay 
reforms or interfere with the autonomy of the judiciary.  
The method of choice for Romanian politicians is to pass weak judicial reforms that are 
incapable of producing meaningful change. Romanian political elites also pack courts with 
loyalists in an attempt to undermine reform efforts. In doing so, the politicians have used the 
courts as their scapegoats to make it appear as if judicial reforms are passed, but in reality they 
are using the political allegiances of the courts to water down the legislation, making it less 
effective. This was best seen in 2005 when actors in the judiciary, who feared a weakening of 
their power, picked the Minister of Justice’s three-law package and Anti-Corruption Plan apart.  
The popular tactic employed by Albanian political elites is to either block reforms 
completely, or to challenge them in the courts. With the passing of the major reform package in 
2016, the PD and PS both seemed receptive to the prospect of passing the reforms, but as soon as 
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the package made it through parliament the PD challenged the laws. The law that caused the 
most political debate was the controversial vetting law. The PD accused the PS of creating an 
unnecessary witch hunt on judges and worked with the Union of Judges to take the law to the 
Constitutional Court in an effort to have it ruled unconstitutional. If reforms are blocked, how 
can they be implemented? This is the main strategy of Albanian political parties who are 
opposed to implementing reforms that can aid in lowering corruption levels. This is not to say 
that things have not improved in Albania. Recently the Constitutional Court blocked the efforts 
of the Union of Judges and the PD to hold up the vetting law, subsequently subjecting judges 
who made the decision to intense scrutiny and investigations in the near future (Mejdini, 2016).  
Thus, it can be seen that politicians in Romania and Albania have also placed political 
vendettas above judicial reform, positioning the courts in the middle of a volatile war between 
parties. Therefore, the variable of destabilizing political competition does have an impact on 
influencing poor judicial independence, which then inhibits the ability of courts to function, as 
well as decreases the overall quality of judicial reforms necessary for lowering corruption. These 
findings definitively support Hypothesis 1, stating that countries with high levels of destabilizing 
political competition will have higher levels of judicial corruption.  
Finally, the type of government system in place proved to play an integral role in Albania 
and Romania’s failure to lower judicial corruption levels over time. In both countries, the issue 
of government system results from the distribution of power between the president and the prime 
minister, as prescribed by each country’s respective constitution. The relationship between the 
ruling government—run by the prime minister—and the president is ambiguous in Romania and 
Albania, which has led to a struggle for power and influence over the judiciary by politicians. 
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The struggle for power undermines the autonomy of the judiciary, as the courts are frequently 
used as pawns to further the political agendas of the ruling elites.  
 Tensions between the prime minister and the president have limited the countries’ efforts 
in curbing judicial corruption in both cases. The issue posed by the semi-presidential system in 
Romania is that of cohabitation between the President and the PM being from different parties. 
Cohabitation leads to the isolation of the president, who was, in Romania’s case, the primary 
force behind judicial reforms. The issue with Romania’s semi-presidential system is that the 
ambiguity between the distribution of powers between the prime minister and president leads to 
one actor attempting to assert its power over the other. The courts inevitably get trapped in the 
middle of struggle between the two, which undermines its independence. This problem is 
exacerbated further when one of these two actors is a reformist and the other is seeking to slow 
down judicial reforms. This was best seen in 2012 during Romania’s Constitutional crisis. The 
reasoning for the USL’s decision to impeach President Basescu was that he had overstepped his 
constitutional duties and infringed upon the rule of law. However, due to the ambiguous nature 
of the separation of powers, it is unclear if this was truly the case or if the USL coalition simply 
wanted an excuse to remove the reformist president to further their political agenda.  
In Albania, the issue posed by the parliamentary system is that the power to appoint 
judges and other judicial actors is granted to the president, thus if the president and ruling 
coalition are not from the same party, the parliament will often veto the president’s nominees. 
The second, and primary issue, with the Albanian parliamentary system in place is that it is not a 
traditional parliamentary system. In Chapter 3 I classified Albania’s judiciary as lean-




 The Albanian president should, in theory, be a largely ceremonial figure. In practice, 
however, this is not the case, as the president—up until July 2016—wielded a significant amount 
of power over the judiciary. The president was one of the sole appointers of judges and held a 
position on the High Council of the Judiciary, a body that oversaw the evaluation, promotion, 
appointment, and transfer of judges. The prime minister in the lean-parliamentary system does 
not have the authority to assist with judicial appointments, and when the president and prime 
minister are from different parties, a struggle ensues between the two. The struggle occurs 
because the governing party is attempting to assert its power and in doing so must block 
presidential appoints to the judiciary in order to promote its political interests The president, on 
the other hand, has too much authority and can pack the court with loyal followers, as 
demonstrated when President Nishani attempted to pack the court with PD supporters after the 
PS swept the parliamentary elections earlier that year. The president also held seats on many of 
Albania’s judicial bodies, thus increasing the likelihood the president could influence the 
decisions made behind the scenes.  
Overall, I find that both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems can attribute to high 
levels of judicial corruption, suggesting that parliamentary systems are not in fact better at 
lowering judicial corruption relative to other government systems.  It appears that both 
government systems have contributed to high levels of judicial corruption, but for different 
reasons. In Romania high judicial corruption levels result from the issues posed by cohabitation, 
but in Albania it is a result of the allocation of powers between the president and the prime 
minister in the lean-parliamentary system. However, both countries share a commonality: the 
distribution of powers between the president and prime minister is ambiguous in nature. The 
ambiguity creates a power struggle between the two political actors and their respective parties, 
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leading to poor cooperation on judicial reform, which has led to a lack of improvement in 
judicial corruption levels since 2002. The ambiguity also allows one political actor to test the 
boundaries of its constitutional limitations, as seen in the Romanian case when Prime Minister 
Ponta defied the orders of the Constitutional Court and triggered a Constitutional Crisis.  It can 
be determined then, that distribution of power is a crucial concept necessary for evaluating 
causes of judicial corruption. It is the distribution of power between the prime minister and 
president that leads us to classify government systems. If the distribution of power is ambiguous, 
it does not matter if a country has a parliamentary, semi-presidential, or presidential system: 
judicial corruption will remain endemic if political actors do not have powers with clearly 
defined parameters and limitations. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 stating that countries with 
parliamentary systems will show to have lower levels of judicial corruption is not supported.  
European Union Leverage 
 Albania and Romania, although one a candidate and the other a member country, have 
roughly the same levels of judicial corruption. After delving into the EU reform process in 
Albania and Romania, I found that EU membership and candidacy status is effective in lowering 
judicial corruption, but there are limits to its effectiveness. Overall, Hypothesis 3 stating that EU 
members and candidate countries will have lower levels of judicial corruption has been 
supported. The findings of this study indicate that the effects of European Union membership on 
judicial corruption levels have proved positive in Romania, but only when the country was 
partaking in the accession process up until 2007. This being said, the EU accession process has 
improved Romania’s corruption levels over the years, and this should not be understated. While 
Romania’s levels are still high, it is quite possible that without undergoing the EU accession 
process, its judicial corruption levels would be much higher today. In Albania, I found that EU 
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leverage was not as effective in lowering corruption levels in the early stages of the accession 
process, but picked up after it was rejected candidacy status three times and continued to 
progress after receiving candidacy status in 2014. Reforms in Albania were adopted in a 
piecemeal fashion up until the country obtained candidacy status in 2014, and then began to 
speed up, lowering overall judicial corruption levels. 
 The European Commission used varying tactics in Romania to encourage the passing of 
judicial reforms. The Commission delayed accession until 2007, used the “carrot” of Schengen 
entry to encourage judicial reform, implemented safeguard clauses with an extensive list of 
benchmarks that had to be met post-accession, and developed the CVM reports after accession to 
continue evaluating the country’s progress. In Albania, the publishing of annual progress reports 
had the greatest impact on pushing the government to make progress in judicial reform up until 
2004, when it began to link poor public opinion of the judiciary to the performance of the 
governing coalition. As the reforms began to stagnate and numerous political crises arose, the 
EU began to directly engage with the government by acting as a mediator and assigning strict 
deadlines/criteria for the country to follow. Perhaps the EU’s most powerful conditionality tactic 
is its authority to reject or delay a country’s progress in the accession process. After the EU held 
Romania back from acceding to the Union with the Visegrad countries in 2004, this helped 
propel reforms forward, allowing it to obtain membership in 2007. Similarly, the EU’s rejection 
of Albania’s candidacy status three times from 2010 to 2014 demonstrated to the Albanian 
government that the adoption of reforms was not enough: without implementation of the reforms 
Albania had no chance of obtaining candidacy status. This proved to be the “push” the Albanian 
government needed, as it moved on to the next stage in the accession process in 2014.  
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 In both the Romanian and Albanian cases, one of the EU’s most important roles was that 
of an agenda setter for the reform progress. Through the use of EU progress reports, the 
European Commission directly laid out detailed criteria for Romania and Albania to meet as they 
progressed throughout the accession process. In Albania, as the country moved farther along in 
the accession process, specifically after the SAA came into effect, the European Commission 
outlined specific reforms for the government to follow, as all of the progress reports moving 
forward were meant to increase performance on the objectives laid out in the EU’s 2010 
Opinion. The EU set similar agendas for Romania in its progress reports, including well after 
accession with the CVM reports. The safeguard clauses helped guide the Romanian government 
so as to ensure that it could not renege on previous commitments or stall reforms that were in the 
process of being adopted. As a result, the agendas set by the EU helped propel reforms forward, 
thus lowering corruption levels.  
 The EU also made use of its formal and informal roles as an overseer of the accession 
process in Romania and Albania. Formally speaking, the EU published regular progress reports 
that set an agenda for the Albanian government to follow, but it also acted within an informal 
setting to help encourage reforms to pass. Notably, the EU’s top leadership made informal 
comments to the press to help spur judicial reform and place pressure on political elites. This was 
best seen in 2016 when many EU leaders specifically asked the government to pass the reform 
independent of the annual progress reports. In Romania, the EU took on a formal role in 
leveraging its conditionality through the annual publication of CVM reports and the creation of 
the safeguard clauses. It did not deviate much from this, though, as the formal publication of 
reports were necessary for guiding the Romanian government, who needed clear objectives to 
follow otherwise it would revert on many of its promises. Overall, it appears that the EU 
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preferred to use its formal role in Romania, and changed tactics in Albania once it became clear 
that formal agenda setting needed to be supplemented with other conditionality tools.  
 A common trend between the two countries is that in the early 2000’s EU conditionality 
proved relatively ineffective between 2000 and 2004. This implies that in the early stages of 
accession negotiations, the influence of domestic factors may interfere with the strength of EU 
leverage. This is due to the fact that at this time political elites in Romania and Albania had few 
tangible benefits to passing judicial reform packages, as the next “carrot” in the accession 
process was not in sight. The role of public opinion was also strong in both countries, but I 
believe that the role of public opinion played a greater role in triggering reforms in Romania than 
Albania in the early 2000s. Obviously, citizens in both cases wanted to accede to the Union. 
However, the pressure placed on Romanian elites in the form of public opinion levels was the 
greatest from 2000 to 2004 in Romania. It is difficult to definitively compare the effectiveness of 
EU leverage during each time period (200-2004; 2004-2008; 2008-2012; 2012-present) because 
Romania and Albania were in different stages in the accession process during these times. 
However, an overall trend can be depicted about the effect of EU leverage in lowering corruption 
levels:  it can be discerned that the effect of EU membership status on judicial corruption levels 
is positive once a country obtains candidacy status or is about to accede to the union, but then 
becomes stagnant after obtaining membership. This is in accordance with much of the literature 
presented in Chapter 1 on the effects of EU leverage on corruption levels. The findings mimic 
those of Dimitrova, who similarly argued that EU leverage is most effective pre-accession 
through agenda setting (2010, 137). My findings also support the findings of Garbbe’s study, 
which found that EU conditionality is strongest pre-accession because of the “carrot” of 
obtaining membership, but wanes off after membership is achieved (2014, 42).  
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EU conditionality played the most important role in curbing judicial corruption levels in 
the lead-up to the Romania’s accession, as it dangled the “carrot” of EU accession over the heads 
of Romanian politicians who were held accountable to their constituents, all of whom viewed EU 
accession favorably. When Romania was engaged in accession talks after 2000, it showed 
remarkable improvement in passing incremental judicial reforms that were praised by the 
European Commission as positive steps forward in curbing judicial corruption. Once Albania 
obtained candidacy status, the country passed comprehensive reform packages that overhauled 
most of the facets of the country’s judiciary the European Commission viewed as weak or 
ineffective. The country even removed political actors from key positions on judicial bodies, 
such as the president. This finding proves that once a country achieves candidacy status, the 
main policy goal of EU accession is almost in sight, thus countries push forward with important 
policy initiatives in order to accede to the Union. This supports literature stating that the effect of 
the “carrot” is more powerful than the actual “stick” of EU conditionality leading to EU 
accession (see Mavrikos-Adamou, 2013).  
 However, an important caveat that must be mentioned is that the political will of 
politicians to actually implement reforms must be present. Political will, coupled with the 
conditionality of the EU, is what proved most effective in lowering judicial corruption levels in 
Romania (Mendelski, 2012, 37). When President Basescu and Minister of Justice Macoevei were 
conducting judicial reforms in Romania, they had key interests in reforming the judiciary, and 
thus used their power to help push through reforms that were critical in positively impacting 
judicial institutions, thus lowering corruption for the time being. However, once Macovei was 
fired and Basescu faced opposition from governing coalitions, the political will to institute 
reforms and continue to uphold the integrity of the judiciary remained low. Political leaders, 
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when faced with pressure from the EU to reform policies post-accession, would listen in the first 
round of negotiations on a law, but then would revert back to the old document, completely 
ignoring the protests of the EU when the final version of the law was passed. Furthermore, many 
authors argue that the incremental reforms conducted by Romanian politicians in the lead-up to 
accession were enough to get the country into the Union, but were not enough to create viable, 
independent judicial institutions (see Mendelski, 2012, 35-6). Thus, the possibility of 
maintaining its progress from before accession remained dim. 
Given that Albania has not yet acceded to the EU, the effects of membership cannot be 
evaluated with this case study. We can, though, evaluate the effect of EU leverage in the early 
stages of the country’s accession process until present. The positive effects of EU conditionality 
overall cannot be denied. Although there were flaws with EU conditionality in the early stages of 
accession because the Union was focused on the 2004 enlargement, after 2009 when the 
country’s SAA came into effect, the Union’s leverage over political elites was crucial in the 
gradual lowering of judicial corruption levels. It is worth noting that a relationship between 
political will and EU conditionality in lowering corruption levels is evident in Albania as well. 
Mavrikos-Adamou (2013, 1166) found that the prospect of EU membership was ineffective at 
times in creating meaningful change in Albania’s judicial corruption levels because the EU is 
viewed as a “carrot” and not the “stick”. The author also noted that even after the prospect of 
obtaining candidacy status was delayed, the government still did not feel incentivized to 
implement any of the reforms (2013, 1166). However, once the country achieved candidacy 
status in 2014, the government worked diligently to pass a comprehensive reform package, even 
collaborating with the PD in order to prove its dedication to judicial reform. The EU viewed the 
2016 reform packages as a positive step forward, and praised Albania’s efforts at judicial reform. 
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This being said, the package was stalled in the courts for quite some time, as the PD challenged 
one of the crucial laws. The actions of the PD demonstrate that without the political will of 
politicians to carry on with the reforms after they are passed, EU conditionality means little in 
the grand scheme of things.  
There is an important external force that must be discussed when evaluating the overall 
effects of EU leverage on lowering Albanian judicial corruption levels: EU enlargement fatigue.  
There is much debate about the effect of EU enlargement fatigue on reform processes in possible 
member countries, particularly the Western Balkans. I briefly touched on this in Chapter 3, but 
will elaborate further. As demonstrated in Romania’s case study, the process of EU accession did 
not go as smoothly as intended. The country struggled to adopt reforms, and when it did it 
frequently watered them down or did not implement them properly. Furthermore, after Romania 
acceded to the Union, it reneged on many of its commitments and underwent a constitutional 
crisis five years later in 2012. The country’s institutions, particularly the judiciary, are not 
completely democratic.  
Peshkopia argues that the flawed results from the Romanian case have made the EU wary 
of expanding to include the rest of the post-communist countries (2014, 213-4). Additionally, the 
2004 enlargement to include the Visegrad countries was intensive, and required lots of 
coordination. To immediately follow with another round of enlargement in 2007 increased the 
total member states to 25, creating coordination issues (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007, 91). After 
the economic crisis, many EU countries also began to look inwards, and were not nearly as 
concerned with expanding when they have their own problems to contend with (Panagiotou, 
2011, 373-4). Furthermore, the Western Balkans are more challenging than other CEE candidate 
countries were, as they are poorer, posing significant political and economic issues. As a result, it 
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is possible that this “enlargement fatigue” has also contributed to the lack of political will on 
behalf of Albania’s government to institute reforms necessary for lowering corruption. Kmezic 
states that the “downplay of enlargement had negative repercussions in the Balkans, undermining 
the credibility of the membership promise” (2015, 11-12). The author argues that this could 
decrease political will of the government and actually lower public opinion of the EU (Kmezic, 
2015, 11-12). Public opinion is a primary motivator for officials, so if the public no longer views 
EU accession as a necessary policy goal, then elites will no longer act to pass reforms necessary 
for reaching EU membership.  
 Thus, it can be discerned that the effect of EU membership on curbing judicial corruption 
levels is effective, but only for candidate countries or countries in the late stages of accession 
talks. Albania’s judicial corruption—while still an area of concern, hence the increase in EU 
pressure in recent years—has improved since achieving candidacy status. Has the country seen a 
dramatic reduction in corruption levels? No, but the progress cannot be ignored, nonetheless. 
One problem Albania faces is that political elites are not keen on passing judicial reforms that are 
capable of making a significant impact on corruption levels. Accordingly, it is necessary to note 
that political will of politicians is important when evaluating the overall effects of EU 
membership on the independent variable. Romania showed to have progress pre-accession, but 
much of that was reversed post-accession, as the country had already obtained membership. The 
EU did threaten Romania on numerous occasions post-accession to get its act together, but the 
political elites did not take the EU’s threats seriously, undermining the effect of EU 
conditionality. Once CEE countries obtain membership to the EU, the incentives to continue 
judicial reform progress remain low and corruption levels often become stagnant. However, 
corruption levels do lower once a country becomes a candidate or member country relative to 
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before the entered into negotiations with the EU. Thus, these finding supports Hypothesis 3, 
stating that Candidate and EU member countries will have lower levels of judicial corruption.  
 Media Freedom 
 Interestingly, the effect of the media on exposing corrupt practices was hard to account 
for in this study. Hypothesis 4 states that countries with low levels of media freedom will have 
higher levels of judicial corruption. Both Romania and Albania’s results support this hypothesis. 
These findings also support theories presented in the literature review, particularly the work of 
Kurkchiyan, who argued that politicization of the press can lead to the covering up of corrupt 
practices, which negatively influences corruption levels (Transparency International, 2007, 106).  
  In Albania, the issue of self-censorship has forced investigative journalism into the 
background. The media has been responsible for leaking cases in which courts have placed 
pressure on journalists, but exposing corrupt practices is not entirely common. Although there 
are no formal limitations on freedom of expression, the Albanian media is not as active in the 
fight against judicial corruption as initially believed. Numerous studies argued that a country 
with minimal limitations placed on the freedom of expression should in fact have lower levels of 
judicial corruption, as transparency of the judiciary and the right to express one’s opinions were 
believed to encourage the media to investigate corrupt practices (Treisman, 2004). BIRN (2015, 
8) stated that the self-censorship in Albania has limited the public’s access to information as 
result of low publication rates on corrupt practices. Additionally, even if the media exposed 
corrupt practices, the court system did not fulfill their duty of investigating the corrupt practices 
to the fullest extent, either due to political influence or conflicts of interest.  
 In Romania, a dynamic relationship between politicians, the courts, and the media was 
uncovered. Unlike in Albania, the Romanian media does investigate some corrupt practices and 
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there is not a high level of self-censorship. Romania also has a ranking of “partly free” and, 
similarly, the independence of the media is frequently compromised. Politicians, or businessmen 
with political ties, own most media outlets in Romania, and there are cases in which the media 
has tried to interfere with judicial decisions on behalf of their owners. Additionally, even when 
the media does attempt to be impartial and exposes judicial corruption, the government or the 
courts criticize the media in an attempt to discredit them. Thus, there is an ongoing battle 
between the court system and the media that results in little progress in curbing judicial 
corruption. Of particular concern is the fact that the Romanian government has little respect for 
the rights of the foreign press to investigate matters of domestic politics. In sum, the findings 
from the Romania case study indicate that the Romanian media has not played a significant role 
in curbing judicial corruption levels, either because of political influence placed on the media 
that prevents them from investigating, or because the courts discredit or threaten journalists with 
legal action, as seen by the recent actions of the Constitutional Court in 2016.  
 In all, the media in Romania and Albania have had little effect on curbing judicial 
corruption, which could explain why judicial corruption has not improved over the years and 
remains high today. The media plays a role in investigating some cases of judicial corruption, but 
it not active. Any efforts the media does take are frequently met with criticism or monetary fines 
by the courts, essentially preventing the media from fulfilling its duty as a watchdog. The 
primary factor that separates the Romanian from the Albanian case is that journalists in Albania 
are forced to self-censor themselves. Although Romania’s media is politicized, some journalists 
do speak openly about corruption, but only when it suits the political agendas of their owners. 
Whereas in Albania, journalists purposefully self-censor themselves due to fear of facing 
repercussions from politicians or businessmen. Because the media in both countries is unable to 
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properly shed light on corrupt practices, the accountability of judges and prosecutors has 
decreased, and corrupt practices have continued to go unreported. Overall, my hypothesis 
pertaining to the relationship between media freedom and judicial corruption values has been 
supported. 
Summary of Findings 
 In sum, the findings suggest that all three variables (the media, judicial independence, 
and EU membership) play an important role in explaining why judicial corruption levels in 
Romania and Albania are high. The findings indicate that most literature criticizing the EU’s 
conditionality and leverage over member countries is partially true. The time period in which EU 
accession proves to benefit countries the most is when they are in the accession process, 
particularly after obtaining candidacy status. These findings could partially explain why CEE EU 
member countries, like Romania, are under fire for committing “democratic backsliding”, 
indicating that it could be a trait specific to the region. Similar problems pertaining to 
backsliding in the rule of law have occurred in Hungary and Poland.  
 The variable of judicial independence also proved to be significant, as both Romania and 
Albania suffer from poor judicial independence as a result of intense, destabilizing political 
competition amongst key parties and their respective government systems. Political competition 
that results in parties sabotaging one another to consolidate power frequently results in very little 
judicial reform progress and undermines the independence of the judiciary. Government type 
also impacted judicial independence, but the findings indicate that ambiguous distributions of 
power between the prime minister and president is a crucial component of understanding why 
certain government systems could be more effective in combating judicial corruption than others. 
Overall, a correlation between low judicial independence and moderate to high levels of 
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corruption was depicted. Finally, while both Albania and Romania have no constitutional 
restrictions on freedom of expression, the media plays a limited role in investigating corruption 
scandals. Media circles in both countries are subject to external pressures through interference 
with their role as a watchdog, either by being threatened with fines, legal action, or blatant 
criticisms by the government. As a result, corrupt practices have been allowed to continue and 
judicial corruption is now systemic. This explains why judicial corruption levels remain high 
today.  
 These findings have broad implications at the regional level. The overall findings 
regarding EU membership are significant for predicting the likely effect EU conditionality will 
have on corruption levels in Albania and other candidate countries when they accede to the 
Union. These findings will prove to be particularly relevant for other CEE countries that are in 
the midst of, or will begin, the accession process. EU enlargement fatigue could play a 
substantial role in explaining why these countries’ future accession processes are delayed. As 
stated previously, the findings pertaining to EU membership can also explain why similar crises 
are occurring in other CEE member states, suggesting that EU membership in CEE states could 
be largely ineffective in lowering corruption levels once a country achieves membership. Of 
course, additional research would need to be done to verify this conclusion, but it is worth 
noting, nonetheless. The project’s findings also suggest that while the media in most CEE states 
may appear relatively free, it is still under significant pressure from external actors and should 
not be ignored. Finally, broadly speaking, it can be assumed that political elites and their efforts 
to interfere with the mandates of the judiciaries in CEE states are largely responsible for the 
moderate to high levels of judicial corruption found across the region. Elites have entrenched 
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themselves in the political scene after communism, and as a result have allowed corrupt practices 
to continue to the point where corruption is systemic and likely irreversible for the time being. 
This observation is particularly relevant to the current events transpiring in Romania, 
where the government has come under fire for adopting a law that would de-criminalize specific 
acts of corruption. Immediately following the news, Romanians across the country took to the 
streets in a massive protest against the government and its blatant disregard for the rule of law. 
The cries of Romanians were heard, as the government was pressured to withdraw the law 
(Lyman and Gillet, 2017). It appears that the only way to truly change the incentives for ruling 
elites is through mass protest and pressure by the population. Hopefully the Romanian example 
sets a precedent for other CEE countries that can bring about a positive change in the actions of 






 This study has examined the causes of judicial corruption in two Central and Eastern 
European countries: Albania and Romania. The four variables tracked from 2000 to the present 
were political competition, government system, EU membership and candidate status, and levels 
of media freedom. After delving into to rich histories of these two post-communist countries, a 
number of important causal relationships can be drawn. Below is a table summarizing the main 
findings from this study: 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, a relationship between levels of political 
competition and levels of judicial corruption was found. In Romania and Albania, the intense, 
destabilizing political competition between the primary governing parties has resulted in a 
culture in which undermining the independence of the judiciary is not only an acceptable means 
of consolidating power, but also an acceptable tool for derailing judicial reform efforts.  Levels 
of judicial independence in both countries have remained stagnant since the early 2000’s, and 
this has contributed to the moderately high levels of judicial corruption in both countries. Thus, it 
can be seen that poor levels of judicial independence can augment levels of judicial corruption. 
Political elites in both countries appear to preference political interests over the creation of an 
autonomous, thriving judiciary. This is primarily because elites in Albania and Romania failed to 
form viable political parties after communism, thus political parties lack clear ideologies and are 
heavily influenced by personality-driven politics.  
 Interestingly, the influence of government type on judicial corruption levels proved to be 
insignificant in both countries. It was hypothesized that parliamentary systems would have lower 
levels of judicial corruption, but this was not the case, as Albania’s judicial independence issues 
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were comparable to those of Romania. What truly matters when discussing government systems 
is the distribution of powers between the prime minister and president. The more ambiguous the 
distribution of powers is, the more likely it is that a power struggle will ensue between the 
president and the prime minister over control of the judicial branch. In Albania in particular, this 
arises from the fact that the Albanian government system can be classified as lean-
parliamentary, which distributes too much authority over the judiciary to the president when in 
reality it should be vested with the prime minister. In Romania, the ambiguity arises from the 
issue of cohabitation—when the president and prime minister are from different parties, thus 
leading to the political isolation of one of the actors, mainly the actor that is more reform-
minded. Also, in both cases, the judiciary is frequently used as a pawn of politicians to carry out 
their dirty work. The courts act as scapegoats for politicians who want to water down reforms but 
do not want to risk appearing as weak to their constituents.  
 In regards to the effect of EU membership and candidacy status on judicial corruption 
levels, the findings support those of scholars presented in the literature review (see Vachudova, 
2009; Garbbe, 2014; Dimitrova, 2010). Both the Romanian and Albanian cases demonstrate the 
powerful effects of EU conditionality on corruption levels. The Albanian case demonstrated that 
EU leverage is moderately effective in lowering corruption levels in the early stages of the 
accession process, but also that EU leverage grows strongest after a country obtains candidacy 
status and stagnates after it accedes to the Union. The Romanian case confirmed what most 
scholars had already believed: the effect of EU conditionality in lowering corruption levels 
appears to become stagnant once a country accedes to the Union, as the “carrot” of EU 
membership has been achieved. While Romania and Albania continued to struggle with judicial 
corruption, obtaining EU membership and candidate status has had an overall positive effect on 
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judicial corruption levels over the years. Below is a table depicting the change in judicial 
corruption levels from 2000 to the present:  
[Insert Table 7] 
 Clearly, EU leverage played a minimal role in lowering judicial corruption levels from 
2000-2004 in Romania and Albania. I believe this to be partially due to the fact that political 
elites lacked incentives and a proper sense of urgency to adopt meaningful judicial reform 
packages during this time period. During this four-year period, reforms were adopted 
infrequently in both countries, and if they were adopted they were watered down or obstructed 
by political elites.  Although Albania and Romania were in different stages of the EU accession 
process from 2004 to 2008, a common trend can be seen: as a country closes in on reaching the 
next “carrot” in the accession process—membership in the Romanian case, and the possibility of 
obtaining candidacy in the Albanian case—EU leverage increases and corruption levels begin to 
decrease. Additionally, once a country is denied reaching the next “carrot” in the accession 
process, it begins to exhibit positive changes in reform adoption as a result of EU leverage. This 
was best demonstrated in both Romania and Albania, when Romania was held back from 
acceding with the Visegrad countries in 2004 and Albania was rejected candidacy status three 
times by EU.  
 Clearly, the role of the EU as an agenda setter proved to be crucial in Albania and 
Romania, as the EU used its informal and formal leverage over the potential member countries to 
bring about change in judicial corruption levels. It appears that the EU preferences using formal 
leverage in Romania, opting to create specific safeguard clauses and a CVM report for after 
accession to monitor reforms. The tactics of the EU used in Albania resembled those of 
Romania, but a greater emphasis was placed on using informal leverage after the country was 
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granted candidacy status to place pressures on political elites. However, EU formal leverage in 
Romania appears to be limited today because political elites have lost the incentives to follow 
EU recommendations after acceding to the Union, as the country has now begun to reap the 
benefits of accession without continued reform progress.  
I argued that domestic factors matter when discussing the effect of EU leverage on 
judicial corruption levels. In both Albania and Romania, it was clear that because public opinion 
about acceding to the EU was high, political elites were more inclined to adopt reforms to please 
constituents. If elites did not demonstrate effort in adopting EU reforms, it was more than likely 
this would have negatively impacted their chances of re-election. Additionally, it is crucial to 
note that politicians, although they would pass reforms, were not deeply committed to the 
implementation of the reforms. It appears as if Romanian and Albanian political elites were 
simply going through the motions of reform at times in order to move on to the next phase of EU 
accession. Political will was also an important factor in implementing EU reforms, as the more 
comprehensive reforms were, the more unlikely it was that political elites would choose to 
follow through on them. This is mainly because reforms were meant to lower the politicization of 
the judiciary, which was contrary to the political interests of the government, thus they had little 
incentive to see them through.  
The influence of EU enlargement fatigue is only applicable to Albania. Scholars have 
heavily debated whether the EU is going through an enlargement fatigue, and I believe it is 
possible that this has impacted Albania’s EU accession progress, but only to a minimal extent. 
Given the current political and economic situation in Europe, it is understandable that the Union 
would be hesitant to admit countries that could negatively affect the stability of the bloc. This 
being said, I believe that any delays in Albania’s accession are primarily influenced by Albania’s 
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poor track record in adopting and implementing reforms. Its track record only reinforces the 
image that EU member states have of countries in the Western Balkans: they are still in the midst 
of developing strong, democratic institutions, and thus most countries are somewhat politically 
unpredictable. However, I do agree with some scholars, such as Kmezic (2015, 11-12), that it is 
possible the constant rejection of candidacy status for Albania could have led to some 
backtracking on reforms, as it demonstrates that the EU is not committed to bring Albania into 
the Union in the near future.  
Finally, I found that countries with low levels of media freedom do in fact have higher 
levels of judicial corruption. This is because investigative journalism in Albania is not popular, 
and self-censorship on the behalf of journalists has created a climate in which corrupt practices 
go undocumented, thus allowing judicial corruption to become systemic. In both Romania and 
Albania, the media is heavily politicized, as all media outlets are typically reliant on politicians 
for funding. As a result, judicial corruption practices are frequently not reported on. In sum, my 
findings support the theory that low levels of media freedom can cause higher levels of judicial 
corruption.  
Limitations and Areas of Improvement 
 Overall, this study proved very successful, but it does possess limitations. I should note 
that the hardest part about conducting a study on countries in Central and Eastern Europe is the 
lack of availability of data, particularly on judicial corruption. This was not as much of a 
problem in Romania, as literature on judicial corruption is more readily available. Given 
Albania’s size and its status as a democratizing country, literature on judicial corruption proved 
to be limited at times. While I was able to put together a comprehensive overview of the 
country’s struggles with judicial corruption, there were times where I found it difficult to piece 
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together the country’s entire story. In order to improve this study in the future, I would attempt to 
conduct interviews with judges, political elites, or other persons with first-hand accounts of 
judicial corruption in Albania to supplement the secondary sources I found. 
 A second limitation of this study is that it only analyzes two case studies. While this 
proved to be adequate for the purposes of this project, in the future I would include more case 
studies in order to account for the political and economic diversity of the region. Additionally, I 
would choose a case that varies more on the independent variables, as Romania and Albania 
lacked variability on some selected variables. By not including a third study, I was unable to 
select a case that was not a EU member or candidate country. Had I selected a non-EU member 
country it would have perhaps strengthened my argument about the effect of EU membership 
and candidate status on judicial corruption levels. I also would include an upper-level income 
country, such as Slovenia or Poland, in order to test if higher levels of economic development 
have an effect on corruption levels. It also would be interesting to select another Western Balkan 
country that is not a EU candidate country, to examine the effect of EU enlargement fatigue on 
overall corruption levels. Finally, I would select cases that are “pure” parliamentary and 
presidential systems. While Romania is a semi-presidential system and Albania a parliamentary, 
neither falls neatly in either category. It would be best to choose countries that fall neatly on 
either side of the spectrum, so as to not have overlap between the cases on this variable.  
 In order to obtain a more complete picture of the causes of judicial corruption at the 
regional level, I would also include more independent variables. While three proved to be a 
sufficient amount of independent variables for the two case studies used in this study, in order to 
avoid falling into the trap of over-generalizing causal relationships—a common issue with a case 
study methodology—I would add at least two more independent variables in order to strengthen 
	
161	
my arguments. Two independent variables worth investigating further are the effects of civil 
society pressure on judicial corruption and the influence of left/right parties on influencing 
judicial corruption reforms. Although my research did not cover the influence of leftist parties on 
judicial corruption levels, I did come across it numerous times in works of other scholars. This 
could perhaps be an interesting avenue to pursue further in the future, as many of these countries 
retained remnants of communist left parties after 1989.  
Concluding Remarks 
 The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have progressed since the fall of 
communism in 1989, demonstrating their resiliency and commitment to rejoining their Western 
counterparts. The results of this study were enlightening, and demonstrated that the effect of 
integration on corruption levels may not be as clear-cut as it would appear. Like any body, the 
EU has its flaws, but the overall effect of its conditionality shows to have positive effects on the 
democratization processes of potential member countries. It is my hope that this study has shed 
light on the benefits that EU leverage can have on successfully lowering corruption levels in 
order to contribute meaningfully to the academic debate on this topic. This project will prove 
particularly relevant in the coming years as the remainder of the Western Balkans states either 
conclude or begin their own accession processes.  
 One important point that I would like to end with is this: the European Union, and the rest 
of the world, should not give up on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is clear that 
these countries, including Romania and Albania, have a ways to go before they become true 
democracies. Even countries such as Poland and Slovakia, two of the first CEE states to join the 
EU in 2004 and considered among the best “success” stories of EU conditionality, have shown to 
have their own problems with maintaining reform post-accession. However, this study has 
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demonstrated that EU conditionality can be effective in changing the agendas of political elites in 
post-communist countries. It is clear that EU conditionality is most effective when the Union 
applies direct and specific pressure on member countries. If the EU can continue to strengthen its 
methods of enacting conditionality in the future, it is quite possible that CEE countries will be 
more responsive in the future to EU pressures calling for reform.  
 A second overarching point I would like to make is that, while a country may appear to 
be “democratic” because they are a member of the European Union and other global institutions, 
it does not mean that they are in fact democratic. This was best seen with the findings from the 
Romania case study, where it was demonstrated that EU member countries are capable of having 
“partly free” media outlets and weak judicial independence even though many would believe 
them to be fully democratized. Thus, I believe that it is important to look past the surface level of 
a given country’s appearances in an effort to understand the root of the cause of judicial 
corruption in CEE states. Time will tell how these countries will continue to progress over the 
coming years, especially as the European Union undergoes internal changes. But one thing is 
certain: unless they can overcome their endemic judicial corruption problems, it is possible that 



















Table 1: Global Perceived Levels of Judicial Corruption 
 
































South Korea 3.6 
Zimbabwe 3.6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.5 
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All values were obtained from Transparency International’s 2011 Global Corruption Barometer Index, available at 








Table 2: Comparative Values for the CEE region 
 
* Note that Albania’s judicial corruption index score was taken Transparency International’s 2007 Global 
Corruption Barometer index, titled “Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 
2007.” Transparency International. Berlin, Germany: 1-25.  
*  All other judicial corruption values come from Transparency International’s 2011 Global Corruption Barometer, 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb201011/results, last accessed 19.03.17. 
* Note that Montenegro, Slovakia, and Estonia are not accounted for on this table because there is no TI score 
available for these countries.  
GDP/Capita, Rule of Law, and Political Pluralism and Participation values were obtained from the Freedom House 
Index’s 2016 Freedom in the World Report. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology, last 
accessed 19.03.17. 
Press Freedom values were obtained from Freedom House Index’s 2016 Freedom of the Press Report 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016, last accessed 19.03.17. 





























(out of 16) 
Ukraine 4.4 Not a member $3,082.50 Partly Free Semi-
presidential 
6 10 
Bulgaria 4.3 Member $7,712.80 Partly Free Parliamentary 10 14 
Croatia 4.1 Member $13,507.40 Partly Free Parliamentary 11 15 
Kosovo 4.1 Not a member Not available Partly Free Parliamentary 6 10 
Lithuania 4.0 Member $16,444.80 Free Semi-
presidential 
13 16 
Romania 4.0 Member $9,996.70 Partly Free Semi-
presidential 
12 14 
Moldova 3.9 Not a member $2,233.80 Partly Free Parliamentary 7 11 
Macedonia 
(FYR) 
3.9 Candidate $5,455.60 Not Free Parliamentary 7 10 
Serbia 3.9 Candidate $6,152.90 Partly Free Parliamentary 10 13 
Albania 3.8* Candidate $4,619.2 Partly Free Parliamentary 9 13 
Russia 3.7 Not a member $12,735.90 Not Free Semi-
presidential 
2 3 
Bosnia 3.5 Not a member $4,805.20 Partly Free Parliamentary 8 10 
Czech 
Republic 
3.5 Member $19,553.90 Free Parliamentary 14 15 
Slovenia 3.5 Member $23,962.60 Free Parliamentary 14 16 
Belarus 3.4 Not a member $8,040 Not Free Presidential 2 3 
Poland 3.3 Member $14,422.80 Free Parliamentary 13 16 
Latvia 3.2 Member $16,037.80 Free Parliamentary 12 14 
Hungary 2.9 Member $13,902.70 Partly Free Parliamentary 10 15 
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Government system values were obtained from the CIA World Factbook 2017, under the section titled 
“Government”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/, last accessed 11.04.17 
Values for EU membership status were obtained from the European Parliament’s website, under “Countries”, last 
accessed 27.03.17, at	https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en 
 
 
Table 3: Average of comparative values for CEE EU and non-EU member countries 
• An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was ran on the data presented above. Below are the findings: 
o An OLS regression with candidate countries as the reference category showed there was no 
statistical significance in average judicial corruption scores between candidate and EU member 
countries. There was also no statistically significant difference between candidate and non-EU 
member counties.  
o Another OLS regression with non-EU members as the reference category revealed that there was 
no statistical difference in average judicial corruption levels between non-EU member countries 
and candidate countries. There was also no statistically significant difference between non-EU 
members and EU member countries.   
All values were taken from Table 1 and split between EU, Candidate, and non-EU member countries. The original 
data sets came from the following sources:  
* Note that Albania’s judicial corruption index score was taken Transparency International’s 2007 Global 
Corruption Barometer index, titled “Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 
2007.” Transparency International. Berlin, Germany: 1-2, last accessed 19.03.17. 
*  All other judicial corruption values come from Transparency International’s 2011 Global Corruption Barometer, 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb201011/results, last accessed 19.03.17. 
* Note that Montenegro, Slovakia, and Estonia are not accounted for on this table because there is no TI score 
available for these countries.  
GDP/Capita, Rule of Law, and Political Pluralism and Participation values were obtained from the Freedom House 



























































Table 4: Average Comparative Scores for CEE Region 
 
Variable Average Regional Score 
Perceived Levels of Judicial Corruption 3.74 
GDP/Capita $10,745.09 
Rule of Law 9.22 
Political Pluralism and Participation 12.11 
 
* Note that Albania’s judicial corruption index score was taken Transparency International’s 2007 Global 
Corruption Barometer index, titled “Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 
2007.” Transparency International. Berlin, Germany: 1-2, last accessed 19.03.17. 
*  All other judicial corruption values come from Transparency International’s 2011 Global Corruption Barometer, 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb201011/results, last accessed 19.03.17. 
* Note that Montenegro, Slovakia, and Estonia are not accounted for on this table because there is no TI score 
available for these countries.  
GDP/Capita, Rule of Law, and Political Pluralism and Participation values were obtained from the Freedom House 





























Table 5: Overview of Albanian Judiciary 
*This table does not reflect changes made in the most recent judicial reform package passed in July 2016  
**All information for the High Council of Justice was obtained from EURALIU’s document, “High Council of 
Justice, Law”, passed in 2001 and last checked in 2016, last accessed on 18.03.17 at 
http://www.euralius.eu/index.php/en/library/albanian-legislation/send/16-high-council-of-justice/64-law-on-high-
council-of-justice-en. 
** All information for the Constitutional Court was obtained from the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Albania’s website, last accessed 16.03.17 at http://www.gjk.gov.al/web/Authorities_175_2.php. 
** All information for the High Court (Supreme Court) was obtained from the Supreme Court of the Republic of 















High Court (Supreme Court) 
 
• Highest court in Albania  
• Rules on charges 
brought against the 
President, Prime 
Minister, MP’s, and 
Constitutional Court 
judges 
• Reviews and oversees 
implementation of law 
by lower courts  
 
 
• 17 members, hold 9 year 
terms with no possibility 
of re-election 
• The president of the 
body is selected from 
within the court’s ranks  
 
• Appointed by the 




• The President of the 
court is appointed by 










• Reviews the 
constitutionality of laws, 
acts, and referendum 
results 
• Oversees disputes 
between branches of 
government  
• Rules on the removal of 
the President from office 
 
 
• 9 members, appointed 
for 9 year terms with no 
possibility of re-election  
 
• Appointed by the 
President of the 






High Council of Justice  
 
• Oversees first and 
second instance courts 
Evaluates, promotes, 
appoints, and transfers 
judges  
 
• 15 members, including 
the President of the 
Republic (Chair), the 
Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, the 
Minister of Justice 
• Three members are 
chosen by parliament 
and the other nine are 





• Parliament appoints 
three members and 
the NJC selects nine 
• The President of the 
Republic selects the 




Table 6: Final Results 
Country H1 H2 H3 H4 
Albania Supported Fail to support Supported Supported 
Romania Supported Fail to support Supported Supported 
 
H1: Countries with high levels of destabilizing political competition will have higher levels of judicial corruption. 
H2: Countries with parliamentary systems will have lower levels of judicial corruption.  
H3: European Union (EU) member and candidate countries will have lower levels of judicial corruption.  
H4: Countries with low levels of media freedom will have higher levels of judicial corruption. 
 
Table 7: Effect of EU Membership and Candidate Status (2000 – Present) on Judicial 
Corruption Levels 
 
Country 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2012 2012 - Present 
Albania Stagnant Slight decrease Slight decrease 
until 2010, and 
then substantial 
decrease after 




Romania Stagnant Decrease until 
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